Although informal procedures such as settlements are preferred, agencies commonly must turn to
judicial proceedings to enforce agency rules.
Rule-Making or Adjudication?
An adjudication addresses specific parties involved in a specific present or past dispute.
Rule-making ordinarily involves standards to be applied to the future conduct of a class of
unspecified parties. Regardless, the agencies are, in effect, “making law” either by setting a
judiciallike precedent n the case of an adjudication or by passing a rule that has authority much like
a law.
Administrative Hearing
Typically, after an investigation, a violation of a statute and/or rule may be alleged. An effort is
made to reach a settlement via a consent order, in which the party being investigated agrees to
steps suitable to the agency but under which the respondent makes no admission of guilt (thus,
retarding the likelihood of subsequent civil liability).
Administrative Law Judge
Failing a settlement, the parties proceed much as in a civil trial. Ordinarily the case is heard by an
administrative law judge (ALJ). Parties have the right to present their cases, cross-examine, file
motions, raise objections, and so on. They do not have the right to a jury trial, however. The ALJ
decides all questions of law and fact and then issues a decision (order). In general, that decision is
final unless appealed to the agency/commission. After exhausting opportunities for review within the
agency, appeal may be taken to the federal court system.
Practicing Ethics: Agency Capture, Iron Triangles, and Revolving Doors?
Agency capture is a form of governmental failure that can occur when regulators are too cozy with
the industry being regulated or when industry representatives have the interest and resources to
offer detailed advice on agency business while the public voice, being much less focused, is
seldom or never heard by the agency. Political scientists argue that regulatory capture of both
agencies and congressional committees sometimes produces a stable, nearly impregnable, iron
triangle. Powerful interest groups (often businesses), occupy one corner of the triangle,
congressional committees are at another corner, and agency bureaucrats occupy the third.
Regulatory capture is facilitated by a revolving door wherein agency officials often come from the
very industry they are hired to regulate and agency regulators often leave government to work for
the industry formerly regulated.
IV. Controlling the Agencies
Just as with the constitutional system generally, certain checks and balances constrain agency conduct
while allowing the latitude necessary to achieve effectiveness.
A. Executive Constraints
The president appoints the top agency administrators for the various agencies, thus significantly