Stock Price Behavior and Market Efficiency 7-6
Interestingly, the market recovered very quickly. The market was up in 1987 and
the bull market continued for many years after the crash. As a result of the crash,
NYSE circuit breakers were introduced. These circuit breakers required trading
halts based upon 7, 13, and 20 percent declines in the DJIA. Recall we discuss
the “flash crash” in chapter 5, as well as the individual stock circuit breakers that
were instituted in response. The text in this chapter provides an article on Apple
triggering this constraint.
C. The Asian Crash
The crash of the Nikkei Index, which began in 1990, lengthened into a
particularly long bear market. It is quite like the Crash of 1929 in that respect. In
three years from December 1986 to the peak in December 1989, the Nikkei 225
Index rose 115 percent. Over the next three years, the index lost 57 percent of its
value. In April 2003, the Nikkei Index stood at a level that was 80 percent
off its peak in December 1989.
D. The “Dot-Com” Bubble and Crash
By the mid-1990s, the rise in Internet use and its international growth potential
fueled widespread excitement over the “new economy.” Investors did not seem to
care about solid business plans—only big ideas. Investor euphoria led to a surge
in Internet IPOs, which were commonly referred to as “dot-coms” because so
many of their names ended in “.com.” Of course, the lack of solid business
models doomed many of the newly formed companies. Many of them suffered
huge losses and some folded relatively shortly after their IPOs.
The Amex Internet Index soared from a level of 114.60 on October 1, 1998, to its
peak of 688.52 in late March 2000, an increase of about 500 percent. The Amex
Internet Index then fell to a level of 58.59 in early October 2002, a drop of about
91 percent. By contrast, the S&P 500 Index rallied about 31 percent in the same
1998–2000 time period and fell 40 percent during the 2000–2002 time period.
E. The Crash of October 2008
Although still under debate, many agree that one of the underlying causes of the
crash of 2008 was excess liquidity, which allowed unworthy borrowers to obtain
financing, primarily for mortgages. Moreover, much of this was done at low
“teaser rates.” When these rates reset, required payments increased, resulting in
bankruptcies for these so-called subprime loans. If house prices had continued to
climb, borrowers could have refinanced, avoiding trouble. However, this did not
happen.
7.6 Summary and Conclusions