1. Workers who feel well treated will work harder and more efficiently (the “carrot”); this is
Akerlof’s gift exchange motive
2. Workers who are well paid won’t risk losing their jobs by shirking (the “stick”)
3. Both the gift exchange motive and shirking model imply that a worker’s effort depends on
the real wage (Figure 11.1)
4. The effort curve, plotting effort against the real wage, is S-shaped
a. At low levels of the real wage, workers make hardly any effort
1. Given the effort curve, what determines the real wage firms will pay?
2. To maximize profit, firms choose the real wage that gets the most effort from workers for
each dollar of real wages paid
3. This occurs at point B in Figure 11.1, where a line from the origin is just tangent to the effort
curve
4. The wage rate at point B is called the efficiency wage
5. The real wage is rigid, as long as the effort curve doesn’t change
E. Employment and Unemployment in the Efficiency Wage Model
1. The labor market now determines employment and unemployment, depending on how far
above the market-clearing wage is the efficiency wage (Figure 11.2)
2. The labor supply curve is upward sloping, while the labor demand curve is the marginal
product of labor when the effort level is determined by the efficiency wage
3. The difference between labor supply and labor demand is the amount of unemployment
4. The fact that there’s unemployment puts no downward pressure on the real wage, since firms
know that if they reduce the real wage, effort will decline
5. Does the efficiency wage theory match up with the data?