Case: Seton, Co. v. Lear Corp.1
Facts: General Motors hired Lear to supply all of the leather seats for its trucks and SUVs. In October,
1998, Lear and Seton agreed that Seton would provide Lear with cut-to-pattern leather, which Lear
would then assemble. Seton agreed to give Lear rebates based on the size of the orders.
Both parties performed the contract for about on year, at which time they agreed to modify the
rebates. In the Fall of 1999, Lear asked Seton to send a written summary of the agreement. In
November, 1999, Seton sent a one-page memorandum summarizing the agreement to Lear, stating:
“Lear is to award Seton the entire [truck and SUV program] cut-to-pattern business for the life of the
program.” The letter ended with a request that Lear “kindly return with acknowledgement signature.”
Lear did not do so.
The parties worked together for two more years, but Seton became anxious that Lear would take
its business elsewhere. In January, 2002 Seton sent a letter requesting that Lear affirm its exclusive
commitment to Seton for the life of the GMC program. Lear responded that there had never been any
such agreement and Seton sued.
At trial, Lear claimed that no contract had ever been signed. Seton claimed that its memo
summarizing the agreement created a valid contract under the “merchant exception” rule. The jury
found for Seton and awarded $34 million. Lear appealed.
Issue: Did Seton’s memorandum create a contract under the merchant exception?
Decision: Yes, the confirming memo between merchants created a contract under the UCC. Affirmed.
Reasoning: Lear argued that the November letter was not a written confirmation of an existing
contract, but rather an offer of a new contract. The company emphasized that the phrase “kindly return
with acknowledgement signature” was evidence that there was no final agreement. But the jury
disagreed. It was clearly influenced by Seton’s argument that the letter referred to a prior agreement
between Lear and Seton executives. Also, although the letter asked for a signature, it did not require
one. For these reasons, the letter amounted to more than a mere offer.
The UCC does require, however, that merchants send any confirmatory memo within a reasonable
length of time. Lear contended that the letter could not count as a written confirmation because it
arrived 13 months after the first discussion of the deal with Seton, but the jury disagreed, probably
because the relationship between the companies had been casual and friendly for a long time.
Question: What is the merchants’ exception to the Statute of Frauds?
Answer: The merchants’ exception applies only when both parties are merchants and
Within a reasonable time of making an oral contract,
Question: What parts of the merchants’ exception did Lear argue was not present on the facts?
Answer: The requirement that one merchant send a written confirmation to the other, and whether
Question: How long after the oral agreement did Seton mail the letter?
Question: What caused the delay?
Answer: Both parties were working well under the agreement, and presumably neither had any
Question: Does it make sense that 13 months is a reasonable time?
Answer: In this case, the court thought it did. Both parties had been operating under the agreement
1 198 Fed.Appx.496, 2006 WL 2860774, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2006.