The qualitative tool that remains untapped by investors in evaluating companies, portfolios, and
developing problems is the ethical culture of companies. The culture of a company is as determinative of
returns (indeed, perhaps more so) than anything an Excel spreadsheet can produce for pro forma
optimism. Quantitative optimism should be tempered by qualitative ethical culture factors whenever we
evaluate a company, an investment firm, or the leadership skills of those running either.
The MF Global collapse reflects a pattern similar to that of other collapsed companies on Wall Street. The
pattern has repeated yet again and another company has collapsed as it attempted to defy logic, reason,
and the inevitability that its failure to disclose bad news would be its downfall. However, the bright spot is
that we can learn from MF Global the same lessons that we should have learnt from the era of the
savings and loans collapses, the dot-com fraud, the Enron period, and the 2008 collapses.
1. If the numbers sound too good to be true, indeed if they defy market reasoning, they are too good to
be true. Knowing the numbers is not enough – how did they get those numbers and what patterns are
emerging in the reporting of those numbers are two critical pieces of information in assessing
performance.
2. Always question the icon. Past performance and recognition are never good determinants of success
going forward.
3. Watch the philanthropy. Remember the adage of Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The louder he spoke of his
honor, the faster we counted our spoons.”
4. Follow board meetings, board agendas, board activity, and board involvement. Be certain the board is
questioning the icon.
5. Check relationships between and among board members and regulators – the closer the
relationships and the more relationships there are, the more slack the company may have. MF Global
helps us to realize that regulatory slack does not always serve investors or customers well in terms of
risk and protection of funds. Conflicts matter because they affect judgment.
6. How are we performing at a level so much better than others? Why do we pursue aggressive
accounting practices? Do we fancy ourselves different from others? Above the fray? Not subject to
the ordinary requirements and rules of business?
As a result, MF Global customers are left in limbo, unable to withdraw their funds and unclear about
whether they even have any funds to withdraw.
When there are conflicts of interest present between and among those responsible for regulation or
oversight of a company (whether board member or public official), the result is less scrutiny, favoritism,
and a diagnosis bias that prevents an objective look at what is really happening at the company and
examination of vulnerabilities. Conflicts of interest do not always produce the eye-popping
self-enrichment. Often the more damaging conflicts of interest are those in which regulators and board
members choose to think the best, despite signals to the contrary. Those charged with oversight simply
conclude, “Oh, Jon is a friend. He would never do such a thing.” That conclusion ends the inquiries that
are needed, particularly with high-risk companies.
Take a gander at the money management skills at former Senator Jon Corzine’s MF Global firm and you
witness activities that give a whole new meaning to the term “shell game.” What has emerged about the
frantic transfers of funds during MF Global’s final days before bankruptcy is disturbing on so many levels,
but there are two shining exemplars amongst the rubble and now emerging ruffian tactics of the firm
taking money from Peter to pay Paul, even as Peter was clueless about the use of his funds. Oh, what
backbone was demonstrated amongst the desperation!
As MF Global tried to transfer funds to settle accounts with trading partners, the folks at JPMorgan Chase
put out a big, “Whoa, partner!” and questioned the source of the funds being used. The bank with a
backbone inquired as to whether MF Global was using customer account funds in violation of CFTC rules.
JPMorgan wouldn’t even take the assurances of a backroom flunky that MF Global responded with; it
wanted Mr. Corzine to provide a written guarantee that the funds were not coming from customer
accounts. That wily chairman Corzine handed the request for a written guarantee off to MF Global’s
general counsel, Laurie Ferber. Ms. Ferber refused such assurances on the grounds that MF Global did