45
CHAPTER OUTLINE
I. The chapter begins with the view of former World Bank president Robert
McNamara, who maintained that population growth was a threat of cata-
strophic consequences. It then contrasts the view of the more recent president
of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, who rarely referred to population
growth. The same has been true of his successor, Robert Zoellick, who did not
even reference population growth when he identi ed his six strategic themes
to meet global challenges. The authors trace the history of world population
and reveal that population growth is a very recent phenomenon in human his–
tory. Finland provides an example of the demographic transition in a high-
income country where birth rates and death rates have fallen dramatically in
recent years. For developing countries, the demographic transition marks a
different effect where the birth rates are still higher than the death rates, but
concern over population explosion has died down. Almost all population
growth in high– income countries is attributable to immigration, with total
fertility rates dropping below replacement levels. A continued increase is pro-
jected for the future, with world population leveling off around 2050 at about
9 billion people (using the median variant gure). However, it will be a very
different world population with many countries containing increased levels of
aged and retired citizenry. Some developing countries may even experience
similar issues (China is already concerned). However, worldwide migration in
the future could change demographics.
II. The text proceeds to explore the relationship between population growth and
economic development. The authors point out the pessimistic implications of
Thomas Malthus’s famous Essay on the Principle of Population, but show
how his arguments have not stood the test of time. Three explanations are
offered that may in uence birth rates: (1) what Malthus calls “passion between
Population
CHAPTER 7
46 | Chapter 7
the sexes” and whether people know how to use birth control, (2) whether hav–
ing children is a social norm, and (3) the economic bene ts and costs of having
children.
III. A scatter diagram yields no correlation between population growth and eco-
nomic growth, indicating that other factors may in uence the effect of popu-
lation growth on economic growth. Models of population’s effect on material
welfare drawn from Coale and Hoover’s work predicted that a reduction in
the birth rate would raise per capita income through a series of mechanisms.
Much recent research decomposes population growth into distinct causes.
Applying these concepts to East Asia, researchers found that the demo-
graphic transition was both the result of and contributor to the region’s rapid
economic growth. Population’s effect on productivity, such as its impact
through scale economies, has been trumpeted by population optimists. How–
ever, empirical support for both pessimists and optimists is very spotty. Revi-
sionists have adopted an approach that remains more in the middle of the
road, recognizing the existence of poor, incomplete, or imperfect markets.
Rapid population growth is not the primary impediment to economic develop-
ment, but population growth can exacerbate the failings in some markets.
IV. Most governments in developing countries favor slower population growth
and thus implement a variety of population policies. Family planning is the
most pop u lar and provides a range of reproductive health information and ser-
vices. Even though family planning may not play a large in de pen dent role in
reducing fertility, it can be viewed as a complement to development. Other
countries, primarily China, have resorted to relatively authoritarian approaches
to reduce birth rates. These approaches have proven effective at reducing fer–
tility levels and rates of population growth but are characterized by high social
costs and the loss of individual freedom.
Boxed Examples
Box 7–1: Total Fertility Rates
Box 7–2: Population Momentum
Box 7– 3: Population Growth, Age Structure, and De pen den cy Ratios
Box 7– 4: Missing Girls, Missing Women
There are four boxed examples. The rst looks in depth at the most common mea-
sure of fertility, total fertility rate (TFR), a synthetic mea sure that sums up age–
speci c fertility rates of women in a given year. The second example explains the
concept of population momentum, in which momentum would still cause a notable
increase in population. The third example contrasts Nigeria to Rus sia and shows
how differences in crude birth and death rates can have a large impact on the age
structure. The nal example discusses the notion of missing women pop u lar ized
Population | 47
by Sen in which actual sex ratios deviate from what is expected in a gender– neutral
environment.
In the New Edition
Building upon statistics presented in the sixth edition, the seventh edition incorpo-
rates the United Nations 2010 revision to its world population projections. The
chapter now includes more discussion of the demographic dividend and a new sec-
tion on population issues for the twenty- rst century. A new section also discusses
the various issues surrounding the impact of aging populations on the nations of the
world. The discussion includes examples of how nations might handle the mounting
pressure of retirement funding— from the U.S. 401K model to the Chilean system
of mandatory personal retirement accounts. Indeed, “Population Issues for the
Twenty-First Century” is a new and thought- provoking conclusion to this chapter.
Class Notes
Population growth is one of the most controversial issues of development policy,
because it touches on sensitive matters relating to family and religion. The topic
becomes less emotional if one downplays government interventions while empha-
sizing aspects like opportunities for women, helping couples achieve family prefer–
ences, and family planning as an instrument to improve maternal and infant health.
The topic is also complicated because the interactions are complex; even the
leading scholars in this eld of study cannot produce nite answers. Although the
material in Chapter 7 is presented mostly in an expository manner, it still is use-
ful to cover the three main analytical topics in class— the causes of rapid popula-
tion growth, the effects of such growth, and the policy options.
To many students, childbearing as an economic decision is alien thinking. You
should clarify this notion and emphasize that empirical studies strongly con rm
the importance of economic factors as determinants of fertility. You may nd it
useful to develop the theory of fertility using a bud get line that re ects the choice
between family size and other goods. This is a con ve nient framework for discuss-
ing the trade– offs, the role of preferences, and deviations between actual and
desired family size. In the same context, one can discuss the effects of changes
that accompany economic development, the effects of family planning, and poli-
cies that alter incentives to bear children.
The theory of optimum population is a simple tool to clarify the meaning of
overpopulation and show how demographic momentum can lead a country to
grow past the desired size. On the dynamics, start by analyzing population growth
using tools from Chapters 3 and 4: the Harrod- Domar model (which one can read-
ily generalize to explain the Coale- Hoover model), the growth accounting model,
and the Fei– Ranis model. Such cross- chapter linkages are useful to reinforce
major learning objectives. These models imply that rapid population growth has
48 | Chapter 7
a negative effect on development. This leads into a discussion of potential positive
effects or ameliorating factors as the empirical evidence does not reveal a strong
negative association between population growth and economic development.
QUESTION BANK
Concept Map
The Demographic Transition
The Demographic Situation Today
Total Fertility Rates
The Demographic Future
Population Issues for the Twenty– First Century
Multiple- Choice Questions
1. By 2008, Finland had reached the fourth stage of its demographic transition,
in which its population growth had fallen close to:
a. 5 percent.
b. 2.2 percent.
c. 0 percent.
d. −7.5 percent.
2. In 2009, approximately what percentage of the population lived in low-
income countries?
a. 15 percent
b. 50 percent
c. 70 percent
d. 84 percent
3. Which of the following statements are true about total fertility rates over the
past 40 years?
a. Higher rates of population growth are strongly associated with lower
rates of economic growth.
b. Low- income countries have low de pen den cy ratios.
c. Low- income countries have higher rates of population growth.
d. All of the above.
4. World population will continue to grow over the next 50 years for all of the
following reasons EXCEPT:
a. the desire for large families.
b. the failure to achieve desired amount of children.
c. population momentum.
d. total fertility rates in all countries will remain above their replacement
levels.
5. One direct implication of the view that childbearing decisions are in uenced
by economic bene ts and costs is that:
a. people will not have additional children unless they can earn a pro t
from doing so.
b. social factors do not affect childbearing decisions.
c. compulsory education will increase fertility by raising each child’s pro–
spective earnings.
d. fertility should fall with improved opportunities for women to work in
jobs outside the home.
6. Gary Becker’s pioneering work was actually directed at:
a. understanding the impact of HIV/AIDS on Africa.
b. understanding the impact of the cold war on population momentum.
c. understanding declining fertility levels in the United States and other
high– income economies.
d. understanding the impact of religious beliefs on population growth.
7. Most analysts still believe which of the following positions?
a. Most developing countries remain underpopulated because of the enor–
mous gains in productivity made possible by modern science.
b. Slower population growth would permit per capita income to rise more
rapidly in nearly all developing countries.
c. High rates of population growth bene t economic development.
d. There is no economic rationale for government intervention in population
growth because individuals properly balance costs and bene ts when
making decisions about family size.
8. The total fertility rate in Nigeria was 5.7 in 2009. This means that:
a. there were 5.7 live births per 100 women of childbearing age.
b. there were 5.7 live births per 100 women.
c. there were 5.7 live births per 100 people.
d. given prevailing age- speci c fertility rates, the average woman in Nige-
ria bears 5.7 children during her reproductive years.
9. Which of the following is NOT considered a “school of thought” on popula-
tion and development?
a. population optimism
b. population revisionism
c. population pessimism
d. population reactionism
10. Personalized family planning was initiated in the Matlab region of Bangla-
desh in the late 1970s; 20 years later, the region experienced all of the follow-
ing EXCEPT:
a. fewer children with greater spacing between them.
b. healthier children.
c. greater prosperity.
d. greater dif culty in conceiving children.
11. The three reproductive norms promoted in China’s wan xi shao program
after 1971 included which of the following elements?
a. Families should plan for longer spacing between births.
b. Families should continue bearing children until a male child is born and
then stop.
c. China can care for all children because it has achieved the Marxist-
Leninist utopia.
d. Having no children is best.
12. China’s decline in population over the past generation can be attributed to all
of the following EXCEPT:
a. government population policies.
b. increased urbanization.
c. rapid economic growth.
d. the revival of the principles of Confucius and “social responsibility.”
13. Which of the following is NOT a lesson learned from China’s family plan-
ning policy?
a. Economic growth at the same time helps decline in population growth.
b. Though successful, family planning policies may have long- term
consequences.
c. Gender imbalance may result.
d. Other nations can replicate China’s policies.
14. By missing women, economists mean:
a. orphaned women.
b. females who were not born because of preference for males.
c. women who are missing from house holds because they are working in
elds.
d. women not accounted for by nationwide census.
15. According to United Nations’ medium projections, population growth in the
developing nations of the world will number some 2 billion more over the next:
a. 20 years.
b. 40 years.
c. 50 years.
d. 100 years.
16. As the twenty- rst century moves forward, many nations in which area of
the world will continue to face high fertility and the burdens (and opportuni-
ties) of a young population?
a. Latin America
b. Southeast Asia
c. sub– Saharan Africa
d. Central Eu rope
IDs and Paired- Concept Questions
These terms can be used individually as short– answer identi cation questions, or
they can be used in pairs. In the latter case, ask students to explain (1) the meaning
and signi cance of each of the two terms and (2) the relationship between them.
2. Crude death rate, demographic transition
4. Rate of natural increase, decline in fertility
6. Coale- Hoover model, capital widening
8. Family planning, state versus personal choice
10. China, I ndia