978-1285770178 Case Printout Case CPC-02-07

Tex.App.–El Paso,2012.

Garcia v. Lucero

366 S.W.3d 275 Court of Appeals of Texas,

[3] Judgment 228 178

[4] Partnership 289 105

289 Partnership

289III Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Partners

289III(C) Actions Between Partners

[5] Estoppel 156 85

156 Estoppel

156III Equitable Estoppel

156III(B) Grounds of Estoppel

228 Judgment

228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding

228k182 Motion or Other Application

228k183 k. In general. Most Cited Cases

[7] Judgment 228 181(21)

228 Judgment

228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding

228k181 Grounds for Summary Judgment

Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex.1994)(holding that damages for lost profits must be proven

[5] The supplemental petition raises a claim for promissory estoppel. The second motion for summary judgment

asserts that Garcia cannot recover for promissory estoppel because there is no evidence of a legally enforceable

promise, that Garcia substantially and detrimentally relied on a promise, or that any reliance was foreseeable. The

elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise; (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor; and (3)

substantial reliance by the promisee to her detriment. See Kelly v. Rio Grande Computerland Group, 128 S.W.3d

Garcia points to the following language in her supplemental petition: “The acts and omissions of the defendant

form the basis [of] promissory estoppel in favor of the plaintiff, because the defendant promised that the apartments

were the property of both plaintiff and defendant.” The second summary judgment motion states that Garcia has no

evidence “[t]hat a legally enforceable promise had been made. Relying on a vague, indefinite promise of future in-

come is unreasonable as a matter of law.” Garcia argues that it was wrong for Lucero to characterize the promise

judgment order granted this motion. Therefore, the second summary judgment disposed of all the claims that re-

mained pending, and constitutes a final judgment. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001).

Moreover, the second summary judgment motion asserts that there is no evidence of a legally enforceable

promise. Because a promise is the first element of a promissory estoppel claim, the motion clearly challenges an

element that Garcia must prove. It is irrelevant that the motion goes on to describe Garcia’s claim as a “vague, indef-

[7] In Issue Seventeen, Garcia argues that she presented more than a scintilla of evidence on the promissory es-

toppel elements that are challenged in the second summary judgment motion: (1) a promise; (2) substantial and det-

rimental reliance; and (3) that reliance was reasonably foreseeable by Lucero. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Garcia, we agree.

Garcia’s affidavit indicates that she and Lucero had a romantic relationship. According to the affidavit, Lucero

asked Garcia to manage the apartment complex after telling her that they were co-owners and that the complex

would be used to fund their retirement. Given the nature of the offer and their relationship, Lucero could reasonably

foresee that Garcia would rely on his promise. She did rely on it, to her detriment, by managing the complex without

pay and without help from Lucero for seven years. Lucero even acknowledged in his e–mail that Garcia had “100%

of the apartments” and that she deserves some recompense.

Issue Seventeen is sustained.

Detrimental Reliance

The supplemental petition asserts: “The acts and omissions of the defendant form the basis of a cause of action

in detrimental reliance in favor of the plaintiff, because the defendant stated that the apartments belonged to both

osource Drilling Servs., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 48 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). There, the court referred

to detrimental reliance as the “doctrinal sibling” of promissory estoppel. Id. at 50. The plaintiff had sued for, among

other things, “detrimental reliance.” Id. In apparent reliance on the nomenclature chosen by the plaintiff, the appel-

late court stated:

“promissory estoppel”). Furthermore, the Roberts court evaluated the plaintiff’s claim under the criteria that apply to

promissory estoppel. See 757 S.W.2d at 50.

Like the court in Roberts, we would not penalize a plaintiff for referring to promissory estoppel as “detrimental

reliance,” but, also like the Roberts court, we would evaluate a detrimental reliance claim under the same criteria as

a promissory estoppel claim. It is not a distinct cause of action. See Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Courtney, 946 S.W.2d 464,

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (Keyes, J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing) (discussing the conflicting

cases); see also Bailey v. Gulf States Util. Co., 27 S.W.3d 713, 715–16 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (af-

firming no-evidence summary judgment on ground that “oppressive conduct” is not a separate cause of action, with-

out addressing whether no-evidence motion was appropriate vehicle). Under the circumstances of this case, we see

no point in reversing the summary judgment merely to remand for further proceedings on a non-existent claim.FN2

FN2. There may be circumstances in which it would not be appropriate to raise a legal issue in a no–

evidence motion. We confine our holding here to the facts before us.

Issue Nineteen is overruled.

CONCLUSION

The first summary judgment order is reversed. The second summary judgment order is reversed with respect to

the promissory estoppel claim, but affirmed with respect to the breach of contract and detrimental reliance claims.

The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.