Court of Appeals of Maryland.
check
PELICAN NATIONAL BANK
PROVIDENT BANK OF MARYLAND.
May 14, 2004.
BELL, C.J.
le only
if each
listed
payees
indorsed
in stacked formation on its face, without any grammatical connector or
it and,
since
appellee
the amount of $60,150.00, to payees as follows:
small notation that read “MEMO Fire–building.”
FN1. The appellant avers that the Bogdan property was financed initially by
First National Funding Corporation. That company sold the note and deed of
Having failed in its attempt to obtain reimbursement from the appellee for
imprope
rly
arguing
ve
pursuant
the mortgage holder and the insurance agent who adjusted the casualty claim.
to the
proceeds in a commercial account he held at the appellee bank. When the
payable
negotiating the check without Oceanmark’s endorsement, the appellant filed
to
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
American *333 Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 39 Md.App. 614, 386 A.2d 1254 (1978). The
court also rejected Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assoc. v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 29 F.Supp.2d 1129 (C.D.Cal.1998) as supporting the
So.2d 381, 383, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 222 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980)).
FN6. The payee designation in City First Mortgage Corp. v. Florida Residential
Property & Casualty, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 126 (Miami-Dade County
“Bay Village Inc Michael
Bijlani & Ron Delo & Assoc
5411 Grenada Blvd
Maryland, 369 Md. 659, 802 A.2d 438 (2002).
In this Court, the appellant argues that the Circuit Court erred when it granted
the appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied its motion. In so
ions is
that they
are
appellan
t dispute
that the
the
appellan
t asserts,
payees
in
stacked
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
of statutory interpretation, FN9 the canons of which are well settled.
FN8. Maryland Code (1975, 2002 Replacement Volume) ß 1-103 of the
Commercial Law Article provides:
“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of Titles 1 through 10 of this
article, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions, except that
Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997) ; Heat & Power
Corp., Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592, 578 A.2d 1202,
1206 (1990) (citations omitted). “Whether summary judgment is properly
as written and if, given the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, the
meaning and application of the statute is clear, we end our inquiry. Comptroller
of the Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567, 826 A.2d 467, 469 (2003). It is
Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992) (Citations
omitted). In seeking to “avoid constructions of a statute which is unreasonable,
illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense,” Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md.
Uniform
Commer
cial
Code, ß
3-110(d)
enunciat
es the
rules for
to an
instrume
nt made
examine
ß 3-
110(d)
in this
*337
case is
American *333 Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 39 Md.App. 614, 386 A.2d 1254 (1978). The
court also rejected Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assoc. v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 29 F.Supp.2d 1129 (C.D.Cal.1998) as supporting the
So.2d 381, 383, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 222 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980)).
FN6. The payee designation in City First Mortgage Corp. v. Florida Residential
Property & Casualty, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 126 (Miami-Dade County
“Bay Village Inc Michael
Bijlani & Ron Delo & Assoc
5411 Grenada Blvd
Maryland, 369 Md. 659, 802 A.2d 438 (2002).
In this Court, the appellant argues that the Circuit Court erred when it granted
the appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied its motion. In so
ions is
that they
are
appellan
t dispute
that the
the
appellan
t asserts,
payees
in
stacked
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
of statutory interpretation, FN9 the canons of which are well settled.
FN8. Maryland Code (1975, 2002 Replacement Volume) ß 1-103 of the
Commercial Law Article provides:
“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of Titles 1 through 10 of this
article, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions, except that
Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997) ; Heat & Power
Corp., Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592, 578 A.2d 1202,
1206 (1990) (citations omitted). “Whether summary judgment is properly
as written and if, given the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, the
meaning and application of the statute is clear, we end our inquiry. Comptroller
of the Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567, 826 A.2d 467, 469 (2003). It is
Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992) (Citations
omitted). In seeking to “avoid constructions of a statute which is unreasonable,
illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense,” Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md.
Uniform
Commer
cial
Code, ß
3-110(d)
enunciat
es the
rules for
to an
instrume
nt made
examine
ß 3-
110(d)
in this
*337
case is