Chapter 15 – Central Banks in the World Today
5. In addition, there is general agreement that policy decisions are better made by
committee than by individuals, and that everyone is well served when policymakers
operate within an explicit framework that clearly states their goals and the tradeoffs
among them.
A. The Need for Independence
1. The idea that central banks should be independent of political pressure is a new one,
because central banks originated as the governments’ banks.
2. Independence has two components: monetary policymakers must be free to control
their own budgets and the bank’s policies must not be reversible by people outside the
central bank.
3. Successful monetary policy requires a long time horizon, which is inconsistent with
the need of politicians to focus on short-term goals.
4. Given a choice, most politicians will choose monetary policies that are too
accommodative, keeping interest rates low and money growth rates high. While this
raises output and employment in the near term it may result in inflation over the
longer term.
5. To insulate policymakers from the daily pressures faced by politicians, governments
have given central banks control of their own budgets, authority to make irreversible
decisions, and appointed them to long terms.
B. Decision-Making by Committee
1. In the course of normal operations, it is better to rely on a committee than on an
individual.
2. Pooling the knowledge, experience, and opinions of a group of people reduces the
risk that policy will be dictated by an individual’s quirks, not to mention that in a
democracy, vesting so much power in one individual poses a legitimacy problem.
C. The Need for Accountability and Transparency
1. Central bank independence is inconsistent with representative democracy.
2. To solve this problem, politicians have established a set of goals and require the
policymakers to report their progress in pursuing these goals.
3. Explicit goals foster accountability and disclosure requirements create transparency.
4. The institutional means for assuring accountability and transparency differ from one
country to the next; in some cases the government sets an explicit numerical target for
inflation, while in others the central bank defines the target.
5. Similar differences exist in the timing and content of information made public by
central banks. Over time these differences have narrowed. Central bank statements
have much more information than they did in the early 1990s.
6. Today it is understood that secrecy damages both the policymakers and the economies
they are trying to manage, and that policymakers need to be as clear as possible about
what they are trying to achieve and how they are going to achieve it.
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