978-0393919684 Chapter 14 Solution Manual Part 3

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U5. (a) ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSLE SITE IN POLAND

In August 2008, after 18 months of negotiations, the United States signed an agreement with

Poland to base anti-ballistic-missile missiles—or interceptors—on Polish soil.1 A related radar site is

Russia contends that the placement of the interceptors would undermine and threaten its

military interests, and has strongly objected to the plan. The radar site in the Czech Republic would be

In July 2007, Russia engaged in an overt display of screening, when President Vladimir Putin

publicly offered the Russian-rented radar base at Garbala in Azerbaijan (which borders Iran) as an

alternative to the proposed sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. America’s refusal is cited by Russia as

Two major arms-control treaties have thus far been abandoned in relation to the plan. To lay the

groundwork for a system of multiple radar and interceptor sites, the United States, under the George W.

Bush administration, unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December

Aside from escalated military rhetoric and the remote possibility of armed confrontation, an

economic crisis might result if the installation of the interceptors goes forward as planned. Russia often

1 www.state.gov/documents/organization/180542.pdf

(b) DETERRING IRAN FROM OBTAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Despite years of concerted diplomacy by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and a series

of United Nations Security Council resolutions (1696, 1737, and 1803), Iran continues to enrich uranium.

Iran maintains that its intention is only to produce fuel for two nuclear power plants under construction.

The Iranian leadership asserts its right to enrich uranium under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

and disavows any desire to produce highly enriched uranium for military purposes. Many in the

Continued enrichment within Iran is worrisome because exactly the same process that is used to

obtain uranium with a 5% concentration of the isotope U-235 can, with only a little more effort, produce

bomb-grade uranium with a 90% concentration of U-235. Moreover, the acquisition of bomb-grade

Future crises over this issue would likely involve increased threats of diplomatic and economic

sanctions, as well as direct or implied threats of military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The

Any form of brinkmanship with Iran would carry significant economic risks to both sides—and to

the world. Geographically, Iran commands the narrow Straight of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the