Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
Chapter 14
Regulating the Financial System
Chapter Overview
In this chapter the sources and consequences of financial fragility are examined, with the
emphasis on banking crises. Next, the chapter looks at the institutional safeguards, like deposit
insurance, that the government has built into the system in an attempt to avert financial crises.
Finally, the regulatory and supervisory environment of the banking system is examined.
Learning Objectives: Establish an understanding of:
1. Banking runs, panics, and crises
2. Government safety net
3. Regulation and supervision
Important Points of the Chapter
Banking crises are not a new phenomena; the history of commercial banking over the last two
centuries is replete with period of turmoil and failure. By their very nature, financial systems are
fragile and vulnerable to crisis. When financial crises occur, governments step in and put
financial intermediaries back on track. They often do so by assuming responsibility for the
banking system’s liabilities, so that depositors won’t lose their savings. But the clean up can also
require the injection of capital into failed institutions, which can be very expensive. Such crises
can also have a tremendous negative impact on a country’s growth.
Application of Core Principles
Principle #3: Information. Information asymmetries are the reason that a run on a single bank
can turn into a bank panic that threatens the entire financial system. People cannot assess the
quality of the bank’s balance sheet, and so can’t tell the difference between a good or a bad bank.
So when the rumors begin, depositors worry about their own bank’s condition.
Principle #5: Stability. The financial system is inherently unstable as a result of liquidity risk
and information asymmetries.
Principle #5: Stability. The goal of financial stability does not mean the stability of individual
financial institutions; this would defeat the purpose of competition. Rather, regulators should
strive to prevent large-scale catastrophes.
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
Teaching Tips/Student Stumbling Blocks
Chapter 14 is your students’ first substantial exposure to Core Principle 5: stability
improves welfare. As you discuss regulation keep reminding students that the point is to
avert financial crises.
An effective way to present the material in this chapter is with an outline of bank balance
sheets displayed on the board or on a handout. Since many, though not all, of the
problems faced by regulators in assuring a stable financial system revolve around the
various items on the balance sheet, this will provide a useful structure for student
understanding.
Features in this Chapter
Your Financial World: The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
Brokerage firms will advertise that they are members of the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation or SIPC. The SIPC provides insurance in the event that a brokerage firm fails owing
its customers cash and securities that are missing. It is insurance against fraud, up to a limit of
$500,000. SIPC insurance does not compensate individuals for investments that lost value due to
changes in market prices, nor will it cover individuals who were sold worthless securities. The
SIPC is there to protect against theft by a broker.
Applying the Concept: The Day the Bank of New York Borrowed $23 Billion
On November 20, 1985 the Bank of New York’s computer system went haywire and the bank
could not keep track of its U.S. Treasury bond trades. Unable to keep track of the trades, the
bank had to make good on the transactions, and without the money ($23 billion) there might
have been a panic. The Federal Reserve, as lender of last resort, stepped in with a loan and
perhaps prevented a full-blown financial crisis.
Lessons from the Crisis: Should the Lender of Last Resort Also Supervise?
Who supervises the financial industry? In the U.S., there are a large number of regulatory
agencies that overlap in responsibility. The Fed is the lender of last resort and supervises bank
holding companies. Most intermediaries lie outside the Fed’s supervision. The U.K. has a
unified financial regulator: the Financial Services Authority. Other countries have systems that
fall in between. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 tested all of these regulatory arrangements.
None of the arrangements fared any better in the crisis than the others.
Applying the Concept: Does Deposit Insurance Really Work
Surprisingly to many, deposit insurance may do more harm than good. While it is supposed to
stabilize the financial system, it may in fact create moral hazard. Knowing that they are
protected by the government relieves depositors of the need to exercise market discipline on
banks. Some research indicates that when governments implement deposit insurance the
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
probability of financial crises has increased rather than decreased. The real key to stabilizing the
financial system may be to give bank managers and owners incentives to protect depositors on
their own. One specific way to do this would be to require that banks sell subordinated debt; the
price of such publicly traded bonds would provide the market’s evaluation of the quality of the
bank and serve to discipline its management.
Your Financial World: Are Your Deposits Insured?
Deposit insurance covers individuals, not accounts; it insures depositors. So if your account is
joint, perhaps with a spouse, you are each covered up to the ceiling amount. If you have more
than one account the amounts will be combined in comparison to the deposit insurance limit. If
you have accounts at more than one bank they will be insured separately, up to the deposit
insurance limit. But remember, should the two banks merge, the accounts will be treated as if
they were at one bank. The FDIC also insures “self-directed retirement accounts” as well; on
these accounts, the limit is $250,000. While this may seem like a large number, many people
will reach that limit before they retire. So insuring your retirement savings is something you will
need to worry about.
Tools of the Trade: The Basel Accords: I, II, III and Counting
The Basel Accord of 1988 was an agreement that established a requirement that internationally
active banks must hold capital equal to or greater than 8 percent of their risk-adjusted assets. By
linking minimum capital requirements to the risk a bank takes on it forced regulators to change
the way they thought about bank capital. Also, it created a uniform international system and it
provided a framework that less-developed countries could use to improve the regulation of their
banks. The original Accord had its limits and was revised; the new Accord is based three pillars:
a revised set of minimum capital requirements, supervisory review of bank balance sheets, and
increased reliance of market discipline to encourage sound risk management practices. In 2010,
regulators refined and extended the Basel Accord. This new agreement sets restrictions on
leverage, introduces three buffers over and above the minimum capital requirement itself, and
adds a liquidity requirement.
In the News: How to Shrink the ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ Banks
A dozen megabanks today control almost 70% of the assets in the U.S. banking industry.
Government policy has made these institutions exempt from the normal processes of bankruptcy
and creative destruction. The 2010 Dodd-Frnak Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act promised to end too big to fail. However, market discipline is still lacking for the largest
institutions.
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
Lessons of the Article: Despite the DoddFrank Act, megabanks enjoy an implicit
subsidy not available to smaller banks: They borrow at lower costs because many
creditors believe that they would be bailed out in a crisis. Ending that subsidy requires
that, if they fail, they can be quickly put under new ownership or liquidated without a
bailout and without damaging the financial system or the economy. To make this
feasible, the article proposes to shrink them. It also proposes to narrow the federal
safety net, but that may not reduce the government’s incentive to bail out the largest
intermediaries in a crisis.
Additional Teaching Tools
Janet Yellen was nominated by President Barack Obama in late 2013 for the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve. The following Wall Street Journal article follows the Senate confirmation
hearings.
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/11/14/live-blog-janet-yellens-confirmation-hearing-for-fed
-chair/?KEYWORDS=Yellen.
Virtual Tools
Visit the bank regulators on line:
For the FDIC go to: http://www.fdic.gov/
For the Comptroller of the Currency go to: http://www.occ.treas.gov/
For the Federal Reserve go to: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
To learn more about your state banking regulators you can go to this site which provides links to
all the state regulators: http://www.csbs.org/Pages/default.aspx
For More Discussion
For a different perspective on bank runs, have students read this short article by George G.
Kaufman, who is the John F. Smith Professor of Finance and Economics at Loyola University in
Chicago. He argues that the dangers of runs may be overstated.
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BankRuns.html
Chapter Outline
I. The Sources and Consequences of Runs, Panics, and Crises
1. Banks’ fragility arises from the fact that they provide liquidity to depositors, allowing
them to withdraw their balances on demand, on a first-come, first-served basis.
2. Reports that a bank has become insolvent can spread fear that it will run out of cash
and close its doors; such a run on a bank can cause it to fail.
3. What matters during a bank run is not whether a bank is solvent but whether it is
liquid; false rumors that a bank is insolvent can lead to a run which renders it illiquid.
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
4. When a bank fails, depositors may lose some or all of their deposits, and information
about borrowers’ creditworthiness may disappear; for this reason, governments take
steps to try to minimize the risk of failure.
5. A single bank failure can also turn into a system-wide panic; this is called contagion.
6. While banking panics and financial crises can result from false rumors, they can also
occur for more concrete reasons; anything that affects borrowers’ ability to repay their
loans or drives down the market price of securities has the potential to imperil the
bank’s finances.
7. The history of banking in the United States shows that downturns in the business
cycle put pressure on banks, substantially increasing the risk of panics.
8. Financial disruptions can also occur whenever borrowers’ net worth falls, as it does
during deflation.
II. The Government Safety Net
1. There are three reasons for the government to get involved in the financial system: to
protect investors, to protect bank customers from monopolistic exploitation, and to
safeguard the stability of the financial system.
2. Government officials employ a combination of strategies to protect investors and
ensure the stability of the financial system: they provide the safety net to insure small
depositors and they operate as the lender of last resort.
A. The Unique Role of Banks and Shadow Banks
1. Depository institutions receive a disproportionate amount of attention from
government regulators because they play a central role in the economy and because
they face a unique set of problems.
2. We all rely heavily on banks for access to the payments system. Shadow banks also
provide liquidity.
3. Banks are also prone to runs, and are linked to each other both on their balance sheets
and in their customers’ minds; this interconnectedness of banks makes bank failures
contagious. This is not true for nondepository institutions.
B. The Government as Lender of Last Resort
1. The best way to stop a bank failure from turning into a panic is to make sure solvent
institutions can meet their depositors’ withdrawal demands.
2. The existence of a lender of last resort significantly reduces, but does not eliminate,
contagion.
3. For the system to work, central bank officials who approve the loan applications must
be able to distinguish an illiquid from an insolvent institution.
4. It is important for a lender of last resort to operate in a manner that minimizes the
tendency for bankers to take too much risk in their operations.
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
C. Government Deposit Insurance
1. To stem the bank panics of the 1930s Congress passed legislation creating the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which guarantees that a depositor will receive
the full account balance up to some maximum amount, even if a bank fails.
2. When a bank fails, the FDIC resolves the insolvency either by closing the institution
(the payoff method) or by finding a buyer (the purchase and acquisition method).
3. Under the payoff method, the FDIC pays off all the depositors then sells the assets in
an attempt to recover the amount paid off.
4. Under the purchase and acquisition method, the FDIC pays another institution to take
over the one that failed.
5. Deposit insurance has been extraordinarily successful in eliminating bank runs and
financial crises, and because the U.S. Treasury backs the FDIC it can withstand
virtually any crisis.
D. Problems Created by the Government Safety Net
1. Protected depositors have no incentive to monitor their banks’ behavior, and knowing
this, banks take on more risk than they would normally.
2. Regulators must balance the often conflicting goals of crisis mitigation and crisis
prevention that sometimes creates moral hazard.
3. Some banks are too big to fail, meaning that their failure would cause havoc in the
financial system. The managers of such institutions know that if they begin to
founder the government will have to bail them out.
4. The too-big-to-fail policy limits the extent of the market discipline that depositors can
impose on banks and compounds the moral hazard problem.
III. Regulation and Supervision of the Financial System
1. Government officials employ three strategies to ensure that the risks created by the
safety net are contained: regulation establishes rules for bank managers to follow,
supervision provides general oversight of financial institutions, and examination
provides detailed information on the firms’ operations.
2. Regulatory requirements are designed to minimize the cost of failures to the
tax-paying public.
3. One example of regulation is the requirement that banks obtain a charter in order to
operate; this provides screening to make sure that the people who own and run banks
will not be criminals. Once a bank is operating other regulations control the assets,
the amount of capital, and makes information about the bank’s balance sheet public.
4. Government supervisors enforce the regulations; they monitor, inspect, and examine
banks to make sure that their business practices conform to regulatory requirements.
5. Banks are regulated and supervised by a combination of the U.S. Treasury, the
Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and state banking authorities. Shadow banks are regulated
by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
6. The existence of regulatory competition has two consequences: regulators force each
other to innovate, improving the quality of the regulations, but it also allows banks to
look for the more lenient regulator.
A. Restrictions on Competition
1. One long-standing goal of financial regulators has been to prevent banks from
growing too big and powerful, both because their failure might threaten the financial
system and because without competition banks might exploit their customers.
2. Even though recent legislation has changed the banking industry, restrictions on bank
size remain, and bank mergers require government approval.
3. To approve a merger, officials must be convinced that the new bank will not
constitute a monopoly in any geographic region and that (in the case of a big bank
taking over a small bank) the acquired bank’s customers will be well served by the
merger.
4. Government officials also worry that the greater the competition among banks, the
harder it is for banks to make a profit, and that this could drive banks to take on too
much risk.
5. This type of moral hazard can be avoided if government officials restrict competition
or if they prohibit banks from making certain kinds of loans and from purchasing
certain types of securities that are considered to be too risky.
B. Asset Holding Restrictions and Minimum Capital Requirements
1. The simplest way to prevent bankers from exploiting their safety net is to restrict
banks’ balance sheets; this can be through restrictions on the kinds of assets banks can
hold and requirements that they maintain minimum levels of capital.
2. U.S. banks cannot hold common stock, and regulations also limit the grade and
quantity of bonds a bank can hold.
3. The size of the loans a bank can make to particular borrowers is also limited.
4. In effect, regulators are telling banks to do what they should be doing: holding a
well-diversified portfolio of liquid, high-grade bonds, and loans.
5. Minimum capital requirements complement these limitations on bank assets.
6. Capital serves as a cushion against declines in the value of the bank’s assets, lowering
the likelihood of the bank’s failure, and is a way to reduce the problem of moral
hazard.
7. Capital requirements take two basic forms: the first requires banks to keep their ratio
of capital to assets above some minimum level regardless of the structure of their
balance sheets; the second requires banks to hold capital in proportion to the riskiness
of their operations.
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
C. Disclosure Requirements
1. Many intermediaries must provide information to customers about the cost of their
products; this is to protect customers.
2. Banks must also provide information to the financial markets about their balance
sheets; this also protects depositors, but in a different way.
D. Supervision and Examination
1. The government enforces banking rules and regulations through an elaborate
oversight process called supervision, which relies on a combination of monitoring and
inspection.
2. Supervision is done remotely, through an examination of the detailed reports banks
must submit, as well as through on-site examination.
3. At the largest institutions, examiners are on site all the time; this is called continuous
examination.
4. The most important part of a bank examination is the evaluation of past-due loans, to
see if they should be declared in default.
5. Supervisors use the acronym CAMELS to describe the criteria used to evaluate the
health of the bank: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings,
Liquidity, and Sensitivity to risk.
6. Current practice is for examiners to act as consultants to banks, advising them on how
to get the highest return possible while keeping risk at an acceptable level that ensures
the bank will stay in business.
E. Evolving Challenges for Regulators and Supervisors
1. Recent changes in the law, together with technological innovation, have challenged
the traditional structure of regulation and supervision.
2. Among these changes are globalization and the explosion in the number and variety
of instruments traded.
3. Adding to these is the fact that Congress removed the functional and geographic
barriers that once separated commercial banking from other forms of intermediation.
4. A compelling case can be made for a super-regulator that would make the entire
process more uniform and coherent.
5. The need for international cooperation will also increase as globalization continues.
6. Regulators must also realize that the goal of financial stability does not mean the
stability of individual financial institutions; that would defeat the purpose of
competition.
7. The regulator’s goal should be to prevent large-scale catastrophes.
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
F. Micro-Prudential Versus Macro-Prudential Regulation
1. Regulators are broadening their focus beyond micro-prudential oversight to
macro-prudential regulation
2. Traditional regulation is micro-prudential and aims to limit risk within intermediaries
in order to reduce the risk that a particular institution will fail.
3. Macro-prudential regulation attempts to prevent systemic risks, including limiting
costly spillovers (externalities), common exposure in which many institutions are
exposed to the same risk factor, pro-cyclicality where interaction between financial or
economic activity can be mutually reinforcing leading to unsustainable booms and
busts.
4. Macro-prudential policy aims to make intermediaries bear the costs that their behavior
imposes on others.
G. Regulatory Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
1. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has four explicit
or implicit goals: (1) to make the financial system robust; (2) to anticipate and prevent
financial crises by limiting systemic risk; (3) to end “too big to fail”; and (4) to reduce
the moral hazard resulting from policy actions such as those taken in the 2007–09
crisis. The act addresses each of them in multiple ways.
2. Some of the biggest shortcomings are:
a. The act fails to streamline the US regulatory apparatus
b. Government guarantees largely come for free
c. The Act regulates according to form rather than function, among others
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
Terms Introduced in Chapter 14
adverse feedback
bank panic
bank run
Basel Accord
CAMELS
common exposure
contagion
deposit insurance
examination
externality
illiquid
insolvent
lender of last resort
macro-prudential
micro-prudential
pro-cyclicality
regulation
regulatory competition
shadow bank
supervision
systemically important financial institution (SIFI)
too-big-to-fail policy
Using FRED: Codes for Data in This Chapter
Data Series FRED Data Code
Failures of depositories BKFTTLA641N
FDIC failure and assistance transactions BKIFDCA641N
Purchase and assumption transactions BKTTPIA641N
Payout transactions BKTTPOA641N
Commercial bank equity/Assets ratio EQTA
Retail MMMFS RMFSL
Institutional MMMFS IMFSL
Discount window borrowings of depositories DISCBORR
Assetbacked commercial paper outstanding ABCOMP
Lessons of Chapter 14
1. The collapse of banks and the banking system disrupts both the payments system and the
screening and monitoring of borrowers.
a. Intermediaries are insolvent when their liabilities exceed their assets.
b. Because banks guarantee their depositors cash on demand on a first-come,
first-served basis, they are subject to runs. Shadow banks like MMMFs and
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
securities brokers also face runs because some of their liabilities can be
withdrawn at face value without notice.
c. A bank run can occur simply because depositors have become worried about a
bank’s soundness. Shadow banks also may face runs due to a loss of confidence.
d. The inability of unsophisticated depositors to tell a sound from an unsound bank
can turn a single bank’s failure into a bank panic, causing even sound banks to fail
through a process called contagion. Shadow banks face similar risks.
e. A financial crisis in which the entire banking system ceases to function can be
caused by:
i. False rumors.
ii. The actual deterioration of bank balance sheets for economic reasons.
2. The government is involved in every part of the financial system.
a. Government officials may intervene in the financial system in order to
i. Protect small depositors.
ii. Protect bank customers from exploitation.
iii. Safeguard the stability of the financial system.
b. Most financial regulations apply to depository institutions, while shadow banks
usually face less regulation.
c. Intermediaries that are less prone to runs, such as pension funds and most
insurers, face less intrusive government oversight than the banking industry.
d. The U.S. government has established a two-part safety net to protect the nation’s
financial system.
i. The Federal Reserve acts as the lender of last resort, providing liquidity to
solvent institutions in order to prevent the failure of a single intermediary
from becoming a systemwide panic.
ii. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures individual
depositors helping to prevent bank runs by reducing depositors’ incentive
to flee at the first whiff of trouble.
e. The government’s safety net encourages bank managers to take more risk than
they would otherwise, increasing the problem of moral hazard.
3. Through regulation and supervision, government officials reduce the amount of risk banks
can take, lowering their chances of failure. Regulators and supervisors
a. Restrict competition.
b. Restrict the types of assets banks can hold.
c. Require banks to hold minimum levels of capital.
d. Require banks to disclose their fees to customers and their financial indicators to
investors.
e. Monitor banks’ compliance with government regulations.
4. Regulators use macro-prudential tools to limit systematic threats to the financial system.
Such risks usually arise from externalities—costly spillovers from the behavior of
intermediaries. These externalities have two sources: (1) common exposure of intermediaries
to frail institutions or to underlying risks and (2) pro-cyclicality of the links between financial
and economic activity, which amplifies boom and bust cycles.
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Chapter 14 – Regulating the Financial System
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