C.A.8 (Iowa),2010.
Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C.
591 F.3d 1033, 108 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 449, 93 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,797
No. 08-3860.
Submitted: Oct. 21, 2009.
Filed: Jan. 21, 2010.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 2, 2010.
man resource director for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act
(ICRA), alleging that she was terminated from her position as a front desk worker at a hotel for not conforming to
sex stereotypes. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Robert W. Pratt, Chief Judge,
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Murphy, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on discrimination claim, and
(2) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on retaliation claim.
Reversed and remanded.
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Female sex appeal is not a bona fide occupational qualification for flight attendants and ticket agents. Civil Rights
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Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether director’s alleged requirements that hotel front desk worker be
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
[8] Civil Rights 78 1535
in an employment discrimination suit under Title VII; plaintiffs may satisfy this element through other types of evi–
dence. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
[9] Civil Rights 78 1166
[10] Civil Rights 78 1177
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78 Civil Rights
78IV Remedies Under Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes
78k1543 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
78k1549 k. Sex discrimination. Most Cited Cases
78II Employment Practices
78k1164 Sex Discrimination in General
78k1166 k. Practices prohibited or required in general; elements. Most Cited Cases
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular
employment decision; the plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Heartland Inns operates a group of hotels, primarily in Iowa. Brenna Lewis began work for Heartland in July 2005
and successfully filled several positions for the chain for a year and a half before the actions at issue here. She start-
ed as the night auditor at Heartland’s Waterloo Crossroads location; at that job she worked at the front desk from
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. There were also two other shifts for “guest service representatives”: the A shift from 7:00
a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and the B shift from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Lewis’ manager at Waterloo Crossroads, Linda Gow-
dy, testified that Lewis “did her job well” and that she had requested a pay raise for her. Heartland recorded two
merit based pay raises for Lewis. The record also indicates that Gowdy received a customer comment praising Lew-
is.
sion over the phone from Cullinan on December 15 to offer Lewis a full time A shift position. Neither Headington
nor Stifel conducted an interview of Lewis before extending their offers, and the record does not reflect that Culli-
nan ever told them a subsequent interview would be necessary. Lewis accepted the offer for the A shift at Ankeny
and began training with her predecessor, Morgan Hammer. At the end of December 2006 Lewis took over the job.
kind of look.” Lewis prefers to wear loose fitting clothing, including men’s button down shirts and slacks. She
avoids makeup and wore her hair short at the time. Lewis has been mistaken for a male and referred to as “tomboy-
ish.”
[1] Cullinan told Stifel that Heartland “took two steps back” when Lewis replaced Morgan Hammer who has been
and receiving reservations. FN1
FN1. Heartland has not tried to suggest that the “Midwestern girl look” or prettiness were bona fide occu-
pational qualifications for its clerk job, as might conceivably be the case with the cheerleaders referenced in
the dissent. Such an affirmative defense requires proof that the qualification is “necessary to the normal op-
eration of that particular business or enterprise[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). For example, “female sex ap–
that hiring for the front desk position would require a second interview. Video equipment was also purchased to
enable Cullinan or Kristi Nosbisch, Heartland’s Human Resource Director, to see an applicant before extending any
offer. When Lewis’ former manager at Altoona, Jennifer Headington, raised a question about the new arrangements,
been said about her appearance, and she protested that other staff members had not been required to have second
interviews for the job. Lewis told Cullinan that she believed a second interview was being required only because she
lacked the “Midwestern girl look.” She questioned whether the interview was lawful, and she cried throughout the
meeting.
Lewis does not challenge Heartland’s official dress code, which imposes comparable standards of professional ap–
pearance on male and female staff members, and her termination letter did not cite any violation of its dress code.
The theory of her case is that the evidence shows Heartland enforced a de facto requirement that a female employee
conform to gender stereotypes in order to work the A shift. There was no such requirement in the company’s written
policies.
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), Iowa Code § 216.1 et
seq.
II.
[2] Heartland was not entitled to prevail on summary judgment unless it showed that plaintiff Brenna Lewis had not
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to analyze the viability of Heartland’s summary judgment motion.
To make a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Lewis had to show that “(1) she was a mem-
ber of the protected group; (2) she was qualified to perform the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) circumstances permit an inference of discrimination.” Bearden v. Int‘l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 828, 831 (8th
Cir.2008). Such a showing creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination, requiring Heartland to produce a legit-
imate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Id. at 831-32. The burden then returns to Lewis to prove
that Heartland’s proffered reason for firing her is pretextual. Id. at 832. The parties agree that Lewis‘ ICRA and fed-
[8] Civil Rights 78 1535
in an employment discrimination suit under Title VII; plaintiffs may satisfy this element through other types of evi–
dence. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
[9] Civil Rights 78 1166
[10] Civil Rights 78 1177
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78 Civil Rights
78IV Remedies Under Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes
78k1543 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
78k1549 k. Sex discrimination. Most Cited Cases
78II Employment Practices
78k1164 Sex Discrimination in General
78k1166 k. Practices prohibited or required in general; elements. Most Cited Cases
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular
employment decision; the plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Heartland Inns operates a group of hotels, primarily in Iowa. Brenna Lewis began work for Heartland in July 2005
and successfully filled several positions for the chain for a year and a half before the actions at issue here. She start-
ed as the night auditor at Heartland’s Waterloo Crossroads location; at that job she worked at the front desk from
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. There were also two other shifts for “guest service representatives”: the A shift from 7:00
a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and the B shift from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Lewis’ manager at Waterloo Crossroads, Linda Gow-
dy, testified that Lewis “did her job well” and that she had requested a pay raise for her. Heartland recorded two
merit based pay raises for Lewis. The record also indicates that Gowdy received a customer comment praising Lew-
is.
sion over the phone from Cullinan on December 15 to offer Lewis a full time A shift position. Neither Headington
nor Stifel conducted an interview of Lewis before extending their offers, and the record does not reflect that Culli-
nan ever told them a subsequent interview would be necessary. Lewis accepted the offer for the A shift at Ankeny
and began training with her predecessor, Morgan Hammer. At the end of December 2006 Lewis took over the job.
kind of look.” Lewis prefers to wear loose fitting clothing, including men’s button down shirts and slacks. She
avoids makeup and wore her hair short at the time. Lewis has been mistaken for a male and referred to as “tomboy-
ish.”
[1] Cullinan told Stifel that Heartland “took two steps back” when Lewis replaced Morgan Hammer who has been
and receiving reservations. FN1
FN1. Heartland has not tried to suggest that the “Midwestern girl look” or prettiness were bona fide occu-
pational qualifications for its clerk job, as might conceivably be the case with the cheerleaders referenced in
the dissent. Such an affirmative defense requires proof that the qualification is “necessary to the normal op-
eration of that particular business or enterprise[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). For example, “female sex ap–
that hiring for the front desk position would require a second interview. Video equipment was also purchased to
enable Cullinan or Kristi Nosbisch, Heartland’s Human Resource Director, to see an applicant before extending any
offer. When Lewis’ former manager at Altoona, Jennifer Headington, raised a question about the new arrangements,
been said about her appearance, and she protested that other staff members had not been required to have second
interviews for the job. Lewis told Cullinan that she believed a second interview was being required only because she
lacked the “Midwestern girl look.” She questioned whether the interview was lawful, and she cried throughout the
meeting.
Lewis does not challenge Heartland’s official dress code, which imposes comparable standards of professional ap–
pearance on male and female staff members, and her termination letter did not cite any violation of its dress code.
The theory of her case is that the evidence shows Heartland enforced a de facto requirement that a female employee
conform to gender stereotypes in order to work the A shift. There was no such requirement in the company’s written
policies.
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), Iowa Code § 216.1 et
seq.
II.
[2] Heartland was not entitled to prevail on summary judgment unless it showed that plaintiff Brenna Lewis had not
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to analyze the viability of Heartland’s summary judgment motion.
To make a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Lewis had to show that “(1) she was a mem-
ber of the protected group; (2) she was qualified to perform the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) circumstances permit an inference of discrimination.” Bearden v. Int‘l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 828, 831 (8th
Cir.2008). Such a showing creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination, requiring Heartland to produce a legit-
imate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Id. at 831-32. The burden then returns to Lewis to prove
that Heartland’s proffered reason for firing her is pretextual. Id. at 832. The parties agree that Lewis‘ ICRA and fed-