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assets, its traditional distribution of responsibility, and its historical norms, values, and management style.”
The McKinsey 7-S Framework identifies the specific dimensions that create a company’s administrative
manufacturing system and the Toyota Way. This aggressive expansion strained the company’s resources, led
them to misread the global market, to produce faulty products, and to build underutilized plants. Their
traditionalpriorities—safetyrst,qualitysecond,andvolumethird—hadbecomeconfused.Toyota’sdrive
for volume had displaced their traditional focus on safety and quality first. Their change from centralized
ing the problems and engineering fixes, and reporting to U.S. regulators were handled by different Toyota
subsidiaries.EachofthesesubsidiarieswasmanagedseparatelyfromJapan.DocumentsreleasedbytheU.S.
House of Representatives’ investigation show that some of the disjointed Toyota subsidiaries had an explicit
strategy to minimize safety recalls, saving the company hundreds of millions of dollars. All key engineering
decisionscamefromJapan.
factthattheacceleratorcrisisoccurredoutsideofJapanprobablycontributedtotheimportanceoftheissue
beingdownplayed.ExpectationsintheUnitedStateswouldemphasizecontrol—solvetheproblem—while
inJapan,theemphasiswouldbeharmony—problemavoidance(seeExhibitTN-5).
2. Michael Porter claims that operational effectiveness is not a strategy. Why was operational effectiveness
such a focus at Toyota? What are the downsides of lean manufacturing?
Inhisclassicarticle,Porterstates:
Operational effectiveness (OE) means performing similar activities better than rivals perform them.
M. E. Porter, “What Is Strategy?” 1996.
In the 1970s, Toyota pioneered the “Total Quality Management” movement in the automotive industry.
Theyintroduced“JustinTime”inventorycontrol;“DesignforManufacturability”inproductdesign;“Con–