on Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 33–1005 (2007). The Bergers unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the
complaint against them for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Arizona Tile then moved to
having failed to pay to Arizona Tile the funds received from the retailers on behalf of the owner-occupants of homes
in which Designer Surfaces had installed countertops. Finally, Arizona Tile argued that the breach of fiduciary duty
arose out of contract, entitling it to attorneys’ fees.
¶ 6 The Defendants also moved for summary judgment. They argued that they could not be personally liable on the
FN3. Arizona Tile, however, had provided affidavits from eleven persons who avowed that they owned
their homes before they had purchased granite materials from a retailer and that Designer Surfaces had in-
stalled the materials in their homes. On appeal, Defendants do not assert that a factual dispute existed re-
garding whether those who received the supplies from Arizona Tile were residential owner-occupants.
[1][2] ¶ 8 The Defendants first argue that the superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and should have
granted the Bergers’ motion to dismiss the complaint. When a defendant challenges the existence of personal juris-
diction, the plaintiff must come forward with facts establishing a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, at which time
the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the showing. Macpherson v. Taglione, 158 Ariz. 309, 312, 762 P.2d 596,
599 (App.1988). However, the court should resolve any conflicts “in the affidavits and pleadings” in the plaintiff’s
(1976), to assert that corporate officers or directors are not liable for a corporation’s torts unless they authorized or
participated in the challenged actions or the corporation was their alter ego.
FN4. Although the Bergers also argue here that § 33-1005 did not impose a duty on them, that issue is more
properly addressed in the summary judgment discussion that follows.