CASE 42-5
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC. v. WILLIAMS
Supreme Court of the United States, 2002
534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3382304874478067867&q=534+U.S.
+184&hl=en&as_sdt=2,34
O’Connor, J.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), [citation], a physical impairment
that “substantially limits one or more * * * major life activities” is a “disability.” [Citation.]
Respondent, claiming to be disabled because of her carpal tunnel syndrome and other related
impairments, sued petitioner, her former employer, for failing to provide her with a reasonable
accommodation as required by the ADA. [Citation.] The District Court granted summary judgment
to petitioner, finding that respondent’s impairments did not substantially limit any of her major life
I
Respondent began working at petitioner’s automobile manufacturing plant in Georgetown, Kentucky,
in August 1990. She was soon placed on an engine fabrication assembly line, where her duties
included work with pneumatic tools. Use of these tools eventually caused pain in respondent’s hands,
wrists, and arms. She sought treatment at petitioner’s in-house medical service, where she was
diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendinitis. Respondent consulted a
personal physician who placed her on permanent work restrictions that precluded her from lifting
more than 20 pounds or from “frequently lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds,”
engaging in “constant repetitive * * * flexion or extension of [her] wrists or elbows,” performing
“overhead work,” or using “vibratory or pneumatic tools.” [Citation.]
In light of these restrictions, for the next two years petitioner assigned respondent to various
modified duty jobs. Nonetheless, respondent missed some work for medical leave, and eventually
inspection”; (3) “shell body audit”; and (4) “ED surface repair.” [Citation.] Respondent was initially
placed on a team that performed only the first two of these tasks, and for a couple of years, she
rotated on a weekly basis between them. In assembly paint, respondent visually inspected painted
cars moving slowly down a conveyor. She scanned for scratches, dents, chips, or any other flaws that
may have occurred during the assembly or painting process, at a rate of one car every 54 seconds.
When respondent began working in assembly paint, inspection team members were required to open
and shut the doors, trunk, and/or hood of each passing car. Sometime during respondent’s tenure,
A short while after the shell body audit job was added to respondent’s rotations, she began to
experience pain in her neck and shoulders. * * * Respondent requested that petitioner accommodate
her medical conditions by allowing her to return to doing only her original two jobs in QCIO, which
respondent claimed she could still perform without difficulty.
The parties disagree about what happened next. According to respondent, petitioner refused her
request and forced her to continue working in the shell body audit job, which caused her even greater
physical injury. According to petitioner, respondent simply began missing work on a regular basis.
Regardless, it is clear that on December 6, 1996, the last day respondent worked at petitioner’s plant,
she was placed under a no-work-of-any-kind restriction by her treating physicians. On January 27,
1997, respondent received a letter from petitioner that terminated her employment, citing her poor
II
The ADA requires covered entities, including private employers, to provide “reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” [Citation.] The Act defines a “qualified
individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” [Citation.] * * *
* * *
To qualify as disabled, a claimant must * * * show that the limitation on the major life activity is
“substantial.” [Citation.] * * * According to the EEOC regulations, “substantially limited” means
“unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform”; or “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life
activity.” [Citation.] In determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity, the regulations instruct that the following factors should be considered: “the nature and
severity of the impairment; the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and the permanent
or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the
impairment.” [Citation.]
The question presented by this case is whether the Sixth Circuit properly determined that respondent
was disabled under * * * the ADA’s disability definition at the time that she sought an accommodation
from petitioner. [Citation.] * * *
Our consideration of this issue is guided first and foremost by the words of the disability
definition itself. “Substantially” in the phrase “substantially limits” suggests “considerable” or “to a
large degree.” [Citations.] The word “substantial” thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in
these effects and create only intermittent symptoms of numbness and tingling. [Citation.] Studies have
further shown that, even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases resolve in one
month, but that in 22 percent of cases, symptoms last for eight years or longer. [Citation.] * * * Given these
large potential differences in the severity and duration of the effects of carpal tunnel syndrome, an
individual’s carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate whether the individual has a
disability within the meaning of the ADA.
* * *
While the Court of Appeals in this case addressed the different major life activity of performing
*** Chapter Outcome***
Explain the doctrine of employment at will and the laws protecting employee
privacy.
C. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
Employee Termination-at-Will
At common law an employment contract not for a definite term could be
terminated by either party.
Statutory Limitations — This rule has been somewhat restricted by a
number of statutes which protect certain employees (1) from discriminatory
discharge, (2) in their exercise of statutory rights, and (3) from discharge
without cause. Many states also protect workers from discriminatory
discharge for filing workers’ compensation claims.
Judicial Limitations — Courts have also intervened by creating exceptions
to this rule primarily under implied contract theories. These cases have
found that employment contracts contain an implied promise to deal in good
faith and a duty to terminate in good faith and for just cause.
A majority of States now consider a discharge as wrongful if it violates a
statutory or other established public policy. In general, this public policy
exception renders a discharge wrongful if it involves a dismissal for (1)
refusing to violate a statute, (2) exercising a statutory right, (3) performing a
statutory obligation, or (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute that is
of public interest (“whistle-blowing”).
CASE 42-6
JASPER v. H. NIZAM, INC.
Supreme Court of Iowa, 2009
764 N.W.2d 751
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?
case=2832611353601787809&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1 &oi=scholarr
Cady, J.
This case arose when Kimberly Jasper was terminated from her employment as the director of a
child care facility in Johnston, Iowa, called Kid University. The center was owned by H. Nizam, Inc.
Mohsin Hussain was the president of the corporation. , Zakia Hussain was the vice president. The
Hussains were married. Mohsin Hussain was a special education teacher for the Des Moines School
District and was not involved in the day-to-day operation of the center.
Jasper began her employment as director of the center in late August 2003. She was paid an
hourly wage. There was no specific term of employment. A few weeks after Jasper started her
employment, she and her husband agreed to rent a home owned by the Hussains. The Jaspers had
moved to Des Moines from Arizona and were looking for housing at the time. Jasper learned the
Hussain house was available to rent when she and Hussain went to the house to retrieve some
equipment to use at the day care center that was stored in the house. The house had four bedrooms
and two bathrooms, but had sustained substantial water damage and was in a general state of
disrepair. The agreed monthly rent was $10, plus utilities, and the Jaspers were required to make all
repairs to the house at their own expense.
Within a short time after Jasper started her employment, Hussain told her the center was not
making enough money to justify the size of the staff. He also encouraged Jasper to attract more
children to the center. Jasper responded by telling Hussain that any staff cuts would place the center
in jeopardy of violating state regulations governing the minimum ratios between staff and children.
The staff-to-child ratio became a frequent subject of conversation, and friction, between Hussain
and Jasper. Hussain was persistent in his desire to reduce staff to decrease expenses, and Jasper was
adamant that the current staff was necessary to meet the minimum staffing ratios under the state
regulations. During one meeting with the Hussains and Jasper in early November, staff reductions
were again discussed. Jasper claimed Zakia Hussain said, “What [the department of human services
consultant] doesn’t know won’t hurt her.” Hussain made no response to the statement. In fact,
Hussain never specifically told Jasper to violate or ignore the staffing regulations.
At a meeting between Hussain and Jasper later in November, Hussain proposed that Jasper and
her assistant director begin to work as staff in the classrooms occupied by the children as a means to
cut staff and reduce expenses. Jasper objected to the plan as unreasonable. She believed it would
prevent her from performing her duties as director of the center and risk placing the center in
violation of the ratio regulations.
Jasper brought a wrongful discharge action against the corporation and Hussain individually. She
claimed Hus-sain terminated her employment because she refused to violate the staff-to-child ratios,
in violation of public policy of this state. She sought damages for lost earnings, emotional pain and
suffering, and punitive damages. She also sought damages relating to the termination of the rental
agreement and for unreimbursed expenses relating to improvements made to the center. At trial,
Jasper presented testimony that the center violated the staff-to-child ratios shortly after she was
terminated. This violation occurred when one staff member was left in a classroom to supervise five
* * *
The jury returned a verdict for Jasper against the corporation and Hussain individually, based
solely on the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The jury awarded Jasper lost
wages of $26,915 and past pain and suffering of $100,000. It awarded her $39,507.25 for expenses
relating to the house and additional services and expenses. The district court refused to submit the
punitive-damage claim to the jury.
* * *
Jasper appealed, * * *. The court of appeals determined a clear public policy existed in Iowa that
child care centers be adequately staffed. It also found Jasper presented substantial evidence to
support a finding that she refused to reduce staff below the minimum ratios and that this conduct was
the cause of her termination. The court of appeals then determined the district court did not err in
finding the $100,000 award for emotional distress was excessive and in setting aside the award of
$39,507.25 for additional services and housing expenses.
* * *
We adhere to the common-law employment-at-will doctrine in Iowa. [Citation.] However, we
joined the parade of other states twenty years ago in adopting the public-policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine. [Citation.] In doing so, we recognized a cause of action in Iowa for
wrongful discharge from employment when the reasons for the discharge contravene public policy.
This case primarily focuses on the public-policy element of the tort and ultimately requires us to
decide if the source of public policy can be derived from administrative regulations. Yet, the case
also requires us to consider the parameters of the public-policy element and to dig into the element to
unearth and identify the often difficult distinction between a claim based on public policy and a
claim based on a private dispute between an employer and employee. In this way, we must also
consider the element of the tort that requires the employee to establish that the discharge was caused
by the employee’s participation in an activity protected by public policy.
Sources of Public Policy. The concept of public policy generally captures the communal
conscience and common sense of our state in matters of public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. [Citation.] Although public policy can be an elusive concept, once recognized, it becomes a
benchmark in the application of our legal principles. [Citation.] * * * Thus, the public-policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine carries forward a hallmark concept of this state; that
the rights of each individual in a civilized society are ultimately “limited by the rights of others and
of the public at large” and that the delicate balance between these rights is what helps hold us
together as a society. [Citations.] When a contract violates public policy, including a contract of
employment, the entire community is damaged.
Our adherence in our prior cases to identifying statutes as a source of public policy is consistent
with our earlier pronouncement that the tort of wrongful discharge should exist in Iowa only as a
narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. [Citations.] The use of statutes as a source of
public policy also helps provide the essential notice to employers and employees of conduct that can
lead to dismissal, as well as conduct that can lead to tort liability. [Citation.] The public-policy
exception was adopted merely to place a limitation on an employer’s discretion to discharge an
employee when the public policy is so clear and well-defined that it should be understood and
accepted in our society as a benchmark. [Citation.] * * *
While we have justifiably relied on statutes, we have not closed the door to using other sources
as a means to derive public policy to support the tort. We have repeatedly observed that our
constitution is a proper source of public policy. [Citation.] Moreover, we have recognized that other
jurisdictions have used administrative regulations as a source of public policy, yet we have not had
the occasion to decide the issue until today. [Citations.]
* * *
In deciding whether administrative regulations may be used as an additional source of public
policy to support the tort of wrongful discharge, we generally observe a strong fundamental
congruence between statutes and administrative regulations. Administrative agencies have become
These observations reveal that administrative regulations can be an important part of a broader
statutory scheme to advance legislative goals. They can reflect the objectives and goals of the
legislature in the same way as a statute. Consequently, the justification for relying on statutes as a
source of public policy can equally apply to administrative regulations. * * * Consequently, we are
satisfied that administrative regulations can be used as a source of public policy to support the tort of
wrongful discharge when adopted pursuant to a delegation of authority in a statute that seeks to
further a public policy. We also recognize this position is consistent with most jurisdictions that have
considered the question. [Citations.]
* * *
Public Policy Derived From Administrative Rules Governing Staff Ratios of Child Care
Facilities. Our legislature has chosen to regulate child care facilities under chapter 237A of the Code.
The regulatory agency is the department of human services. [Citation.] Specifically, this statute
* * *
From the beginning of our adoption of the public-policy exception, we have emphasized that the
public policy must be both well recognized and clearly expressed. * * *
* * *
In this case, the legislature clearly delegated authority to the department of human services to
promulgate specific rules concerning the proper staff-to-child ratios as a means “to assure the health,
safety, and welfare of children” in child care facilities. [Citation.] Without question, the protection of
children is a matter of fundamental public interest. [Citations.] These factors satisfy the goal that the
regulation affect the public interest.
* * *
We conclude the particular administrative rule at issue in this case supports a clear and
well-defined public policy that gives rise to the tort of wrongful discharge. The ratios were
implemented at the specific direction of the legislature to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
those children in Iowa who attend day care facilities. Additionally, the legislature intended for the
* * *
We readily recognize the tort of wrongful discharge is not intended to interfere with legitimate
business decisions of an employer. Yet, staffing a child care facility below the minimum
requirements established by an administrative rule is not a legitimate business concern.
*** Chapter Outcome***
Explain (a) OSHA, (b) worker’s compensation, (c) unemployment compensation,
(d) social security,
(e) the Fair Labor Standards Act, and (g) the Family Medical Leave Act.
Occupational Safety and Health Act
Enacted in 1970, this act requires employers to provide a safe work
environment. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) develops standards, conducts inspections, monitors compliance,
and institutes enforcement actions. Employers may not discharge or
otherwise discriminate against employees who exercise their rights under
this act.
Employee Privacy
Protection from unwanted searches, electronic monitoring and other forms of
surveillance, and disclosure of confidential records are safeguarded by the
tort of invasion of privacy.
Drug and Alcohol Testing — A number of States have legislation
prohibiting such tests or providing certain scientific and procedural
standards. The NLRB has held such testing in a union setting is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. Based on Supreme Court and lower court
decisions, the government may use (1) random or universal testing where
the public health or safety or national security is involved, and (2) selective
drug testing for those employees believed to have a drug problem.
Lie Detector Tests— The Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act
of 1988 prohibits private employers from requiring employees from
undergoing a lie detector test. The act exempts government employers and
certain others.
Workers’ Compensation
Social Security and Unemployment Insurance
Enacted in 1935, the federal Social Security system has expanded to cover
almost all employees, and contains four major benefit programs: (1)
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) (providing retirement and
survivor benefits), (2) Disability Insurance (DI), (3) Hospitalization
Insurance (Medicare), and (4) Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
The system is financed by taxes paid by employers, employees, and
self-employed individuals. Benefits vary greatly depending on the particular
program and how much the individual has paid into the program. The OASI
benefits are tax-free unless recipient has income in excess of a specified
amount.
Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regulates the employment of child
labor outside of agriculture (no employees under age 14, except in
newspaper delivery and acting; 14 and 15-year–olds can work limited hours
in nonhazardous jobs; 16 and 17-year–olds may work in any nonhazardous
job, while persons 18 years old or older may work in any job, whether it is
hazardous or not.) In addition, the act provides for a minimum hourly wage
and overtime pay of time-and-a-half for hours worked in excess of forty
hours per week.
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Noti=cation Act (WARN)
requires sixty days advance notice of a plant closing or mass layo; (either
500 employees or for at least 1/3 of the employees at that site, if 1/3 equals
or exceeds 50 employees).
WARN requires the notification be given to specified State and local oEcials
as well as to the affected employees or their union representatives. The act
reduces the notification period for failing companies and emergency
situations.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
requested leave may be paid, unpaid, or a combination of both.