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445 F.3d 105

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445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741

(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)

Robert Wayne CHALFANT, Appellee,

TITAN DISTRIBUTION, INC.; Titan International, Inc., Appellants.

Filed: Jan. 22, 2007.

Before , Chief Judge, SMITH and , Circuit Judges.

damages. The district court then awarded Chalfant $18,750 in front pay and denied Titan’s

post-trial motions. Titan appeals. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

The Honorable Ross A. Walters, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District

of Iowa, presiding by consent of the parties pursuant to .

Titan, a division of Titan International, Inc., hired Quintak, Inc. to run its tire mounting and

distribution operation. Quintak employees worked at Titan’s building and used Titan’s

equipment. In July 2002, Titan decided to cut costs by terminating Quintak and hiring its own

employees. William Campbell, president of Titan, announced that Titan would be hiring only a

portion of Quintak’s employees. All Quintak employees who wanted to work at Titan were

required to apply for a position with Titan and have a qualifying physical. Nadis Barucic and

Cheryl Luthin oversaw the application process.

Chalfant worked for Quintak as a second shift supervisor in the tire and wheel mounting

division. His duties included loading trucks with a forklift. Jerry Williams was Chalfant’s direct

supervisor, and Martin Craig Warren was Williams’s supervisor. At the time of Quintak’s

termination, Chalfant was 56-1/2 years old and had been working for Quintak for five years.

Chalfant had suffered a in 1992 and had undergone surgery and heart by-pass surgery in

1997. He had in his back, neck, ankle and hands.

Chalfant applied at Titan for the same position he had with Quintak, second shift supervisor in

the tire and wheel mounting division. He believed that this position would have the same

stated on a Voluntary Applicant Identification Survey that he was physically handicapped. He

based this conclusion on the fact that he had numerous physical ailments.

The final part of the application process, the physical examination, was conducted by Dr.

Anthony Sciorrota. Dr. Sciorrota determined that Chalfant could work in his current capacity,

including driving a forklift. Dr. Sciorrota also wrote on the exam record that Chalfant would

need to have a functional capacity examination if he was required to do heavy lifting. Barucic

it, along with the application, to Luthin. Chalfant continued working as a second shift

supervisor in the tire and wheel mounting division as an employee of Labor Ready, a

temporary work service used by Titan during the application period.

At some point after the physical exam, Barucic wrote “not pass px” on top of Chalfant’s

application. Barucic testified that he did not make the decision, but he did not know who told

him to write that note. Luthin, in her deposition testimony, said that she did not know who

decided that Chalfant failed the physical. However, during trial, Luthin changed her testimony

and said that Cheri Holley, corporate counsel, made the decision in August 2002. At trial,

Luthin testified that Barucic gave Holley the documents and Holley decided that Chalfant did

not pass the physical. Holley did not testify at the trial.

Circuit Judge.

based on Chalfant’s disability and awarded him $60,000 in back pay and $100,000 in punitive

445 F.3d 105

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445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741

(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)

After Titan refused to hire him, Chalfant took a job with AMPCO Systems, a parking ramp

management company, within two months. At AMPCO, Chalfant performed general service

work, walking up to five miles a day and lifting more than he did as a Quintak employee. His

wages were half of what he earned at Quintak. Once he started working at AMPCO, Chalfant

continued his job search by reviewing newspaper classifieds for other jobs. The day after he

the physical examination that was withdrawn after he failed the physical. During litigation,

however, Titan claimed that Chalfant was not hired as a second shift supervisor because the

entire second shift was going to be eliminated.

Chalfant sued Titan for disability and age discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, et seq., respectively, and

new trial, its motion for remittitur and its motion to alter or amend the front pay *988 award

under . Titan appeals.

Titan challenged the award of back pay in its motion for judgment as a matter of law.

However, we adopt the district court’s characterization of Titan’s back pay challenge as a

motion for remittitur.

and (iii) the district court abused its discretion in awarding Chalfant front pay. We address

each argument in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Titan argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial

because there was insufficient evidence for the jury’s verdict of discrimination and for the jury

445 F.3d 105

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445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741

(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)

matter of law nor did it abuse its discretion in denying Titan’s motion for a new trial.

1. Judgment as a Matter of Law

A plaintiff alleging discrimination based on a disability under the ADA must establish a prima

facie case. The three elements of this prima facie case are (1) that the plaintiff has “a disability

within the meaning of the ADA;” (2) that he is qualified “to perform the essential functions of

the job, with or without reasonable accommodation;” and (3) that he suffered “an adverse

employment action due to a disability.” . Titan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being

regarded as having such an impairment.” ; . A person is regarded as disabled if “(1) the

employer mistakenly believes that the employee has an impairment (which would substantially

limit one or more major life activity), or (2) the employer mistakenly believes that an actual*989

impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity.” .

(quoting ). If an employer believes that an employee is unable to perform “one specific job,”

then the employee is not regarded as disabled. .

Titan regarded Chalfant as disabled because it mistakenly believed that his physical ailments

substantially limited his ability to work in a broad range of jobs. Chalfant wrote in his

application packet that he considered himself physically handicapped because of his ailments.

Chalfant only applied for that position, and Titan declined to hire Chalfant for that one position.

If Titan did not believe that Chalfant was substantially limited in his ability to perform either a

class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, Titan argues that Chalfant cannot

show that he was regarded as disabled by Titan.

Giving all reasonable inferences to the jury’s verdict in favor of Chalfant, we find sufficient

445 F.3d 105

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445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741

(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)

evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Titan believed Chalfant’s impairments

substantially restricted his ability to work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various

classes. While Chalfant only applied for the second shift supervisor position, that position did

not require unique or strenuous lifting. Titan employees testified that there was no lifting

Chalfant would have been prevented from performing 70 percent of the jobs in the Dictionary

of Occupational Titles. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury

could have found that Titan did not believe that a person with Chalfant’s medical impairments

could work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Therefore, the jury

could have reasonably found that Titan regarded Chalfant as disabled.

prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent

on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to

perform the function; and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

(quoting ).

Titan first argues that it cannot identify the fundamental job duties of the position of a second

and heavy lifting at times. Palmer, the second shift supervisor who assumed Chalfant’s

duties, testified that he had to walk more in his position after Titan replaced Quintak.

Chalfant’s doctor, Dr. Jeffrey Schoon, testified that Chalfant could not lift more than five

pounds or walk more than one-half mile in one day. With this evidence, Titan argues that

Chalfant would not have been able to meet the requirements of the second shift supervisor

employee during the first week of August, before he was told that he would not be hired.

Furthermore, the jury heard evidence concerning Chalfant’s new position at AMPCO. In that

position, Chalfant testified that he walked over five miles each day. Chalfant argued that he

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445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741

(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)

Chalfant’s vocational expert considered Chalfant’s limitations and testified that he would be

able to perform the supervisor position as described by Titan. The jury heard the evidence of

both parties, and that evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that Chalfant

was able to perform the essential functions of the second shift supervisor position.

The third element of the prima facie case requires a showing that the person suffered an

motivating factor in the employer’s decision for the adverse action.

Titan argues that Chalfant did not present sufficient evidence to establish a specific link

between Chalfant’s alleged disability and the adverse action of refusing to hire him. The

position is no longer in existence, and Campbell testified that he made the decision to

terminate the second shift at the beginning of 2002. Therefore, Chalfant allegedly was not

because he failed the physical exam. Titan even provided this reason for not hiring Chalfant

to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. It was not until the litigation proceedings that Titan

claimed that the reason Chalfant was not hired was that the position had been eliminated. On

these facts, a reasonable jury could decide that there was a specific link between the disability

discrimination and Titan’s decision not to hire Chalfant.

also know that it “may be acting in violation of federal law.”

Titan argues that there was insufficient evidence for the district court to submit the issue of

punitive damages to the jury. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Chalfant, we find

sufficient evidence to show that Titan acted with malice or reckless indifference in its decision

not to hire Chalfant. Campbell testified that he and Holley knew that disability discrimination

acting in violation of federal law. In short order, Titan accepted that Chalfant passed his

445 F.3d 105

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445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741

(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)

445 F.3d 105

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445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741

(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)

omitted). The purpose of front pay is to address the equitable needs of the employee,

including his ability to find another position with a similar salary.

Titan and Chalfant agreed that reinstatement was not practical. While Chalfant sought an

award of front pay that would compensate him for six years, the district court determined that

front pay should cover only one year. The district court awarded Chalfant $18,750,

representing the difference between Chalfant’s wages and health insurance benefits at

AMPCO and what they would have been at Titan for the one-year period. The district court

reasoned that Chalfant should be able to find employment similar to the Titan position within

one year. Titan argues that the district court erred in providing this award because Chalfant

did not attempt to find a comparable job. The district court, however, properly considered

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.