exhausted or fatigued that it should have foreseen that working him three shifts in one 24-hour period
would create a foreseeable risk of harm to motorists such as plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that defendant failed
to preserve that argument and that, in any event, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s
ruling.
There is evidence that defendant controlled all work assignments. Therefore, defendant knew or had
reason to know of the number of hours Theurer had been working. There also is evidence that defendant
ordinarily did not use high school students to work after midnight, and when it did, it tried to limit that late
shift to once a week. Defendant also had a policy of not working its employees two shifts in one day.
According to at least one of the defendant’s managers, those policies were adopted and enforced out of
concern that employees not become overly tired on the job. In fact, defendant was aware that at least two
of its employees had recently had automobile accidents as a result of falling asleep while driving home
after working late shifts. There is evidence that, during and after his late-night shift, Theurer was visibly
fatigued, and that defendant’s managers were on site and saw Theurer throughout that shift. It is
undisputed that defendant knew that Theurer was a high school student, and that most of the high school
students who worked there drove to work in their own cars. On the basis of that evidence, a reasonable
jury could conclude that defendant knew or should have known that working Theurer so many hours
would impair his ability to drive home safely.
Defendant and the dissent insist that, because Theurer “volunteered” to work so many hours, the
evidence simply is insufficient to establish defendant’s negligence, as a matter of law. The evidence
shows that defendant – not its employees – generally controlled all work assignments and that defendant
penalized its employees for not working as assigned.
Second, even indulging the assumption that Theurer volunteered for his all-night shift, the evidence still is
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Defendant’s managers knew that Theurer already had been
scheduled to work more than its own policies permitted. Moreover, they saw him in a visibly fatigued state
and continued to work him as scheduled. In that regard, defendant was much like a bartender who served
alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated person who then caused an automobile accident that harmed
another. No one required the intoxicated person to have the extra drink. He or she asked for the drink and
“volunteered” to pay for it. Nevertheless, the courts have held that, because the bartender saw the driver
in a visibly intoxicated state, and it is reasonably foreseeable that the customer will drive when he or she
leaves, the bartender is liable for the consequences of the automobile accident.
Finally, defendant itself conceded at trial that, if it had allowed Theurer to “volunteer” to work around the
clock three full days, the “court can almost say as a matter of law, allowing someone to work that long
without any rest or sleep might very well constitute affirmative misconduct by an employer, but [it] may be
a matter of degrees….”
Defendant, the dissent and the amid curiae the National Council of Chain Restaurants and the Defense
Research Institute, Inc., implore us to reverse the trial court’s judgment on the public policy ground that
the result is “patently unreasonable,” “shocking,” “farfetched” and “goes beyond the commonsense
application of tort law.” However, that argument was not made to the trial court, and we will not consider it
for the first time on appeal.
Affirmed.
Answers and Key Discussion Items
1. The court ruled that it did, although the decision is one that is different from most states and their
liability standard. However, the legal standard is only a starting point. McDonald’s did set in motion a
series of events that sent a sleep-deprived employee out onto the roads. There are many underlying