ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS
1. Kirkland conveyed a farm to Sandler to have and to hold for and during his life and on
Sandler’s death to Rubin. Some years thereafter, oil was discovered in the vicinity.
Sandler thereupon made an oil and gas lease, and the oil company set up its machinery
to begin drilling operations. Rubin then filed suit to enjoin the operations. Assuming an
injunction to be the proper form of remedy, what decision?
2. Smith owned Blackacre in fee simple absolute. In section 3 of a properly executed will,
Smith devised Blackacre as follows: “I devise my farm Blackacre to my son Darwin so
long as it is used as a farm.” Sections 5 and 6 of the will made gifts to persons other than
Darwin. The last clause of Smith’s will provided: “All the remainder of my real and
personal property not disposed of heretofore in this will, I devise and bequeath to
Stanford University.”
Smith died in 2011, survived by her son Darwin. Smith’s estate has been administered.
Darwin has been offered $100,000 for Blackacre if he can convey title to it in fee simple.
What interests in Blackacre were created by Smith’s will?
3. Panessi leased to Barnes, for a term of ten years beginning May 1, certain premises
located at 527–529 Main Street in Cleveland. The premises were improved with a
three-story building, the first floor being occupied by stores and the upper stories by
apartments. On May 1 of the following year, Barnes leased one of the apartments to
Clinton for one year. On July 5, a fire destroyed the second and third floors of the
building. The first floor was not burned but was rendered unusable. Neither the lease
from Panessi to Barnes nor the lease from Barnes to Clinton contained any provision
regarding loss by fire. Discuss the liability of Barnes and Clinton to continue to pay rent.
Answer: Tenant’s Obligations: Destruction of the Premises. Barnes is liable for rental
after the destruction of the premises, but Clinton is not liable. The lessee of an entire
4. Ames leased an apartment to Boor at $200 a month, payable the last day of each month.
The term of the written lease was from January 1, 2013, through April 30, 2014. On
March 15, 2013, Boor moved out, telling Ames that he disliked all the other tenants.
Ames replied, “Well, you’re no prize as a tenant; I probably can get more rent from
someone more agreeable.” Ames and Boor then had a minor physical altercation in
which neither was injured. Boor sent the apartment keys to Ames by mail. Ames wrote
Boor, “It will be my pleasure to hold you for every penny you owe me. I am renting the
apartment on your behalf to Clay until April 30, 2011, at $175 a month.” Boor had paid
his rent through February 28, 2013. Clay entered the premises on April 1, 2013. How
much rent, if any, may Ames recover from Boor?
Answer: Tenant’s Obligations: Eviction or Abandonment. Boor is liable to Ames for the
rent ($600) that accrued on March 31, 2010, and for $175 a month thereafter until April
30, 2011. A lease vests in the lessee’s exclusive possession of the premises for its
duration. He gains an estate in the land. He cannot relieve himself of his rent obligation
by abandoning the premises. His promise to pay rent is an “independent covenant,” and
he continues to be liable on it even though he abandons the premises.
5. Jay signed a two-year lease containing a clause that expressly prohibited subletting.
After six months, Jay asked the landlord for permission to sublet the apartment for one
year. The landlord refused. This angered Jay, and he immediately assigned his right
under the lease to Kay. Kay was a distinguished gentleman, and Jay knew that everyone
would consider him a desirable tenant. Is Jay’s assignment of his lease to Kay valid?
Answer: Assignment of a Leasehold. Jay’s assignment of his lease to Kay is valid. The
lease prohibited subletting but contained no provision forbidding an assignment. The law
6. In 2005, Roy Martin and his wife, Alice, their son, Hiram, and Hiram’s wife, Myrna
acquired title to a 240-acre farm. The deed ran to Roy Martin and Alice Martin, the
father and mother, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and to Hiram Martin
and Myrna Martin, the son and his wife, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
Alice Martin died in 2007, and in 2010, Roy Martin married Agnes Martin. By his will,
Roy Martin bequeathed and devised his entire estate to Agnes Martin. When Roy Martin
died in 2015, Hiram and Myrna Martin assumed complete control of the farm. State the
interest in the farm, if any, of Agnes, Hiram, and Myrna Martin on the death of Roy
Martin.
Answer: Joint Tenancy/Tenancy in Common. When Alice Martin died, Roy Martin, her
husband, as surviving joining tenant in one-half of the farm, became sole owner of that
half of the title. Roy Martin’s death did not cast his half of the title upon his son, Hiram
7. In her will, Teressa granted a life estate to Amos in certain real estate, with remainder to
Brenda and Clive in joint tenancy. All the rest of Teressa’s estate was left to Hillman
College. While going to Teressa’s funeral, the car in which Amos, Brenda, and Clive were
riding was wrecked. Brenda was killed, Clive died a few minutes later, and Amos died on
his way to the hospital. Who is entitled to the real estate in question?
8. Otis Olson, the owner of two adjoining city lots, A and B, built a house on each. He laid
a drainpipe from lot B across lot A to the main sewer pipe under the alley beyond lot A.
Olson then sold and conveyed lot A to Fred Ford. The deed, which made no mention of
the drainpipe, was promptly recorded. Ford had no actual knowledge or notice of the
drainpipe, although it would have been apparent to anyone inspecting the premises
because it was only partially buried. Later, Olson sold and conveyed lot B to Luke Lane.
This deed also made no reference to the drainpipe and was promptly recorded. A few
weeks later, Ford discovered the drainpipe across lot A and removed it. Did he have the
right to do so?
Answer: Easements. No. Lot A became subject to an easement in favor of Lot B.
Although one cannot truly have an easement over his own land, an easement may be
created by implication when a grantor has used one portion of his land for the benefit of
another in a manner similar to that of an easement and then conveys one of such portions.
9. At the time of his marriage to Ann, Robert owned several parcels of real estate in joint
tenancy with his brother, Sam. During his marriage, Robert purchased a house and put
the title in his name and his wife’s name as joint tenants, not as tenants in common.
Robert died; within a month of his death, Smith obtained a judgment against Robert’s
estate. What are the relative rights of Sam, Smith, and Ann?
Answer: Joint Tenancy. Upon Robert’s death, his brother Sam, as surviving joint tenant,
became the sole owner of the property owned by Robert and Sam in joint tenancy prior to
Robert’s marriage to Ann.
10. In 1986, Ogle was the owner of two adjoining lots numbered 6 and 7 fronting at the
north on a city street. In that year, she laid out and built a concrete driveway along and
two feet in front of what she erroneously believed to be the west boundary of lot 7. Ogle
used the driveway for access to buildings situated at the southern end of both lots. Later
in 1986, she conveyed lot 7 to Dale, and thereafter in the same year she conveyed lot 6 to
Pace. Neither deed made any reference to the driveway, and after the conveyance, Dale
used it exclusively for access to lot 7. In 2014, a survey by Pace established that the
driveway encroached six inches on lot 6, and he brought an appropriate action to
establish his lawful ownership of the strip upon which the driveway approaches, to enjoin
its use by Dale, and to require Dale to remove the overlap. Will Pace prevail? Why?
Answer: Transfer of Property: Easement by Prescription. Decree in favor of Dale. Dale
had effective and actual possession of the strip in question, and the statute of limitations
had run against Pace. Whether Dale has acquired title to the strip by easement by
prescription (adverse possession) and the running of the statute of limitations against
11. Temco, Inc., conveyed to the Wynns certain property adjoining an apartment complex
being developed by Sonnett Realty Company. Although nothing to this effect was
contained in the deed, the sales contract gave the purchaser of the property use of the
apartment’s swimming pool. Temco’s sales agent also emphasized that use of the pool
would be a desirable feature in the event that the Wynns decided to sell the property.
Seven years later, the Bunns contracted to buy the property from the Wynns through the
latter’s agent, Sonnett Realty. Although both the Wynns and Sonnett Realty’s agent told
the Bunns that use of the apartment’s pool went with the purchased property, neither the
contract nor the deed subsequently conveyed to the Bunns so provided. When the Bunns
requested pool passes from Temco and Offutt, the company that owned the apartments,
their request was refused. Discuss whether the Bunns have a right to use the apartment’s
pool.
Answer: Licenses. Whether the Bunns have a right to use the apartment’s pool depends on
whether the Wynns were granted a license or an easement to use it in the sales contract
12. On January 1, Mrs. Irene Kern leased an apartment from Colonial Court Apartments,
Inc., for a one-year term. When the lease was entered into, Mrs. Kern asked for a quiet
apartment, and Colonial assured her that the assigned apartment was in a quiet,
well-insulated building. In fact, however, the apartment above Mrs. Kern’s was occupied
by a young couple, the Lindgrens. From the start of her occupancy, Mrs. Kern
complained of their twice-weekly parties and other actions that so disturbed her sleep
that she had to go elsewhere for rest. After Mrs. Kern had lodged several complaints,
Colonial terminated the Lindgrens’ lease effective February 28. The termination of the
lease was prolonged, however, and Mrs. Kern vacated her apartment, claiming that she
was no longer able to endure the continued disturbances. Colonial then brought this
action to recover rent owed by Mrs. Kern. Will Colonial prevail? Has Mrs. Kern been
constructively evicted? Explain.
13. In 1972, a deed for land in Pitt County was executed and delivered by Joel and Louisa
Tyson “unto M. H. Jackson and wife Maggie Jackson, for and during the term of their
natural lives and after their death to the children of the said M. H. Jackson and Maggie
Jackson that shall be born to their inter-marriage as shall survive them and their heirs
and assigns in fee simple forever.” Thelma Jackson Vester, a daughter of M. H. and
Maggie Jackson, died in 2014, survived by three children. M. H. Jackson, who survived
his wife, Maggie Jackson, died in 2015, survived by four sons. The children of Thelma
Jackson Vester brought this action against M. P. Jackson, a son of and executor of the
will of M. H. Jackson. The children of Vester contended that through their deceased
mother they were entitled to one-fifth interest in the land conveyed by the deed of 1972.
The executor contended that the deed conveyed a contingent remainder and only those
children who survived the parents took an interest in the land. Discuss the contentions of
both of the parties.
Answer: Remainder Interests. Judgment for executor affirmed. The distinction between a
vested and a contingent remainder is the capacity to take upon the termination of the
preceding estate. Where those who are to take in remainder cannot be determined until
14. Robert and Marjorie Wake owned land that they used as both a cattle ranch and a farm.
Each spring and autumn, the Wakes would drive their cattle from the ranch portion of the
operation across an access road on the farmland to Butler Springs, which was also on
the farmland.
In December 1991, the Wakes sold the farm to Jesse and Maud Hess but retained for
themselves a right-of-way over the farm access road and the right to use Butler Springs
for watering their livestock. In 1998, the Hesses sold the farm to the Johnsons, granting
them uninterrupted possession of the property “excepting only that permissive use of the
premises” owned by the Wakes.
The Wakes continued to use the access road and Butler Springs until 1999, when they
sold their ranch and granted the new owners “their rights to the water of Butler
Springs,” but they said nothing about the access road. The ranch was subsequently sold
several times and all the owners used the access road and watering hole. In 2013, the
Nelsons purchased the ranch. Shortly thereafter, the Johnsons notified the Nelsons that
they had revoked the Nelsons’ right to use the access road and Bulter Springs. In 2014,
the Johnsons closed the access road by locking the gates across the road. The Nelsons
brought this action, claiming easements to both the access road and Butler Springs. Does
an easement in favor of the Nelsons exist? Why?
Answer: Easements. Judgment for the Nelsons affirmed. The Johnsons allege that the
Butler Springs easement was “in gross,” and therefore personal to the Wakes. An
easement in gross is merely a personal interest in the land of another. However, an
easement appurtenant is an interest which is annexed to the possession of the dominant
15. Clayton and Margie Gulledge owned a house at 532 Somerset Place, N.W. (the Somerset
property) as tenants by the entirety. They had three children: Bernis Gulledge, Johnsie
Walker, and Marion Watkins. When Margie Gulledge died in 1987, Clayton became the
sole owner of the Somerset property. The following year, Clayton remarried, but the
marriage was unsuccessful. To avoid a possible loss of the Somerset property, Bernis
forwarded Clayton funds to satisfy the second wife’s financial demands. In exchange,
Clayton conveyed the property to Bernis and himself as joint tenants. In 2008, Clayton
conveyed his interest in the Somerset property to his daughter, Marion Watkins. In 2008,
Clayton died. Bernis died in 2014 and Johnsie Walker died in 2014. In these proceedings,
Marion Watkins claims to be a tenant in common with the estate of Bernis Gulledge. The
estate claims that when Clayton died, Watkins’ interest was extinguished and Bernis
became the sole owner of the Somerset property. Who is correct? Why?
Answer: Concurrent Ownership. Watkins is correct. The applicable rule in a large majority
of jurisdictions is that either party to a joint tenancy may sever that tenancy by
unilaterally disposing of his interest, that the consent of the other tenant is not required,
16. By separate leases, Javins and a few others rented an apartment at the Clifton Terrace
apartment complex. When they defaulted on their rent payments, the landlord, First
National Realty, brought an action to evict them. The tenants admitted to the default but
defended on the ground that the landlord had failed to maintain the premises in
compliance with the Washington, D.C., Housing Code. They alleged that approximately
1,500 violations of this code had arisen since the term of their lease began. Discuss the
merits of this case.
Answer: Landlords’ Obligations. Traditionally, a lease conveyed an interest in land.
Consequently, courts applied the general rules governing real property transactions to
lease controversies. The rigid doctrines of real property law have inhibited the
application of implied warranties to real estate transactions. Today’s tenant is not
interested in land, however, but in a suitable place for occupation. The value of the lease
17. On January 14, 2010, Eura Mae Redmon deeded land to her daughter, Melba Taylor,
and two sons, W. C. Sewell and Billy Sewell, “jointly and severally, and unto their heirs,
assigns and successors forever,” with the grantor retaining a life estate. W. C. Sewell
died on November 18, 2011, and Billy Sewell died on May 11, 2012. Mrs. Redmon died
on February 17, 2014. Melba Taylor then sought a declaration that her mother had
intended to convey the property to the grantees as joint tenants, thereby making her, by
virtue of her brothers’ deaths, sole owner of the property. Descendants of W. C. and Billy
Sewell opposed the complaint on the ground that the deed created a tenancy in common
among the grantees. Who is correct? Explain.
Answer: Joint Tenancy/Tenancy in Common. At common law, joint tenancy was favored
in cases in which the wording in the deed was ambiguous. However, in Arkansas, and in
many other states, statutes have been adopted which presumptively construe an
ANSWERS TO “TAKING SIDES” PROBLEMS
On June 30, 2005, Martin Hendrickson and Solveig Hendrickson were married, and on
January 3, 2006, a home previously owned by Martin was conveyed to them as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common. Solveig Hendrickson paid no part of the consideration for the
premises. On August 3, 2013, Martin Hendrickson duly executed a Declaration of Election
to Sever Survivorship of Joint Tenancy by which he endeavored to preserve an interest in the
premises for Ruth Halbert, his daughter by a previous marriage. On the same day, he
executed his last will and testament, by the terms of which he directed that his wife, Solveig
Hendrickson, receive the minimum amount to which she was entitled under the laws of the
State of Minnesota. Martin Hendrickson died with a valid will on October 9, 2013.
(a) What are the arguments that the joint ownership was severed by Martin
Hendrickson’s declaration thus creating a tenancy in common?
(b) What are the arguments that the joint tenancy was not severed by Martin
Hendrickson’s declaration and thus the property passed to Solveig Hendrickson by
survivorship upon Martin Hendrickson’s death?
(c) Which argument should prevail? Explain.
ANSWER:
(a) The joint tenancy was terminated by declaration of Martin Hendrickson because he
