Chapter 4 Specific Factors and Income Distribution 15
Suppose that after trade, the relative price of cloth increases by 10%. As a result, the country will increase
production of cloth. This will lead to a less than 10% increase in the wage rate because some workers will
move from the food to the cloth industry. The real wage paid to workers in terms of cloth (w/PC) will fall,
while the real wage paid in terms of food (w/PF) will rise. The net welfare effect for labor is ambiguous
and depends on relative preferences for cloth and food. Owners of capital will unambiguously gain
because they pay their workers a lower real wage, while owners of land will unambiguously lose as they
now face higher costs. Thus, trade benefits the factor specific to the exporting sector, hurts the factor
specific to the import competing sector, and has ambiguous effects on the mobile factor. Despite these
asymmetric effects of trade, the overall effect of trade is a net gain. Stated differently, it is theoretically
possible to redistribute the gains from trade to those who were hurt by trade and make everyone better off
than they were before trade.
Given these positive net welfare effects, why is there such opposition to free trade? To answer this
question, the chapter looks at the political economy of protectionism. The basic intuition is that the though
the total gains exceed the losses from trade, the losses from trade tend to be concentrated, while the gains
are diffused. Import tariffs on sugar in the United States are used to illustrate this dynamic. It is estimated
that sugar tariffs cost the average person $7 per year. Added up across all people, this is a very large loss
from protectionism, but the individual losses are not large enough to induce people to lobby for an end to
these tariffs. However, the gains from protectionism are concentrated among a small number of sugar
producers, who are able to effectively coordinate and lobby for continued protection. When the losses
from trade are concentrated among politically influential groups, import tariffs are likely to be seen. Ohio,
a key swing state in U.S. presidential elections and a major producer of both steel and tires, is used as an
example to illustrate this point with both Presidents Bush and Obama supporting tariffs on steel and tires,
respectively.
Although the losers from trade are often able to successfully lobby for protectionism, the chapter
highlights three reasons why this is an inefficient method of limiting the losses from trade. First, the actual
impact of trade on unemployment is fairly low, with estimates of only 2.5% of unemployment directly
attributable to international trade. This fact is highlighted in a case study on the decline in U.S.
manufacturing employment, which is often blamed on competition from China. Manufacturing
employment had been falling long before the United States had any significant trade with China,
suggesting that factors other than trade (at least with China) are responsible. Second, the losses from trade
are driven by one industry expanding at the expense of another. This phenomenon is not specific to
international trade and is also seen with changing preferences or new technology. Why should policy be