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Although virtue ethics usually refer to an individual’s character, the concept can also be applied
Likewise, Massey’s actions do not pass the “virtue” test. Massey was animated by “bottom line
thinking” and showed an almost complete lack of empathy for others.
In sum, an application of the four methods of ethical analysis to this case demonstrates that
met the standards of utilitarianism.
TEACHING TIP: ETHICAL CLIMATE
The instructor may wish to ask students to classify Massey according to the typology of ethical
climates, as presented in Chapter 5. The textbook explains:
By this typology, Massey’s would probably be classified as “egoist,” that is, the company was
primarily concerned with its own profits and the compensation of its senior executives; it showed
little concern for others or for society’s laws.
TEACHING TIP: FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEMS
of the arrival of government inspectors; and the infamous “RUNNING COAL” memo—seemed
to contradict this. In other words, at Massey the formal and informal systems were not in
alignment.
3. Who or what caused the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, and why do you think so?
Some students will answer this question by citing the sequence of physical events that occurred
on April 5, 2010, that is:
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Instructor prompt: What people or groups were most responsible for the Upper Big Branch
disaster, and why do you think so?
Students may answer this question in several ways. Among the possible responses are these:
gasoline or ton of coal. Accordingly, he should bear the ultimate responsibility for the Upper
Big Branch mine disaster. Students may note that Blankenship himself disavowed any
responsibility for the disaster, telling analysts that his conscience was “totally clear.”
productivity, surface mining productivity, and fulfillment of contracts). Percent reduction in
policy of not recording miners’ injuries. Other factors (identification of successors, employee
environmental and safety violations—was a predictable outcome.
TEACHING TIP: A STUDENT/C STUDENT
Average students will immediately recognize Blankenship’s responsibility for the disaster.
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TEACHING TIP: INDUSTRIAL HOMICIDE
Government safety and health regulators: Another view is that the main responsibility lies
with government regulators from MSHA and the corresponding West Virginia agency. Evidence
Policymakers: Some may argue that despite decades of legislative advances in the area of mine
safety and health, the law was still too weak to effectively constrain the actions of rogue
corporations like Massey. In this view, strong laws might have prevented the tragedy.
“God:” Finally, it is worth mentioning that the company’s view was that “God” was responsible
4. What steps could be taken now to reduce the chances of a similar tragedy occurring
in the future? In your answer, please address the appropriate roles of mining
companies (and their directors and managers), government regulators and
policymakers, and the workers and their union in assuring mine health and safety.
TEACHING TIP: BOARD WORK
One way to approach this question is to work across the board from “causes” to “possible
remedies.” Another approach would be to look in turn at steps various parties could take, e.g.,
policymakers, management, etc.
Students may wish to make a number of specific recommendations for change, including the
following:
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of effectively balancing the requirements of profit and productivity with the legitimate
interests of stakeholders and the need to comply with all relevant laws.
Legal compliance: Managers should make it clear that the policy of the corporation is to
TEACHING TIP: CHANGING THE LAW
As a separate assignment, students might be asked to research existing mine safety and health
laws and recommend public policy changes that would help prevent an Upper Big Branch-like
disaster in the future. Students may be interested in comparing their recommendations with that
Miller of California.
Labor laws: Strengthen the labor laws that enable fair, unbiased elections for union
representation.
Epilogue:
As of November 2015, the following further developments had occurred:
Massey failed to make a profit in any quarter of 2010.
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Various institutional investors sued Massey for damages.
the House Committee on Education and the Workforce declared the bill “dead.”
In December 2010, CEO Don Blankenship stepped down as CEO of Massey.
Massey.
Alpha Natural Resources publicly repudiated the Massey report that blamed the disaster
on a sudden, unexpected inundation of natural gas through a crack in the floor.
In January 2012, Alpha settled with the families of victims (who had not already settled
with Massey). Terms of the settlement were not revealed.
In late 2011, Hughie Stover, a former security officer, was convicted of lying to
in prison.
In March 2012, a former superintendent of the mine, Gary May, pleaded guilty to
In November 2012, David C. Hughart, formerly president of a division of Massey
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In October 2015, Don Blankenship went on trial in West Virginia for breaking mine