set up an asset on its balance sheet in the amount of $32,000 for goodwill. As a result of
this entry, I.D.E. had a surplus at the end of each of its fiscal years from 2008 until 2013.
Cano, a shareholder, received $7,144 in dividends from I.D.E. during the period from
2009 to 2014. May Fried, the trustee in bankruptcy of I.D.E., recover the amount of these
dividends from Cano on the basis that they had been paid when I.D.E. was insolvent or
when its capital was impaired?
12. GM Sub Corporation (“GM Sub”), a subsidiary of Grand Metropolitan Limited,
acquired all outstanding shares of Liggett Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation.
Rothschild International Corporation (“Rothschild”) was the owner of 650 shares of the
7 % cumulative preferred stock of Liggett Group, Inc. According to Liggett’s certificate of
incorporation, the holders of the 7 % preferred were to receive $100 per share “in the
event of any liquidation of the assets of the Corporation.” GM Sub had offered $70 per
share for the 7 % preferred, $158.63 for another class of preferred stock, and $69 for
each common stock share. Liggett’s board of directors approved the offer as fair and
recommended acceptance by Liggett’s shareholders. As a result, 39.8 % of the 7 %
preferred shares was sold to GM Sub. In addition, GM Sub acquired 75.9 % of the other
preferred stock and 87.4 % of the common stock. The acquisition of the overwhelming
majority of these classes of stock—coupled with the fact that the 7 % preferred
shareholders could not vote as a class on the merger proposal—gave GM Sub sufficient
voting power to approve a follow-up merger. As a result, all remaining shareholders
other than GM Sub were eliminated in return for payment of cash for their shares. These
shareholders received the same consideration ($70/share) as in the tender offer.
Rothschild brought suit against Ligge9 and Grand Metropolitan, charging each with a
breach of its duty of fair dealing owed to the 7 percent preferred shareholders. Rothschild
based both claims on the contention that the merger was a liquidation of Ligge9 insofar as
the rights of the 7 percent preferred stockholders were concerned and that those preferred
shareholders therefore were entitled to the liquidation preference of $100 per share, not
$70 per share. Are the preferred shareholders entitled to a liquidation preference? Why?
Answer: Preferred Stock. Judgment for Liggett and Grand Metropolitan. Preference rights
of preferred stock can be eliminated legally through the merger process. In addition, a
merger is a separate and distinct process from a liquidation or a sale of assets. Thus, the
7 % preferred was always subject to defeasance by merger as the merger provisions of
Delaware law are a part of Liggett’s charter. The preferential rights attaching to shares of