Answer:
a. The monopoly outcome is to produce a quantity of 50 and charge a
price of $70. If the duopolists evenly split production, each will produce 25
b. DWL = 0.5(100 − 50)(70 − 20) = $1,250.
c. If duopolist A increases production by 10, price for all units will fall to
d. If Dupolist A increases production by 10 units, DWL decreases to
12. Oil Giant and Local Oil are the only two producers in a market, as
shown in Figure 15P-6. They have an agreement to restrict oil output in order
to keep prices high. [LO 15.7]
a. What is the dominant strategy for each player?
b. If this game is played once, what is the Nash equilibrium?
c. Now suppose that both players know that the game will be played
multiple times. What outcome would we expect?
Answer:
a. The dominant strategy for Oil Giant is to compete. The dominant
strategy for Local Oil is to compete.
b. If this game is played once, the Nash equilibrium is for both “rms to
c. If the game is played multiple times, we would expect collusion to be
13. Suppose Warner Music and Universal Music are in a duopoly and
currently limit themselves to 10 new artists per year. One artist sells 2 million
songs at $1.25 per song. However, each label is capable of signing 20 artists
per year. If one label increases the number of artists to 20 and the other
stays the same, the price per song drops to $0.75, and each artist sells 3
million songs. If both labels increase the number of artists to 20, the price
per song drops to $0.30, and each artist sells 4 million songs. [LO 15.7]
a. Fill in the revenue payo#s for each scenario in Figure 15P-7.
b. If this game is played once, how many artists will each producer sign, and
what will be the price of a song?