Global Business Today Ninth Edition Chapter 11
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came to a head when investors, who had been pouring money into Mexico, suddenly withdrew
their investments after the Mexican government announced that, despite earlier promises, it would
no longer maintain its pegged exchange rate. The peso quickly dropped in value ending up about
40 percent below what it had been. Some students will probably suggest that one of the biggest
challenges for governments facing a financial crisis is the domino effect it seems to have
throughout the economy. In the case of Mexico, IMF assistance to stabilize the situation meant
that the country had to follow what initially seemed to be unattractive policies.
2. Why did the United States provide assistance to Mexico? Why was it important to the United
States to stabilize Mexico?
Lecture Note: To extend the discussion of this feature and what can be learned from Mexico’s
experiences, consider {http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1999-03-14/why-countries-shouldnt-
break-their-currency-promises}.
E) The causes of the financial crisis that erupted across Southeast Asia during the fall of 1997 were
sown in the previous decade when these countries were experiencing unprecedented growth.
F) Huge increases in exports, and hence the incoming funds, helped fuel a boom in commercial
and residential property, industrial assets, and infrastructure. As the volume of investments
ballooned during the 1990s, often at the bequest of national governments, the quality of many of
these investments declined significantly. Often the investments were made on the basis of
projections about future demand conditions that were unrealistic. The result was the emergence of
significant excess capacity.
G) Investments made on the basis of unrealistic projections about future demand conditions
created significant excess capacity. These investments were often supported by dollar-based debts.
When inflation and increasing imports put pressure on the currencies, the resulting devaluations
led to default on dollar denominated debts. A final complicating factor was that by the mid-1990s
although exports were still expanding across the region, so were imports.
H) The Asian meltdown began in mid-1997 in Thailand when it became clear that several key Thai
financial institutions were on the verge of default. Following the devaluation of the Thai Baht,
wave after wave of speculation hit other Asian countries. These devaluations were largely driven
by similar factors to those that underlay the earlier devaluation of the Thai Baht. A combination of
excess investment, high borrowings – much of it in dollar denominated debt, and a deteriorating
balance of payments position.
Evaluating the IMF’s Policy Prescription