Business Ethics, 8e Jennings
eventual government takeover of Fannie because of the drop in real estate values, the resulting mortgage
defaults, and a portfolio so large that there could not be sufficient guarantees without federal intervention.
Answers and Key Discussion Items
1. Point out to the students that the external evaluation process has not been effective in detecting
fraudulent or weak company structures and ineffectual boards. This case is yet another illustration
that one cannot equate social responsibility with the basic virtue ethics. A company can be socially
responsible in its community and still engage in earnings manipulation that eventually rises to the
level of fraud. Virtue/Aristotelian ethics are different from the caring/community ethics of social
responsibility. There also does not appear to be a connection between corporate governance and
social responsibility. A company can be socially responsible and still have a weak board and poor
processes. In fact, note for the students that they will be studying a few cases in which weak boards
allowed excessive social responsibility that then brought attention to the officers of the company for
their noblesse oblige.
2. The signals at Fannie Mae that were missed included phenomenal earnings performance that just
kept going; an officer team completely focused on the share price and numbers because their
bonuses and compensation were tied to that performance; promised continuing double-digit growth;
flexible accounting treatment for assets and loan quality; bonus plans tied to EPS with a specific
number in mind; off-the-books losses; amortization policy flexibility; and creative accounting terms
such as “arbitrary volatility.” Mr. Barnes tried to raise the red flag on all of these practices but he was
rebuffed within the culture of Fannie Mae because of the focus on EPS, the high success of the
company, etc.
3. Incentive plans and bonuses should be encased in a set of values, a credo if you will. And those who
are responsible for the administration of internal controls who are covered under bonus plans seems
to be conflicted and cannot be counted on to maintain those controls or even respond to questions
and concerns raised by employees about the plans.
4. Dealing with volatility was not the issue. Those at Fannie Mae were using volatility formulas to
manage earnings so as to meet goals for incentive plans. The changes were not necessary from a
true financial picture perspective; they were made to suit the needs for earnings figures at the time.
5. The pep talk was strictly numbers based. And the executive presented the goal as a “no excuses”
proposition. The 6.46 EPS became, in the words of the office, “a moral obligation.” That talk coupled
with the “no more surprises” philosophy almost guaranteed that employees would remain silent about
issues and concerns. And the way Barnes was treated also sent a powerful signal to the culture that
dissent and questions were not appropriate. There are some lessons for students about constantly
talking about numbers with no parameters on achieving those numbers or even a philosophy of no
excuses for not achieving those numbers. Also, there was little discussion of ethics, values, lines not
to cross in reaching goals. The culture was consumed with meeting the earnings figure.
The promise of “too big to fail” was one that indicated institutions such as Fannie Mae, AIG, and
Goldman could not be allowed to fail because of the impact their failures would have on the markets
and, as a result, on the economic system. If there is a known risk in investment, those who are held
accountable for that risk are more measured and careful, according to the moral hazard theory. The
moral hazard theory could have helped Fannie in its rapid expansion. If it knew that it was on the line
in the event the mortgages failed, its expansion may not have been as rapid. For Countrywide, its
expansion into riskier home mortgages and the writing of mortgages without income verification or
sufficient down payment would have been more measured because the company would have been
on the line. Instead, it was passing the risk along to Fannie and Fannie perceived that the federal
government would rescue it. Finally, if individuals understand that they are responsible for the risk of
a decline in property values or a decline in their income or loss of job and that such circumstances
may make it difficult to continue with their house payments, they are more measured in the decisions
they make about their type of mortgage, the size of the mortgage, the down payment, and other
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