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Add. Info: Control of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) is leading to controls on many
industries not much affected before. Commercial bakeries, mixing flour, water, yeast and heat
produce ethanol, a VOC that contributes to the ozone problem. E.g., Emissions from bakeries
had to be reduced significantly in many ozone problem areas. Other products, such as
windshield-wiper fluids, must be reformulated to reduce VOCs. Local dry cleaning
establishments have to install costly emission control equipment. Major polluters, such as
refineries and chemical plants, are under tough controls; now the controls will move down to
much finer levels.
Enforcement—The EPA and appropriate state agencies are responsible for enforcing the Clean
Air Act. Violators may face civil fines of up to $25,000 per day. Citizens may sue under the act
but only if the government fails to enforce pollution control requirements after notification by
citizens. EPA prosecution of a polluter forecloses the possibility of a citizen suit. Enforcement of
other environmental statutes is similar to the enforcement provisions under the Clean Air Act.
Most of the statutes permit criminal convictions for repeated offenses and for willful violations.
Criminal fines and jail sentences may be imposed.
Carrot-and-Stick Approach—The Sentencing Guidelines for environmental crimes lessen the
penalties for companies that cooperate with investigators, report violations, and educate their
workers of environmental standards. Hence, firms with a strong internal compliance program
will be punished less harshly than those that do not.
International Perspective: Industrialization Brings Environmental Problems to China
Rapid industrialization in China, where the government controls who will be allowed to produce
what where, has meant large scale environmental damage of all sorts. Formal law looks much
like environmental law in the U.S. and EU, and there are environmental agencies. In practice,
they have little authority and only the ability to impose trivial fines.
CLEAN WATER ACT—In the 19th century, the federal government exerted some small degree
of control over water pollution by means of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1886 and 1899. The
1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act likewise had a small effect on the problems of water
pollution. Effective federal regulation of water pollution did not occur until the 1970s.
Strengthened federal efforts to monitor and improve the nation’s water resources were a response
to pollution problems, such as the deterioration of Lake Erie.
The Clean Water Act was passed in 1972 and amended in 1977 and 1986. The goal is to protect
the integrity of the nation’s water resources. EPA is responsible for setting national effluent
standards on an industry-by-industry basis, approving state water quality standards, monitoring a
pollution discharge program, making special provisions for oil and toxic chemical spills, and
providing construction grants and loans for publicly owned water treatment works (POTWs).
The Act provides that no person or industry may discharge pollutants into navigable waters
without a permit. Almost all water in the country is subject to the law. Although discharge of
pollutants from point sources into water has probably been reduced by 50%, significant efforts
will be needed to further reduce water pollution in this country.
Add. Case: Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines (10th Cir., 2005)--El Paso owns 100 acres of
land it bought in 1968 near Cripple Creek, Colorado. El Paso engaged in no mining activity on
the land which contains a collapsed mine shaft built in 1910. The shaft is connected to a six-mile
long drainage tunnel that is connected to other old mines. The tunnel drains into Cripple Creek.
The Sierra Club sued El Paso for violating the Clean Water Act (CWA) by discharging pollutants
from a point source, the mine shaft, into Cripple Creek without a discharge permit. The district
court awarded summary judgment for plaintiff. El Paso was ordered to pay $94,000 in civil
penalties, pay attorneys’ fees for the Sierra Club, and to apply for a discharge permit. El Paso
appealed.
Decision: Reversed in part. To establish a violation of the CWA provision prohibiting discharge
of pollutants without a permit, a plaintiff must prove that defendant 1) discharged 2) a pollutant
3) into navigable waters 4) from a point source 5) without a permit. El Paso could be liable
under the CWA for discharges from the abandoned mine shaft even though it never conducted
Add. Case: Solid Waste Agency of No. Cook Co. v. Army Corps of Engineers (S. Ct., 2001)--
The Waste Agency went through the permit process to set up a new trash dump for Chicago-area
towns. The Army Corps refused to give permission for an abandoned gravel pit to be used,
contending that it was under Corps jurisdiction as wetlands because rain ponds had formed in
the pit that were used by assorted birds. The Waste Agency challenged Army Corps jurisdiction.
Decision: Reversing, the high court held that the Corps did not have jurisdiction because the pit
Add. Case: Milwaukee v. Illinois (S. Ct., 1981)--The Court originally faced this case in 1972
(406 U.S. 91). The dispute centered on sewage discharge by Milwaukee into Lake Michigan,
which drifted down to Illinois. The Court held that nuisance applies to the issue. The district
court held of Illinois, and imposed strict effluent limitations on Milwaukee. After the suit, the
CWA was passed, giving EPA control of water quality standards. Milwaukee asked for rehearing
of the matter.
Decision: Federal statutory preemption of an area of law made the use of common law to resolve
this case inappropriate. The CWA left little room for federal courts to craft their own standards
of pollution abatement. The EPA and the states are responsible for setting water quality
standards; courts may not impose standards upon parties that are stricter than the standards
Point Source Pollution—Pollution that is easily identifiable is known as point source pollution,
such as discharges from a pipe. Control of this pollution has been the primary goal of the federal
water pollution laws. Home sewage and much industrial waste is treated at publicly owned
treatment works. POTWs return approximately 50% of pollutants back to oceans, rivers, or lakes
after treatment. Heavy metals and sludge left over from sewage treatment pose particular
problems. States are responsible for designating how the water within their boundaries are used:
for drinking water, recreation, or other uses. Each use requires a certain degree of cleanliness.
The state plans must be approved by EPA.
Industrial Permits—Industries must obtain permits from the (state) EPA in order to discharge
substances into waters. EPA and state environmental agencies require industries to disclose the
amounts and types of pollutants that they discharge. These disclosure requirements fall under the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Permissible emissions are set on an
industry-by-industry basis.
Control Technology. The EPA must consider cost-effectiveness when setting these standards.
Toxic and other hazardous waste must be controlled by the more stringent Best Available
Technology (BAT). Cost considerations are less of a concern for these pollutants. Conventional
pollutants are subject to best conventional technology (BCT) standards. New plants are subject to
the high standards set by New Source Performance Standards. NSPS require new plants, or new
sources of pollution, to achieve the greatest degree of pollution reduction possible through use of
BAT and other technologies that minimize pollution output. Pollution permits will not be issued
until the agency is satisfied that the appropriate degree of pollution control has been attained.
Add. Case: Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. EPA (9th Cir., 1995)--The EPA set new controls
on the amount of dioxin that could be released into the Columbia River basin by pulp and paper
mills. Dioxin had to be controlled more to protect human, aquatic, and animal life. EPA was sued
by environmental groups contending that the standards were not strong enough. The mills sued
EPA, claiming it violated the CWA by issuing a regulation that controlled total maximum daily
load (TMDL) of dioxin (which specified the maximum amount of a pollutant that can be
discharged, or loaded, into waters from all sources), rather than a less costly technology-based
limit on dioxin. District court held for EPA.
Decision: Affirmed. The environmentalist objections were rejected. EPA sufficiently considered
the effect of dioxin on all life in setting the TMDL standards. Industry objections were rejected.
Enforcement—The permit system is the key to enforcing point source water pollution control.
States have primary enforcement responsibility, subject to EPA monitoring and approval. Firms
with permits are responsible for self-monitoring and must file discharge monitoring reports.
Firms must report violations of the permit or face penalties of up to $25,000 per day. Criminal
prosecutions are possible in the case of serious violations. Unlike the Clean Air Act, citizen suits
are common under the Clean Water Act. Potential plaintiffs must inform both the EPA and the
alleged polluter of their “intent to sue.” The EPA may then take over, blocking further citizen
action, unless the agency acts negligently and violations continue. Firms (and executives)
convicted of violations may be subject to penalties imposed by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
which would apply to serious matters involving knowing discharges. The Guidelines are
generally tougher than the penalties otherwise imposed.
Add. Case: Arkansas v. Oklahoma (S. Ct., 1992)--Fayetteville, Arkansas received a pollution
permit for its sewage treatment plant in accordance with the NPDES. It allowed the plant to
discharge certain levels of pollutants into the Illinois River, which flows to Oklahoma. Oklahoma
protested that the level of discharges permitted was higher than that permitted by Oklahoma.
The Arkansas pollution levels would pollute the river more than allowed by Oklahoma water
standards. EPA let the Arkansas permit stand. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a
permit may not be issued if a polluter would discharge effluents sufficient to violate applicable
water quality standards. Arkansas and EPA appealed.
Decision: The CWA requires states to set water quality standards and to secure EPA approval of
these standards. Fayetteville received a permit from EPA that met Arkansas water quality
standards. The Court rejected the argument of Oklahoma. Arkansas was not prohibited from
discharging effluents into the Illinois River because the water in the river was in violation of
Add. Info.: The Clean Water Act protects whistleblowers. In Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm. v.
Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3rd Cir.), the court held that intra-corporate complaints about
improper operating procedures at a sewage treatment facility were protected, as are complaints
taken to the government. The whistleblower protection applied to all sewage treatment facilities,
or other water works, that are supported at least in part by federal funds.
CASE: Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (S.Ct. 2013)—Entities that
discharge pollutants from point sources must have an NPDES permit. EPA requires permits for
logging operations unless water discharges (runoffs) are only storm water (as opposed to runoff
at a logging mill). G-P had a permit from Oregon to harvest some timber in state forests. Water
runs off logging roads into rivers. The NEDC brought a citizen suit against all parties demanding
that G-P be subject to the NPDES rule. District court dismissed. 9th Circuit reversed; NEDC
appealed.
Decision: Reversed. EPA has decided that ordinary logging operations are not industrial
operations that require NPDES permits. The agency’s reading of the law, in conjunction with the
Questions: 1. Since Oregon regulates logging operations, why would the environmental group
want EPA regulations also under discharge permits?
It is likely that the regulations would be more costly to meet than the state rules, thereby
2. Does road runoff seem like point source emission or nonpoint source?
Traditionally it has been nonpoint source—it is rainwater running off a road, not industrial
Add. Case: Peconic Baykeeper v. Suffolk County (2nd Cir., 2010)—Suffolk Co., NY, found
mosquito-borne diseases that have caused death. To protect public health, the County ordered
spraying of mosquitoes with EPA approved pesticides. The Baykeepers sued the county for
violating the Clean Water Act; the district court held for the county; Baykeeper appealed.
Decision: Vacated in part. The district court incorrectly held that spray applicators from trucks
and helicopters were not point sources. The definition of point source is broad and includes such
Issue Spotter: Does Obeying EPA Regulations Eliminate Litigation?
Companies are not exempt from common law actions for damages done by pollution that may
meet EPA standards. If downstream water users can show that discharges from the plant cause
the water to be harmed for recreational use, such as swimming and fishing, the company may be
sued for nuisance and violation of riparian rights. Meeting EPA standards is evidence of good
faith by the company, but does not eliminate potential common law liability. EPA (and state
agencies) cannot know every discharge consequence, so rules can be inadequate to deal with
problems (while others go overboard). Common law litigation is important and leads to huge
judgments in some cases.
Nonpoint Source Pollution—About half of water pollution comes from nonpoint sources, such
as runoff from streets, agricultural, and pollution from construction, logging, and mining sites.
Efforts to control such pollution through federal regulation are relatively new, complex, and
possibly costly. Groundwater pollution from runoff is a problem being considered in relation to
several federal statutes.
Wetlands—Defined by EPA as areas “inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support ... a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for
life in saturated soil conditions,” wetlands have changed from being a nuisance to be filled in to a
natural resource to be saved. Large tracts of land in the U.S. have been designated wetlands.
Permit System—Wetland designation can restrict the type of construction that may be
undertaken on land. Before any changes may be made to wetlands areas, a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers must be obtained. The EPA may block permits if it is acting to prevent
environmental damage. Since it is common for construction to damage wetlands, builders often
buy wetlands credits from restoration projects that may be done in another location.
CASE: Hearts Bluff Game Ranch v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 2012)—Hearts bought 4,000 acreas of
land in Texas to use as a mitigation bank for wetlands offset. Prior to purchase, Hearts confirmed
with the Army Corps that it would be suitable for mitigation. The state of Texas later announced
it would build a reservoir that would put the property underwater. The value of the land was
lower since it could not be preserved for mitigation. Hearts sued in the Court of Claims for
uncompensated taking. Court denied the claim; Hearts appealed.
Decision: Affirmed. Section 404 permits allow landowners to use land for mitigation banking
purposes. Here, the Corps never guaranteed Hearts could use it for that purpose in the future, just
Question: 1. Why would the value of the land be different if it was used for mitigation banking?
The land may be obtained at fair market value initially but its conversion to mitigation banking is
complex and costly. Developers who get 404 permits pay the bank owners for the credit and
2. When the Corp initially told Hearts Bluff that the land was suitable for mitigation, did
that not create a property interest?
The initial assessment was done before it was known for sure that Texas was going to build a
large reservoir that would flood part or all of Hearts Bluff. Until the regulatory process is
Add. Case: Responsible Economic Develop. v. S.C. Dept. of Human and Enviro. Control
(Sup. Ct., SC, 2007)—Wal-Mart was building a new store in Florence, SC. The parking lot
required a permit that detailed how stormwater runoff would be handled. It would go to a
holding pond and then flow into assorted creeks. The SC DHEC granted the stormwater permit.
The RED challenged the permit, claiming the stormwater would degrade creek water and flow
into an impaired body of water. DHEC upheld the permit; RED sued, but the permit was upheld
by the trial court and appeals court. RED appealed.
Decision: Affirmed. The ALJ determined that the time the water spent in creeks before it reached
Add. Case: U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes (S. Ct., 1985)--Riverside was a developer with
property for a housing development. It began to fill in marshy parts of land. The Army Corps
sued to enjoin from filling the land. The Corps believed that the land was a wetlands within the
meaning of the CWA, so the defendant could not fill without a permit. The court held the
property was subject to Corps regulations. The appeals court reversed, applying a narrow
definition to wetlands. Requiring defendant to obtain a Corps permit before filling their land
could be an unconstitutional takings. The government appealed.
Decision: Reversed. The Corps has extensive powers under the CWA and broad jurisdiction over
wetlands. Neither the imposition of a permit requirement or denial of a permit was a takings.
Add. Info.: In Hoffman Homes v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.), the court held that one acre of
land that would normally not be called a wetland—its only source of moisture was rainfall—was
properly classified as such by the Army Corps because it adjoined a wetland used for migratory
birds. Allowing construction on the acre of land could disturb the birds on adjoining wetlands,
and, hence, could be prohibited. Further, as the court in U.S. v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir.)
noted, discharging fill material in wetlands without Army Corps permission results in strict
liability, regardless of the material. Any fill material is regulated, even if it is moving the same
dirt around in the same area.
Wetlands Takings—Because there is uncertainty about what is a wetland and what consequence
that has, which varies case by case, there is strong pressure on Congress to clarify the law.
Wetland designation can be a property taking, as the court found in Loveladies where the
government essentially stopped all development in an area, which was nearly a 100 percent
taking.
Add. Case: Loveladies Harbor v. US (Fed. Cir., 1994)--A NJ real estate development started in
1958 (before Clean Water Act Section 404 concerning wetlands). Most land was developed.
When developer sought permission to fill the last 50 acres, it agreed with state environmental
officials to only fill 1/4 of the land. The Army Corp rejected that and would not allow any land to
be developed. Developer sued in the Court of Federal Claims for compensation. Court held that
Army Corp refusal made property drop from $2.66 million to $12,500 in value and ordered the
government to pay.
Decision: Affirmed. The economic value of the land was reduced by 99% by the regulatory
Add. Case: Good v. U.S. (Fed. Cir., 1999)--Good owned land in the Florida Keys before the
Endangered Species Act. In 1980, he began to prepare the land for construction. Permits from
federal, state and county agencies were granted by 1984 after modifications had been adopted.
The Florida Dept. of Community Affairs opposed the project, which tied it up in court for years,
by which time the Army Corp permit expired. A new permit was issued, but then was opposed by
the FWS because of discovery of an endangered specie in the area. After more environmental
work and permit process, the Corp denied its permit in 1994. Good sued the government for
illegal taking that entitled him to compensation. The Court of Federal Claims denied the claim;
Good appealed.
Decision: Affirmed. “For any regulatory takings claim to succeed, the claimant must show that
the government’s regulatory restraint interfered with his investment-backed expectations in a
manner that requires the government to compensate him.... In view of the regulatory climate that
Add. Case: Florida Rock Ind. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir., 1994)--Before passage of the CWA, Florida
Rock (FR) bought 1,560 acres of wetlands west of Miami. The value was in underlying
limestone; when it is extracted, the wetland is destroyed. After the CWA passed, the Army Corps
refused to allow FR to dig limestone. After years of fighting, FR sued in the Court of Federal
Claims for regulatory taking. The reduction in the value of the land because it could not be
mined was the basis of the claim. The court awarded $1.03 million plus attorney fees. U.S.
appealed.
Decision: Vacated and remanded. The S.Ct. allows taking compensation when nearly all value is
destroyed. Here, there was value to the land despite the mining restriction. The value may be less
with the restriction, but all value has not been destroyed. The trial court must reconsider to
LAND POLLUTION—Pollution of the land occurs primarily when hazardous or toxic
substances are dumped, stored, or otherwise disposed of on land. Disposal often involves placing
hazardous substances in drums and burying these in clay-lined dumps, injecting hazardous
wastes underground, or putting these wastes in landfills, vacant lots, or lagoons. Problems arise
when substances leach into groundwater. To reduce such pollution and health risks associated
with dumping substances, environmental controls have been imposed on the production,
distribution, use, and disposal of toxic chemicals. Firms that dispose of toxic chemicals may face
enormous financial liability for cleanups of polluted dumping sites, regardless of the level of care
taken in the disposal process.
Toxic Substances Control Act—TOSCA, passed in 1976, controls and keeps track of chemicals
produced in the U.S. Producers wishing to sell a new chemical must notify the EPA, which
studies the product and determines whether it presents an environmental hazard. Producers may
have to run tests to help the EPA determine what restrictions, if any, need be placed on a
chemical. Producers of new chemicals must notify EPA before importing or producing the
substance. There is a presumption of innocence, but EPA may ban a chemical if tests determine it
is not suitable. Biotechnology is subject to the restrictions and regulations found under TOSCA.
Companies that manipulate biological process to produce chemicals or living organisms for
commercial use must notify the EPA of their intent to market a new product. The EPA monitors
efforts by such industries to use natural organisms and genetically altered microorganisms in new
ways.
Add. Info: Chemical Use Inventory: EPA has been working to improve its chemical inventory.
TOSCA applies to perhaps 12,000 chemicals produced or imported, in excess of 10,000 pounds
per year, by about 2,400 facilities. Since EPA reviews only about 100 chemicals per year, the
GAO has noted that it will take over a century for EPA to review chemicals currently in use.
Pesticides—Most products that reduce the destructive capabilities of insects, plants, rodents,
fungi, and molds are toxic and are subject to control under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) of 1947 (amended in 1988). Pesticides must be registered with the
EPA before they can be sold. The agency examines scientific data about the product’s effects and
checks for proper labeling. A product will be approved for five years if it meets the following
regulations: doing what the producer claims it can do, having accurate registration materials and
accurate labeling, not adversely affecting the environment when used in the manner in which it
was intended to be used. Over 20,000 products are registered under FIFRA. Social, economic,
and environmental costs and benefits must be considered before a product is approved.
Add. Info: EPA regulations now protect the health and safety of over three million ag workers
from occupational exposure to pesticides on farms, greenhouses, forests and nurseries. The rules
limit the number of hours of exposure and require more safety training.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act—RCRA (Solid Waste Disposal Act) passed in 1976
and amended in 1984; is concerned with how toxic substances are controlled once they are on the
market and with proper disposal of hazardous substances. An EPA regulatory program specifies
how transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes is to take place.
Hazardous Waste—Under RCRA, EPA maintains a list of hazardous wastes defined as “a solid
waste ... which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics may (a) cause ...[a] serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or, (b)
pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment.” Waste
products that fit this definition may be stored or disposed of only at sites whose owners or
operators have an EPA permit. A permit involves meeting applicable regulations dealing with the
treatment and storage of such wastes.
Add. Case: Owen Elec. Steel v. Browner (4th Cir., 1994)--Owen produces slag as a byproduct
of steel production. The slag is mostly limestone and dolomite; after processing on site for about
six months, the slag is sold for use as road base material. EPA claimed the slag processing area
is a solid waste management unit under RCRA. Owen claims it is not, since it is processed for
commercial use. Owen appeals the EPA decision.
Decision: EPA is correct. Slag from steel production is a discarded material, hence it is in a
solid waste management unit subject to RCRA. EPA is given substantial deference by the courts;
Regulation of TSD Sites—Owners and operators of TSD sites must follow EPA regulations.
Facilities are regulated according to function: treatment, storage, or disposal. The EPA and state
environmental agencies regulate every aspect of TSD operations.
The Manifest System—Compliance with RCRA is forced by the manifest system. A hazardous
waste (which includes most chemicals) generator must complete a detailed form (the manifest)
stating the nature of its materials and identifying their origin, routing, and final destination.
Hazardous materials must be properly packaged and labeled. Companies transporting the
materials must have a copy of the manifest, which they sign and give to the owner of the site
where they deliver the materials. Upon disposal of the waste, the site owner must return the
manifest to the generator. If a generator does not receive the manifest from the site owner it must
notify the EPA. This system provides EPA with a cradle-to-grave monitoring system and control
over such waste.
Add. Case: KFC v. Meghrig (S. Ct., 1996)--KFC bought property from Meghrig in 1975. It
built and operates a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise on the property. In 1988, when doing
more work, KFC discovered the soil was contaminated by lead and benzene, which contaminated
the soil when Meghrig improperly operated a gasoline station there years before, unknown to
KFC. The government required KFC to spend $211,000 to remove contaminated soil. After the
clean-up, KFC sued Meghrig to recover the costs it incurred in complying with RCRA. The
district court dismissed the suit; the appeals court held that KFC could collect from Meghrig,
who appealed.
Decision: Reversed. The action by KFC was a citizen suit. That provision of RCRA does not
authorize private causes of action to recover prior costs of cleaning up toxic waste that do not
Superfund—RCRA is concerned with the current disposal of hazardous wastes. CERCLA, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), is the
federal legislation concerned with improper past dumping. Thousands of sites in the U.S. contain
hazardous wastes that were disposed of before any regulation of such dumping existed. Cleaning
these sites is extraordinarily costly and time consuming. The worst sites are placed on the
National Priority List (NPL), which has 2,000 sites. CERCLA provides the President with
authority to clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites and to provide the remedial action
necessary in the case of spills. Funding for Superfund was increased in the 1986 amendments to
the Act, known as SARA (Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act).
Add. Info: Superfund costs and progress: A GAO report noted that the number of Superfund
sites is uncertain. There are about 2,000 sites on the NPL (selected from 25,000 sites evaluated)
at any one time, but since there are many unevaluated and unknown private property sites, the
total clean up is unknown. The cost of cleaning the first 275 sites was estimated to be $32
billion; private parties incurred over half the cost, the states about one-quarter of the costs, and
the federal government about one-sixth of the cost of remediation. Since the number of sites is
nearly unlimited, EPA has essentially capped the number on the NPL list and kept it quite steady
over the years.
Responsible Parties—A site containing hazardous waste will typically have been used by a
number of waste generators. Different owners may have operated the site over the years. In these
situations it can be extremely difficult to pinpoint who dumped what when. Superfund takes this
into account and holds several potentially liable for the costs of cleaning a contaminated site.
Parties that might be responsible are Potentially Responsible Parties. PRPs include 1) current site
owners (including banks or trustees holding title to property), 2) any prior owner who held title
at the time of a hazardous waste disposal, 3) any generator who arranged for disposal of its
wastes at the site, and 4) any transporter of waste who selected the site for disposal. The scope of
liability under Superfund is broad: all PRPs are potentially jointly and severally liable for
cleanup costs, regardless of their individual contribution.
