Chapter 18 – Internet Law and Ethics
Hambrick, a Virginia resident, was criminally charged with illegal activities stemming from his
on-line solicitation of a minor boy from another state to come live with him. At his criminal trial,
he moved to have suppressed all evidence obtained from his internet service provider (ISP)
and all evidence discovered in his home as a result of the police having obtained identifying
information from his ISP.
Hambrick’s activities were discovered by an off-duty police officer from New Hampshire, who
encountered Hambrick in a chat room operating under an alias. The chat room activity led the
officer to believe that criminal activities were occurring. In order to identify the individual behind
the alias, the officer obtained a New Hampshire subpoena, which he then served on
Hambrick’s ISP in order to obtain Hambrick’s true identity, address and phone numbers. The
ISP complied with the subpoena, the information was obtained and ultimately a criminal suit in
Virginia was brought.
Hambrick argued use of the information violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the
information was protected unless a valid warrant was obtained. (All parties agreed the
subpoena was invalid.) The court found that the government is not required to obtain a warrant
if the information it is seeking is such that the defendant (1) does not have a subjective
expectation of privacy in the invaded place or (2) any such privacy expectation is not one
society accepts as “objectively reasonable.” Granting that Hambrick had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the information from his ISP, the court found that it was not an
expectation society would accept as reasonable. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
could not be said to give citizens such a privacy expectation, because it only required ISPs to
be presented with a warrant before giving information to the government, but did not in any
way prohibit them from giving personal information on their users to any nongovernmental
entity. Further, Hambrick had not entered into any restrictive agreement with his ISP prohibiting
their giving his information to others. Had his ISP given the information to the government
without the subpoena (which the ISP could not have known was invalid), then Hambrick could
have sued his ISP for damages. But Hambrick had no recognizable expectation of privacy and,
thus, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
V. M.A. Mortenson Company v. Timberline Software Corporation, 970 P. 2d 803
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (Contracts and Uniform Laws, p. 802)
Syllabus
Mortenson licensed software from Timberlake for use in preparing construction bids.
Mortenson in fact used the software to prepare a particular bid and later discovered that a bug
in the software resulted in the bid they submitted being $2 million too low. When Mortenson
sued Timberline for damages, Timberline defended by pointing to the license agreement they
distribute with their software which disclaims any responsibility for consequential damages
associated with using the software. Mortenson argued that the license agreement was not part
of their contract both because (1) their contract only included the terms contained in the
purchase order, not the license agreement which was not even provided until after the
purchase was made and (2) that, in any case, the license agreement was not part of their
agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Timberline.
The court found that the purchase order was not an integrated contract and therefore did not
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