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Additional Case: Dickinson v. Charter Oaks1
Facts: Marlee and Richard Snowdon bought a house next door to Hal and Carol Dickinson. Carol had
owned the house for 30 years; Hal had moved in 10 to 15 years later when he and Carol married. Hal
had no ownership interest in the property.
The Snowdons decided to clean out an area of overgrowth adjacent to the Dickinson land. Richard
spoke with Hal, who okayed the work. Marlee hired Charter Oaks for the project. Hal expressed
impatience to Richard over the lack of progress and Richard told Hal that Charter was coming soon.
As Charter was working the first day, Hal came out into the yard to look at what was going on and
then went back into the house. The next day, Carol returned from an out-of-town trip and was upset to
see what Charter had done. She ordered the company to stop work. She then filed a lawsuit seeking
damages for the harm to her property.
Charter admitted that Carol had not personally given permission for the landscaping work, but
claimed it had relied on Hal’s apparent authority. The jury returned a verdict for Charter on Carol’s
trespass and damage to vegetation claims and Carol appealed.
Issue: Did Hal Dickinson have apparent authority to make decisions about Carol Snowdon’s property?
Holding: Judgment for Charter Oaks affirmed. A husband and wife are not necessarily agents for each
other. However, in this case, Hal worked frequently in the Dickinson yard, both alone and with his
wife. He also dealt with contractors, including a tree service Carol hired. No one ever told the
Snowdons that Hal was not authorized to make decisions about landscaping. Therefore, it was
reasonable for the Snowdons to assume that Hal did have authority on landscaping matters.
Question: Who owned the house that the Dickinsons lived in?
Question: Did Hal have actual authority to make decisions on landscaping?
Question: Did Carol tell Charter Oaks that Hal had authority?
Question: Did Carol give approval to Charter Oaks for the work they did?
Question: So wouldn’t Charter Oaks be liable for the damage they did to Carol’s property?
Question: Do all spouses have apparent authority for each other.
Question: Then why does Hal have apparent authority?
Answer: He did landscaping work himself and he supervised contractors who worked in the yard.
Question: The fact remains, though, that this was Carol’s property and she did not approve Charter
Oak’s work. Is the result in this case fair?
Answer: Carol was is in a better position to prevent the harm than either the Snowdons, who drew
Example
This letter appeared in the legal advice column of the Chicago Tribune:
I signed a lease and lived with a roommate. He had financial trouble and, as a result, we didn’t
pay the rent for the past month. One night I went back to my apartment and found the locks
changed. The landlord informed me that my roommate had told him that we had moved out and
that my roommate had returned the apartment keys to him. My roommate has moved
1 2003 Ohio 2055; 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 1940 Court of Appeals of Ohio, 2003.
out-of-town and I don’t know where he is. The landlord refuses to let me back in the apartment,
where all my belongings are located.2
This is a good example of an instance where there is not apparent authority. After two cases in which
an employee had apparent authority, it is also useful to give students an example of the alternative.
Question: Did the roommate who left town have apparent authority in this case?
Answer: Probably not. Under apparent authority, the third party must reasonably believe that the
Writing Exercise: Apparent Authority
If students prepared the apparent authority writing exercise, ask them to share examples of apparent
authority. What elements do they have in common with Dickinson v Charter Oaks and the Pure Brush?
Does the class agree that they are valid examples of apparent authority?
Ratication
If a person accepts the benefit of an unauthorized transaction or fails to repudiate it, then he is as bound
by the act as if he had originally authorized it. He has ratified the act.
Subagents
As a general rule, an agent has no authority to delegate her tasks to another unless the principal
authorizes her to do so. But when an agent is authorized to hire a subagent, the principal is as liable for
the acts of the subagent as he is for the acts of a regular agent.
Agent's Liability for Contracts
The agent’s liability on a contract depends upon how much the third party knows about the principal.
Disclosure is the agent’s best protection against liability.
Fully Disclosed Principal
An agent is not liable for any contracts she makes on behalf of a fully disclosed principal.
Unidentied Principal
In the case of an unidentified principal, the third party can recover from either the agent or the
principal. (An unidentified principal is also sometimes called a “partially disclosed principal.”)
Undisclosed Principal
The text describes instances in which both William Zeckendorf and Harvard University, assembled
large parcels of land as undisclosed principals. Students who completed the research assignment on
straw buyers should present their findings. Here are some general questions for the class:
Under what circumstances is it fair or unfair to operate as an undisclosed principal?
One reason to purchase land as an undisclosed principal is to prevent the owner of a final
unsold lot from charging an exorbitant price. Is it fair for the last purchaser to receive a much
higher price?
2Robert A. Boron, “Double Cross; Lies and Fast Exit Leave Roommate Out in the Cold,” Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1994,
p. 34.
Unauthorized Agent
Thus far, in this section, we have been discussing an agent’s liability to a third party for a transaction
that was authorized by the principal. Sometimes, however, agents act without the authority of a
principal. If the agent has no authority (express, implied, or apparent), then the principal is not
liable to the third party and the agent is liable.
Additional Case: Van Damme v. Gelber3,
Facts: Alexandre Van Damme was eager to buy a painting by the artist Gerhard Richter. Nahum Gelber
was willing to sell his Richter entitled “A.B. Diffus.” Van Damme hired Christophe Van De Weghe to
inspect the painting at the Toronto apartment of Gelber’s son. Van De Weghe was not officially told
whose apartment it was, but Gelber’s son was present and Van De Weghe saw a letter on the kitchen
table addressed to Gelber. Van Damme’s agent signed a contract with Gelber’s agent, Gasiunasen
Gallery, to buy the painting for $2.6 million. Gasiunasen signed the contract “Gasiunasen Gallery as
Seller by Seller’s Agent.”
Between the time the contract was signed and Van Damme wired the purchase price to Gasiunasen,
a different Richter painting has sold at auction for $5.55 million. Believing he had made a bad deal,
Gelber refused to accept Van Damme’s payment.
Van Damme sued Gasiunasen for breach of contract. Gasiunasen moved to dismiss on the grounds
that he was an agent for a fully disclosed principal.
Issue: Was Gasiunasen liable under the contract?
Holding: Yes, Gasiunasen was liable under the contract; his motion to dismiss was denied. According
to the court, an agent of a fully disclosed principal cannot be personally liable under a contract. Van De
Weghe did not know who the seller was when he inspected the painting at the Toronto apartment. He
“inferred: the seller’s identity from an envelope lying on the kitchen counter. Although this inference
turned out to be correct, the disclosure of a principal’s identity cannot depend on a person’s ability to
make inferences. Gelber’s name does not appear in the contract. Gelber’s name as the owner does
appear in an e-mail from Gasiunasen to the escrow agent, but there are no allegations that Van Damme
was privy to this e-mail.
According to the court, a principal whose identity has not been disclosed, although the agency
relationship is known is referred to “partially disclosed." The agent for a partially disclosed principal
will be liable on any contract that he makes on behalf of his principal, unless the parties to the contract
expressly agree that the agent will not be liable. An agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a
partially disclosed principal is jointly and severally liable with the principal.
Question: Who signed the contract?
Question: Did Van Damme know that Gelber owned the painting?
Question: If Van Damme knew that Gelber was the owner of the painting, then why does the court
consider Gelber a partially disclosed principal?
Answer: Because Van De Weghe did not officially know that Gelber was the owner, nor did he
Question: But Van De Weghe knows that Gasiunasen is not the owner, right?
Answer: True, but the court stated that a partially disclosed principal is one whose identity is not
Question: What is joint and several liability?
3 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 203, Supreme Court of New York, 2008.
Principal's Liability for Torts
An employer is liable for a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of employment or
acting with apparent authority. This principle of liability is called respondeat superior,
Respondeat Superior
Under the theory of respondeat superior, the employer (that is, the principal) is liable for misbehavior
by the employee (that is, the agent) whether or not the employer was at fault.
Employee or Independent Contractor?
There are two kinds of agents: (1) employees and (2) independent contractors. A principal may be liable
for the torts of an employee but generally is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. The
more control the principal has over an agent, the more likely that the agent will be considered an
employee.
Question: Employers are “generally” not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. When is
a principal liable for these torts?
Scope of Employment
Principals are liable only for torts that an employee commits within the scope of employment. An
employee is acting within the scope of employment if the act:
Is one that employees are generally responsible for
Takes place during hours that the employee is generally employed
Is part of the principal’s business
Is similar to the one the principal authorized
Is one for which the principal supplied the tools; and
Is not seriously criminal.
Additional Case: You Be the Judge: Kashin v. Kent4
Facts: Douglas Kent was the Consul General of the United States in Vladivostok, Russia. One evening,
he drove from his office to a gym and then home. On the way home, he was involved in an accident
that left Aleksandr Kashin severely injured. Kashin sued the United States government, claiming that
Kent was within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
You Be The Judge: Was Kent acting within the scope of his employment while driving home from the
gym?
Holding: Kent was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
Question: Why would Kashin care if Kent was acting within his scope of employment?
Question: Was Kent driving to or from work when the accident happened?
Question: Was he involved in any diplomatic activity at the time of the accident?
4 333 F. Supp. 2d 926; 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17381 United States District Court for the Southern District of
California, 2004.
Question: Why was Kent at the gym?
Question: Was he going to do any more work that day?
Question: Who leased his apartment?
Question: Was he acting within the scope of employment?
Authorization
An act is within the scope of employment, even if expressly forbidden, if it is of the same general
nature as that authorized or if it is incidental to the conduct authorized.
Abandonment
The principal is liable for the actions of the employee that occur while the employee is at work, but not
for actions that occur after the employee has abandoned the principal’s business. The McDonald's case
is perhaps the high-water mark for employer liability.
You Be the Judge: Zankel v. United States of America5
Facts: Staff Sergeant William E. Dreyer was a recruiter for the United States Marine Corps. Driving to
work one morning at 6:40 a.m., in a government owned car, he struck and killed 12 year-old Justin
Zankel. The child’s parents sued the federal government, claiming that it was liable for Dreyer’s
actions because he had been acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
The Marine Corps had provided Dreyer with a car to drive while on government business, but he was
not permitted to use this car while commuting to and from home unless he had specific authorization
from his boss, Major Michael Sherman. However, Sherman was flexible in giving authorization and
even permitted his soldiers simply to leave a message on his voicemail. Indeed, he had only denied
about one dozen such requests over a three-year period.
Each month, Dreyer was expected to meet specific quotas for the number of contracts signed and
recruits shipped to basic training. However, despite working 16 to 18 hours every day of the week,
Dreyer had not met his recruiting quotas for months. Sherman had formally reprimanded him and
increased his target for the following month.
On the day before the accident, Dreyer left home at 6:30 a.m., driving his own car. At the office, he
switched to a government car and worked until 10:45 p.m. He then discovered that his personal car
would not start. He did not want to call Sherman that late, so he drove his government car home
without permission. He believed that, had he called, Sherman would have said it was ok.
Dreyer arrived home at midnight. He was under orders to attend an early morning training session the
next day. So he awoke early and left home at 6:35 a.m. At 6:40 a.m. his car hit Justin Zankel.
You Be the Judge: Was Dreyer within the scope of employment when he killed Zankel?
Argument for the Zankels: At the time of the accident, Dreyer was driving a government vehicle.
Although he had not requested permission to drive the car, if he had done so, permission would
certainly have been granted.
Moreover, even if Dreyer was not authorized to drive the Marine Corps car, the government is still
liable because his activity was of the same general nature as that authorized and it was incidental to the
conduct authorized. Driving the car was part of Dreyer's work. Indeed he could not perform his job
without it. In addition, Dreyer was on the road early so that he could attend a required training session.
5 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23655, United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 2006
He was exhausted from trying to reach impossible goals. The Marine Corps must bear responsibility
for this tragic accident.
Argument for United States: The government had a clear policy stating that recruiters were not
authorized to drive a government car without first requesting permission. Dreyer had not done so.
Therefore, he was not authorized to drive the government car at the time of the accident.
Moreover, it is well established that an employee commuting to and from work is not within the
scope of employment. If Dreyer had been driving from one recruiting effort to another, that would be a
different story. But in this case, he had not yet started work for the Marine Corps and therefore the
government is not liable.
Holding: After considering and weighing all the evidence presented by the parties and applying
the controlling law to the court’s factual findings, this court finds, although it is a close question,
that Dreyer was acting within the scope of his employment with the Marine Corps at the time of
the accident on January 27, 2005. Pursuant to the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3), the court
certifies that Dreyer was acting within the scope of his employment and orders that the United
States is hereby substituted as defendant for William E. Dreyer and that William E. Dreyer is
hereby dismissed as a defendant in this case. The court finds that this court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim under the FTCA, because Dreyer was within the scope of his
employment with the government at the time of the accident underlying plaintiffs’ claim.
Question: Would the outcome have been different if Dreyer had not previously received permission
to borrow the government car to drive home?
Intentional Torts
A principal is not liable for the intentional torts of an employee unless (1) the employee intended to
serve some purpose of the employer; or (2) the employer was negligent in hiring or supervising this
employee.
Case: Doe v. Liberatore6
Facts: The Rev. Albert Liberatore was a priest who worked in a seminary in Scranton, Pennsylvania. A
number of priests wrote to James Timlin, the Bishop of Scranton, warning him that Liberatore was
engaged in a sexual relationship with Richard Roe, a 21 year-old seminarian. Bishop Timlin transferred
Liberatore from the seminary to Sacred Heart Church in Duryea, Pennsylvania.
Fourteen year-old John Doe was a member of Sacred Heart. Liberatore befriended Doe, taking him
to movies and buying him expensive gifts. The two went on trips together and Doe routinely slept in
Liberatore’s bed at the rectory. Liberatore also counseled Doe and his mother when Doe’s father died.
A number of observers, including a friend of Doe’s mother, a member of the rectory housekeeping
staff, and other Diocesan employees told priests in the Diocese that they feared Liberator was sexually
abusing Doe. One witness reported that she had seen Doe put his hand down Liberatore’s pants. The
priests related this information to Timlin, and Doe himself told a priest that he was being sexually
abused. The priest instructed Doe to forgive Liberatore, to keep the issue private, and not to let other
people know because it would ruin Doe’s life and the lives of others.
Only after Liberatore pleaded guilty to multiple counts of sexual abuse did the Church dismiss him.
Doe filed suit against the Diocese of Scranton, Sacred Heart Church and Bishop Timlin alleging that
they were liable for the torts committed by Liberatore. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
6 478 F.Supp. 2d 742, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19067, United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, 2007.
Issue: Was Liberatore acting within the scope of his employment? Was the Church negligent in hiring
and supervising him? Was the Church liable for his criminal acts?
Excerpts from Judge Caputo’s Decision: An employer is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of
his employees which cause injury to a third party, provided such acts were committed during the
course of and within the scope of the employment.
Conduct of an employee is considered within the scope of employment for purposes of vicarious
liability if: (1) it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform; (2) it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (3) it is actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the employer; and (4) if force is intentionally used by the employee against another,
the force is not unexpected by the employer.
Here, it is clear Liberatore’s sexual molestation of Plaintiff was not within the scope or nature of
his employment as a priest. Indeed, the activity is wholly inconsistent with the role of one who is
received into the Holy Orders as an ordained priest of the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, the acts
of sexual abuse perpetrated by Liberatore were both outrageous and certainly not actuated by any
purpose of serving the Diocese, Sacred Heart, or Bishop Timlin. Therefore, the court will grant
summary judgment in favor of the Diocese, Sacred Heart and Bishop Timlin as to [this issue].
Plaintiff next claims that Defendants are liable for negligence in their hiring, supervision and
retention of Liberatore as a priest. [A]n employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting,
supervising and controlling employees. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that to hold an
employer liable, it must be shown that the employer knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should
have known of the necessity for exercising control of his employee.
Here, the Diocese, Sacred Heart, and Timlin may be liable if they knew or should have known that
Liberatore had a propensity for committing sexual abuse and his employment as Pastor at Sacred Heart
might create a situation where his propensity would harm a third person such as the Plaintiff. A
reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendants were negligent or reckless in supervising and
retaining Liberatore. However, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could not find that the
Defendants were negligent or reckless in hiring Liberatore because there is no evidence suggesting that
Liberatore was or would become a child sex predator when he was hired.
Question: Liberatore’s abuse of Doe happened while Liberatore was employed by Sacred Heart,
how then could the court conclude that the abuse did not happen during the scope of Liberatore’s
employment?
Answer: Although the abuse did happen while Liberatore was employed by Sacred Heart, and in
fact was most likely enabled because Liberatore was a priest, the conduct was not the type of
Question: What does the Court mean when it says “a reasonable jury could conclude that the
Diocese, Sacred Heart, and Bishop Timlin were negligent or reckless in supervising and retaining
Liberatore” and also “a reasonable jury could not find that the Diocese, Sacred Heart and Bishop
Timlin were negligent or reckless in hiring Liberatore”?
Answer: In order for the Defendants to be liable for negligence in hiring, supervising, and retaining
Liberatore, the Defendants must have known or should have known that Liberatore had a
propensity for committing sexual abuse, and that his employment at Sacred Heart might create a
Question; What evidence was there that the Defendants were negligent or reckless in retaining or
supervising Liberatore?
Answer: Liberatore gave Doe expensive gifts, Doe routinely slept in Liberatore’s bed at the
rectory, a number of observers told priests in the Diocese that they feared Liberatore was abusing
Question: Do we know whether the Diocese, Sacred Heart or Timlin knew that Doe was sleeping
in Liberatore’s bed at the rectory? Does that matter?
Answer: There is no evidence that the Defendants knew of these things. However, the standard is
whether they knew or should have known that Liberatore’s employment at Sacred Heart would
Physical or Nonphysical Harm
In the case of physical torts, a principal is liable for the negligent conduct of an employee that occurs
within the scope of employment. Nonphysical torts are treated more like a contract claim, and the
principal is liable if the employee acted with express, implied, or apparent authority.
Agent’s Liability for Torts
Agents are always liable for their own torts.
Multiple Choice Questions
1. At Business University, semester enrollment begins at midnight on April 1. Jasper asked his
roommate Alonso as a favor to register him for an important required course. Alonso agreed to do
so but then overslept. As a result, Jasper could not enroll in the required course he needed to
graduate and had to stay in school for an additional semester. Is Alonso liable to Jasper?
(a) No, because an agency agreement is invalid unless the agent receives payment.
(b) No, because Alonso was not grossly negligent.
(c) No, because the cost of the extra semester is unreasonably high.
(d) Yes, because Alonso disobeyed his instructions.
2. Finn learns that, despite his stellar record, he is being paid less than other salespeople are at Barry
Co. So he decides to start his own company. During his last month on the Barry payroll, he tells all
of his clients about his new business. He also tells them that Barry is a great company, but his fees
will be lower. After he opens the doors of his new business, most of his former clients move with
him. Is Finn liable to Barry?
(a) No, because he has not been disloyal to Barry -- he praised the company.
(b) No, because Barry was underpaying him.
(c) No, because his clients have the right to hire whichever company they choose.
(d) Yes, Finn has violated his duty of loyalty to Barry.
3. Kurt asked his car mechanic, Quinn, for help in buying a used car. Quinn recommends a Ford Focus
that she has been taking care of its whole life. Quinn was working for the seller. Which of the
following statements is true?
(a) Quinn must pay Kurt the amount of money she received from the Ford's prior owner.
(b) After buying the car, Kurt discovers it needs $1000 in repairs. He may recover that amount
from Quinn, but only if Quinn knew about the needed repairs before Kurt bought the car.
(c) Kurt cannot recover anything because Quinn had no obligation to reveal her relationship with
the car’s seller.
(d) Kurt cannot recover anything because he had not paid Quinn for her help.
4. Figgins is the dean of a college. He appointed Sue acting dean while he was out of the country and
posted an announcement on the college website announcing that she was authorized to act in his
place. He also told Sue privately that she did not have the right to make admissions decisions.
While Figgins was gone, Sue overruled the admissions committee to admit the child of a wealthy
alumnus. Does the child have the right to attend this college?
(a) No, because Sue was not authorized to admit him.
(b) No, because Figgins did not ratify Sue’s decision.
(c) Yes, because Figgins was a fully disclosed principal.
(d) Yes, because Sue had apparent authority.
5. CPA QUESTION A principal will not be liable to a third party for a tort committed by an agent:
(a) Unless the principal instructed the agent to commit the tort
(b) Unless the tort was committed within the scope of the agency relationship
(c) If the agency agreement limits the principal’s liability for the agent’s tort
(d) If the tort is also regarded as a criminal act
6. CPA QUESTION Cox engaged Datz as her agent. It was mutually agreed that Datz would not
disclose that he was acting as Cox’s agent. Instead he was to deal with prospective customers as if
he were a principal acting on his own behalf. This he did and made several contracts for Cox.
Assuming Cox, Datz, or the customer seeks to avoid liability on one of the contracts involved,
which of the following statements is correct?
(a) Cox must ratify the Datz contracts in order to be held liable.
(b) Datz has no liability once he discloses that Cox was the real principal.
(c) The third party can avoid liability because he believed he was dealing with Datz as a principal.
(d) The third party may choose to hold either Datz or Cox liable.
Essay Questions
1. An elementary school custodian hit a child who wrote graffiti on the wall. Is the school district
liable for this intentional tort by its employee?
2. What if the custodian hit one of the schoolchildren for calling him a name? Is the school district
liable?
3. A soldier was drinking at a training seminar. Although he was told to leave his car at the seminar,
he disobeyed orders and drove to a military club. On the way to the club, he was in an accident. Is
the military liable for the damage he caused?
4. One afternoon while visiting friends, tennis star Vitas Gerulaitis fell asleep in their pool house. A
mechanic had improperly installed the swimming pool heater, which leaked carbon monoxide
fumes into the house where he slept, killing him. His mother filed suit against the owners of the
estate. On what theory would they be liable?
Answer: Principals are liable for the torts of their independent contractors only if they have been
5. You Be the Judge: WRITING PROBLEM Sarah went to an auction at Christie's to
bid on a tapestry for her employer, Fine Arts Gallery. The good news is that she purchased a Dufy
tapestry for $77,000. The bad news is that it was not the one her employer had told her to buy. In
the excitement of the auction, she forgot her instructions. Fine Art refused to pay, and Christie's file
suit. Is Fine Arts liable for the unauthorized act of its agent? Argument for Christie's: Christie's
cannot possibly ascertain in each case the exact nature of a bidder’s authority. Whether or not
Sarah had actual authority, she certainly had apparent authority and Fine Arts is liable. Argument
for Fine Arts: Sarah was not authorized to purchase the Dufy tapestry, and therefore Christie’s
must recover from her not Fine Arts.
Discussion Questions
1. ETHICS Mercedes has just begun work at Photobook.com. What a great place to work! Although
the salary is not high, the company has fabulous perks. The dining room provides great food from
7am to midnight, five days a week. There is also a free laundry and dry cleaning service.
Mercedes’s social life has never been better. She invites her friends over to Photobook for meals,
and has their laundry done for free. In addition, because her job requires her to be online all the
time, she has plenty of opportunity to stay in touch with her friends by chatting, tweeting and
checking Facebook updates. She is, however, shocked that one of her colleagues takes paper home
from the office for his children to use at home. Are these employees behaving ethically?
2. Kevin was the manager of a radio station, WABC. A competing station lured him away. In his last
month on the job at WABC, he notified two key on-air personalities that if they were to leave the
station, he would not hold them to their non-compete agreements. What can WABC do?
3. Jesse worked as a buyer for the Vegetable Co. Rachel offered to sell Jesse 10 tons of tomatoes for
the account of Vegetable. Jesse accepted the offer. Later, Jesse discovered that Rachel was an agent
for Sylvester Co. Who is liable on this contract?
Answer: Because Vegetable Co. was a fully disclosed principal, Vegetable Co. is liable but Jesse is
4. The Pharmaceutical Association holds an annual convention. At the convention, Brittany, who was
president of the Association, told Luke that Research Corp. had a promising new cancer vaccine.
Luke was so excited that he chartered a plane to fly to Research's headquarters. On the way, the
plane crashed and Luke was killed. Is the Pharmaceutical Association liable for Luke's death?
5. Betsy has a two-year contract as a producer at Jackson Movie Studios. She produces a remake of
the movie Footloose. Unfortunately, it bombs and Jackson is so furious, he fires her on the weekend
the movie opens. Does he have the power to do this?
Answer: Yes, he has the power. He does not, however, have the right, because she has a two-year
