136 | Chapter 19
effective rates of protection are quite high. Import quotas have similar
effects, with the added disadvantage of bestowing monopoly power and
scarcity rents on favored rms. Subsidies and other market preferences can
achieve similar ends, with less of a deadweight loss to the economy. These
instruments can be applied to very speci c products or rms. Exchange–
rate policy, however, affects all producers of tradables in a more even-
handed fashion. An overvalued real exchange rate renders exports less
pro table and imports less expensive, while an undervalued real exchange
rate has the opposite effects. Ironically, efforts to shield domestic produc-
ers from import competition discriminate, through exchange- rate effects,
against exports as well as against imports.
IV. Where these instruments have been geared to protect import- substitution
industries, they typically impose heavy costs on consumers, discourage
exports (limiting import capacity), induce excessively capital- intensive
investments, discourage backward linkages, promote po liti cal rent– seeking
activity in lieu of competitive market adjustments, and ultimately lead to
arrested growth. Where the instruments have been used to encourage
outward- looking industrialization, the result generally has been rapid
growth in income and productivity, although the direction of cause- and-
effect remains uncertain.
V. To induce domestic entrepreneurs to commit capital to new industries,
there may well be a need for some form of protection, but it should be used
selectively to support infant industries that show clear promise of growing
up and becoming competitive. Not all developing countries, of course,
have the capacity to intervene so judiciously. In any case, once competitive
production is within reach, no further protection is justi ed.
VI. The spread of outward- looking trade strategies, together with multilateral
agreements to reduce barriers to international trade, has sparked rapid
growth of manufactured exports from developing countries after 1965.
This trend bene ts all trading countries. Yet, within each country, trade
creates losers as well as gainers. Since the bene ts of trade tend to be
spread widely, while the costs are borne narrowly by par tic u lar sectors,
shifts in comparative advantage have bred po liti cal pressures in many
industrial economies to impose new nontariff barriers to trade. Such reac-
tions are quite costly to the developed country itself, but even more so for
developing countries that lose access to large export markets.
VII. More sophisticated recent research indicates that open economies per–
form better than closed ones. Still, some notable skeptics remain. In gen–
eral, trade helps poverty reduction as well. Even though some suggest that
outward orientation creates more sweatshops, evidence does not corrobo-
rate this suggestion.