978-1285770178 Case Printout Case CPC-11-04 Part 2

subject Type Homework Help
subject Pages 9
subject Words 3166
subject Authors Roger LeRoy Miller

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eral claims are analytically indistinguishable. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1380 (8th Cir.1996).
Among the authorities relied on by Lewis is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104
required to wear contact lenses instead of glasses, see Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F.Supp. 763, 790
(D.D.C.1973), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C.Cir.1976). In a
more recent example in the Ninth Circuit, an airline policy requiring female flight attendants to be comparatively
thinner than male attendants was found discriminatory. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th
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© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
that Cullinan or Nosbisch could inspect a front desk applicant's look before any hiring. Heartland's termination letter
to Lewis only relied on the January 23 meeting she had with Cullinan. Only later did Heartland allege poor job per-
formance would justify her termination. Lewis asserts further that Heartland did not follow its own written termina-
tion procedure, which includes assessing the employee's previous disciplinary record (Lewis had none) and conduct-
ing an investigation before making the termination decision. Kristi Nosbisch, Heartland's equal employment officer
responsible for directing investigations of employment discrimination, knew that Lewis had complained that Culli-
nan's requirements were illegal, but she nonetheless relied on Cullinan's account of their meeting without asking
Lewis for her own.
At this stage of the case, the question is not whether Lewis will prevail on her claim but rather whether she has of-
preme Court stated, “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group[.]Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, 109 S.Ct. 1775.
III.
[13][14] We turn next to Lewis' retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees
In making out a prima facie retaliation claim, Lewis need not prove the merits of the underlying claim of sex dis-
crimination. She can establish protected conduct “as long as [she] had a reasonable, good faith belief that there were
grounds for a claim of discrimination[.]” Id. at 1118. Lewis went into the January 23 meeting with Cullinan after
learning about the “Midwestern girl look” comment. Lewis had already held her job for nearly a month and under-
stood that other transferred employees in her situation had not been required to submit to a second interview. She
phatically stated that she thought it was illegal for us to ask her to interview, and illegal for us to schedule her to
another shift” and that Lewis said she thought the interview demand was because of her appearance. These state-
ments cannot reasonably be characterized as anything other than opposition to illegal action.
No one questions that Lewis was subjected to an adverse employment action, and there is ample record evidence to
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© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
that Cullinan or Nosbisch could inspect a front desk applicant's look before any hiring. Heartland's termination letter
to Lewis only relied on the January 23 meeting she had with Cullinan. Only later did Heartland allege poor job per-
formance would justify her termination. Lewis asserts further that Heartland did not follow its own written termina-
tion procedure, which includes assessing the employee's previous disciplinary record (Lewis had none) and conduct-
ing an investigation before making the termination decision. Kristi Nosbisch, Heartland's equal employment officer
responsible for directing investigations of employment discrimination, knew that Lewis had complained that Culli-
nan's requirements were illegal, but she nonetheless relied on Cullinan's account of their meeting without asking
Lewis for her own.
At this stage of the case, the question is not whether Lewis will prevail on her claim but rather whether she has of-
preme Court stated, “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group[.]Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, 109 S.Ct. 1775.
III.
[13][14] We turn next to Lewis' retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees
In making out a prima facie retaliation claim, Lewis need not prove the merits of the underlying claim of sex dis-
crimination. She can establish protected conduct “as long as [she] had a reasonable, good faith belief that there were
grounds for a claim of discrimination[.]” Id. at 1118. Lewis went into the January 23 meeting with Cullinan after
learning about the “Midwestern girl look” comment. Lewis had already held her job for nearly a month and under-
stood that other transferred employees in her situation had not been required to submit to a second interview. She
phatically stated that she thought it was illegal for us to ask her to interview, and illegal for us to schedule her to
another shift” and that Lewis said she thought the interview demand was because of her appearance. These state-
ments cannot reasonably be characterized as anything other than opposition to illegal action.
No one questions that Lewis was subjected to an adverse employment action, and there is ample record evidence to

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