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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

Answers to Chapter Questions (p. 463)

Sections a.-d of this question would likely result in a healthy debate that could help students

e. Posner argues that the only proper role for antitrust law is the promotion of efficiency.

Arguments for a broader role abound in the readings. For more than a decade the Supreme

a. Among other reasons, the Germans, for example, believe that their policy generates a more

b. Those supporting the anti-discounting laws claim that older books are cheaper, on the

c. The US system results in fewer stores, but presumably prices are lower. New book sales

a. Here the tying product would be the franchise itself; the tied product would be the

b. Subway argued that there was no tied product because there was in fact only one product—

c. Previous to Subway giving an exclusive agreement to RBS, Subway franchisees had

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

a. Inter-brand competition has more impact in achieving the virtues one seeks from the free

b. Students could have a discussion on this question.

c. Some distributors or retailers make heavy investments in advertising, service, and general

goodwill. The result would ordinarily be an improved product image. Other distributors or

5. Students may feel that Whirlpool may refuse to deal with any purchaser that sells the products of

a. Abuse of the market power conferred by a patent must be proven rather than presumed.

Even if market power is established, an antitrust violation does not occur unless some

b. Students could have a discussion on this question. The plaintiff must prove the existence of

an anticompetitive agreement or conduct and also prove that, on balance, the agreement or

conduct harms competition.

a. Tanaka claimed it was a restraint of trade to be analyzed under the rule of reason to

b. The court found that the rule prohibiting transfers within a conference does not have

8. No. Following a price leader is not unlawful. Witness the auto industry. Put another way:

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

9. No firm can charge more for an identical product than its competitor and succeed in preserving a

share of the market.

10. The court ruled that a vertical restraint of trade is not per se illegal violation of Sherman Act

11. The view that holds that market power should be eradicated as soon as possible believes that

social welfare is harmed by the private advantages that accrue to market power, even in the short

12.

a. Adidas claimed that the NCAA unreasonably restrained trade and engaged in a group

boycott in violation of section1 of the Sherman Act.

b. The court dismissed the suit after stating that the first step in the analysis was to define the

relevant market and then finding that Adidas did not “establish that promotional rights are, in

13.

a. The antitrust violation raised by the plaintiff was unlawful tying arrangement.

b. Students may be in favor of the hospital. There is no unlawful tying arrangement. Seventy

14.

a. The antitrust violation in both of these cases was price-fixing.

b. Architects argued that they should be chosen for reasons other than price; that is, for the

15.

a. Trans Sport claimed that Starter’s policy constituted both attempted monopolization and

illegal tying.

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

b. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held for Starter. “A business may properly seek to

maintain the image of its products by controlling where those products are sold, even if profit

Supplementary Cases

I. Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 134 F. 3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998)

(See Horizontal Price Fixing, p. 439)

Syllabus

Defendant-appellant, the NCAA, promulgated a rule applicable to its Division I members which

prohibited the schools from paying certain of their entry-level coaches more than $16,000 annually.

The circuit court pointed out that historically horizontal price-fixing was considered per se

unreasonable, but that the Supreme Court has indicated that in some circumstances that is

II. U.S. v. Brown University, 5 F. 3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (See Horizontal Price

Fixing, p.439)

Syllabus

The Department of Justice brought a civil antitrust action against MIT and eight other Ivy

League schools, based on their joint agreement to distribute financial aid exclusively on the

basis of need and to collectively determine the amount of financial assistance commonly

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

admitted students would be awarded. All of the schools except MIT signed a consent decree;

the suit against MIT proceeded to trial.

The district court found that the arrangement constituted horizontal price-fixing, but declined to

apply a per se rule to find a violation of the law. However, under an abbreviated rule of reason

analysis, the district court found for the government because the agreement was plainly

anti-competitive in that it eliminated price competition for outstanding students. MIT appealed

to the Third Circuit.

The Third Circuit agreed that the arrangement was not per se illegal, indicating that antitrust

analysis is based largely on the assumption that economic behavior “is primarily directed

toward the maximization of profits.” In a nonprofit educational setting, that assumption may not

pertain; therefore, a rule of reason analysis is required.

The Third Circuit disagreed, however, with the abbreviated rule of reason analysis done by the

district court and remanded the case for a full rule of reason evaluation. Specifically, the circuit

court instructed the district court to consider MIT’s justification to determine its

persuasiveness. MIT’s justifications included: (1) That the agreement promoted

socio-economic diversity at the member institutions and therefore improved the quality of

education offered by those schools, and (2) that the arrangement increased the financial aid

available to needy students, therefore allowing some needy students an Ivy League education

that would not otherwise be able to receive one. MIT argued that these are procompetitive

effects. It further argued that none of the reasons for the arrangement were to maximize the

profits of any of the member institutions.

III. National Collegiate Athletic Association V. The University Of Oklahoma and

University Of Georgia Athletic Association, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (See Horizontal

Price-Fixing, p.439)

Syllabus

In 1981, petitioner National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) adopted a plan for the

televising of college football games of its member institutions for the 1982-85 seasons. The

plan recites that it is intended to reduce the adverse effect of live television upon football game

attendance. The plan limits the total amount of televised intercollegiate football games and the

number of games that any one college may televise; and no member of the NCAA is permitted

to make any sale of television rights except in accordance with the plan. The NCAA has

separate agreements with the two carrying networks, ABC and CBS, granting each network

the right to telecast the live “exposures” described in the plan. Each network agreed to pay a

specified “minimum aggregate compensation” to the participating NCAA members, and was

authorized to negotiate directly with the members for the right to televise their games.

Respondent universities, in addition to being NCAA members, are members of the College

Football Association (CFA), which was originally organized to promote the interests of major

football-playing colleges within the NCAA structure, but whose members eventually claimed

that they should have a greater voice in the formulation of football television policy than they

had in the NCAA. The CFA accordingly negotiated a contract with NBC that would have

allowed a more liberal number of television appearances for each college and would have

increased the revenues realized by CFA members. In response, the NCAA announced that it

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

would take disciplinary action against any CFA member that complied with the CFA-NBC

contract. Respondents then commenced an action in federal district court which, after an

extended trial, held that the controls exercised by the NCAA over the televising of college

football games violated §1 of the Sherman Act, and accordingly granted injunctive relief.

Held: The NCAA’s television plan violates §1 of the Sherman Act.

1. While the plans constitute horizontal price fixing and output limitation, restraints that

ordinarily would be held “illegal per se,” it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule

in this case, where it involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition

are essential if the product is to be available at all. The NCAA and its members market

competition themselves—contests between competing institutions. Thus, despite the

fact that restraints on the ability of NCAA members to compete in terms of price and

output are involved, a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires

consideration, under the rule of reason, of the NCAA’s justifications for the restraints.

2. The NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free

market, and the district court’s findings establish that the plan has operated to raise

price and reduce output, both of which are unresponsive to consumer preference.

Under the rule of reason, these hallmarks of anti-competitive behavior place upon the

NCAA a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense that competitively justifies

this apparent deviation from the operations of a free market. The NCAA’s argument that

its television plan can have no significant anti-competitive effect since it has no market

power must be rejected. As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does

not justify a naked restriction on price or output; and, as a factual matter, it is evident

from the record that the NCAA does possess market power.

3. The record does not support the NCAA’s proffered justification for its television plan that

it constitutes a cooperative “joint venture” which assists in the marketing of broadcast

rights and hence is pro-competitive.

4. Nor, contrary to the NCAA’s assertion, does the television plan protect live

attendance, since, under the plan, games are televised during all hours that college

football games are played. Moreover, by seeking to insulate live ticket sales from the full

spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the product itself is insufficiently

attractive to draw live attendance when faced with competition from televised games,

the NCAA forwards a justification that is inconsistent with the Sherman Act’s basic

policy. “The rule of reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that

competition itself is unreasonable.” National Society of Professional Engineers v. United

States, 435 U.S. 679, 696.

5. The interest in maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic teams that

the NCAA asserts as a further justification for its television plan is not related to any

neutral standard or to any readily identifiable group of competitors. The television plan

is not even arguably tailored to serve such an interest. It does not regulate the amount

of money that any college may spend on its football program or the way the colleges

may use their football program revenues, but simply imposes a restriction on one

source of revenue that is more important to some colleges than to others. There is no

evidence that such restriction produces any greater measure of equality throughout the

NCAA than would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition rates, or any other

revenue-producing activity. Moreover, the district court’s well-supported finding, that

many more games would be televised in a free market than under the NCAA plan, is a

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

compelling demonstration that the plan‘s controls do not serve any legitimate

pro-competitive purpose.

IV. TODD v. EXXON, 275 F. 3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (See Parallel Conduct, p.440)

Syllabus

Plaintiff accused Exxon and other major oil companies of a Sherman Act violation based on

the collecting and sharing of past, present and future (through budgets) salary information on

nonunion managerial, professional and technical employees, such that these salaries were set

at artificially low levels. Here there was no direct price fixing, rather there was an exchange of

information from which plaintiffs wish the trier of fact to infer a price-fixing agreement. Proper

analysis is under the rule of reason approach. The Second Circuit found that the complaint

should not have been dismissed. Specifically, this is an oligopsony case where what is

objected to be abuse of buying power by a small group of hirers of these employees. The

court found that in such a case the “proper focus is … the commonality and interchangeability

of the buyers, not the commonality or interchangeability” of the employees. Further, plaintiff

had identified a plausible product market and “the pleadings support the contention that the

market was susceptible to tacit coordination by the defendant companies.” As support, the

court cited plaintiff’s allegations the not just past, but future salary information was shared, that

data could be disaggregated sufficiently to include only three competitors, that the information

was not shared with employees and that frequent meetings were held to discuss the salary

information. Plaintiff should have been allowed to go to trial.

V. United States V. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (See Colgate Doctrine,

p.449)

Syllabus

In a civil suit under §4 of the Sherman Act charging appellee with combining and conspiring to

maintain resale prices of its products in areas which have no “fair trade” laws, the government

introduced evidence showing that appellee had: (1) Announced a policy of refusing to deal

with retailers who failed to observe appellee‘s suggested minimum resale prices or who

advertised discount prices on appellee’s products; (2) discontinued direct sales to those

retailers who failed to abide by the announced policy; (3) induced wholesale distributors to

stop selling appellee’s products to the offending retailers; (4) secured unanimous adherence

by informing a number of the retailers that if each of them would adhere to the announced

policy, one of their principal competitors would also do so; and (5) permitted the retailers to

resume purchasing its products after they had indicated willingness to observe the policy. The

evidence further established that appellee had terminated these practices after becoming

aware that the Department of Justice had begun an investigation of its price maintenance

activities. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the government had

not shown a right to relief.

Held: The judgment is reversed and the case remanded: The district court erred in holding that

these practices constituted only unilateral action by appellee in selecting its customers, as

permitted by United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300. Appellee did not merely announce

its policy and then decline to have further dealings with retailers who failed to abide by it; but,

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

by utilizing wholesalers and other retailers, it actively induced unwilling retailers to comply with

the policy. The resulting concerted action to maintain the resale prices constituted a

conspiracy or combination in violation of the Sherman Act, although it was not based on any

contract, express or implied.

VI. Hack V. President And Fellows Of Yale College, 237 F. 3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000)

(See Tying Arrangements, p.453)

Syllabus

Plaintiffs, devout Orthodox Jews, sued Yale over its policy of requiring all unmarried freshmen

and sophomores under 21 to live in coed campus dorms. They claimed it was an illegal tying

because “a Yale degree ‘has unique attributes that make it without substitute or equal’.” The

circuit court disagreed: “there are many institutions of higher learning providing superb

educational opportunities. … If … plaintiffs … were dissatisfied with the Yale parietal rules,

they could matriculate elsewhere.”

VII. Kodak V. Image Technical Services, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992) (See Tying

Arrangements, p.453)

Syllabus

After respondent independent service organizations (ISOs) began servicing copying and

micrographic equipment manufactured by petitioner, Eastman Kodak Co., Kodak adopted

policies to limit the availability of replacement parts for Kodak equipment and to make it more

difficult for ISOs to compete with Kodak in servicing such equipment. Respondents then filed

this action, alleging, inter alia, that Kodak had unlawfully tied the sale of service for its

machines to the sale of parts, in violation of §1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and had

unlawfully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the sale of service and parts for such

machines, in violation of §2 of that Act. The district court granted summary judgment for

Kodak, but the circuit court reversed. Among other things, the appellate court found the

respondents had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue concerning Kodak’s

market power in the service and parts markets and rejected Kodak’s contention that lack of

market power in service and parts must be assumed when such power is absent in the

equipment market. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court and held:

1. Kodak has not met the requirements for an award of summary judgment on the §1

claim.

a. A tying arrangement—i.e., an agreement by a party to sell one product on the

condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least

agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier—violates §1

only if the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market.

b. Respondents have presented sufficient evidence of a tying arrangement to defeat

a summary judgment motion. A reasonable trier of fact could find that service and

parts are two distinct products and that Kodak has tied the sale of the two

products.

c. For purposes of determining appreciable economic power in the tying market, this

Court’s precedents have defined market power as the power to force a purchaser

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

to do something that he would not do in a competitive market, and have ordinarily

inferred the existence of such power from the seller’s possession of a

predominate share of the market.

d. Respondents would be entitled under such precedents to a trial on their claim

that Kodak has sufficient power in the parts market to force unwanted purchases

of the tied service market, based on evidence indicating that Kodak has control

over the availability of parts and that such control has excluded service

competition, boosted service prices and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak

service.

e. Kodak has not satisfied its substantial burden of showing that, despite such

evidence, an inference of market power is unreasonable. It is plausible to infer

from respondents’ evidence that Kodak chose to gain immediate profits by

exerting market power where locked-in customers, high information costs and

discriminatory pricing limited and perhaps eliminated any long-term loss.

2. Respondents have presented genuine issues for trial as to whether Kodak has

monopolized or attempted to monopolize the service and parts markets in violation of

Section 2.

a. Respondents’ evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts market and

80% to 95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, is

sufficient to survive summary judgment on the first element of the monopoly

offense, the possession of monopoly power. Kodak’s contention that, as a matter

of law, a single brand of a product or service can never be a relevant market

contravenes cases indicating that one brand of a product can constitute a

separate market in some instances. The proper market definition in this case can

be determined only after a factual inquiry into the commercial realities faced by

Kodak equipment owners.

b. As to the willful use of monopoly power, respondents have presented evidence

that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its

control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the service market. Thus,

liability turns on whether valid business reasons can explain Kodak’s actions.

However, none of its asserted business justifications—a commitment to quality

service, a need to control inventory costs and a desire to prevent ISOs from

free-riding on its capital investment—are sufficient to prove that it is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.

VIII. Brooke Group V. Brown and Williamson, 61 U.S. Law Week 4699 (1993)

(See Discounts/Price Discrimination, p.458)

Syllabus

Cigarette manufacturing is a concentrated industry dominated by only six firms, including the

two parties here. In 1980, petitioner (Liggett) pioneered the “economy” segment of the market

by developing a line of generic cigarettes offered at a list price roughly 30% lower than that of

name-brand cigarettes. By 1984, generics had captured 4% of the market, at the expense of

name-brand cigarettes, and respondent Brown & Williamson entered the economy segment,

beating Liggett’s net price. Liggett responded in kind, precipitating a price war, which ended,

according to Liggett, with Brown & Williamson selling its generic cigarettes at a loss. Liggett

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

filed this suit, alleging that volume rebates by Brown & Williamson to wholesalers amounted to

price discrimination that had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition in violation of §2 of

the Clayton Act. Liggett claimed that the rebates were integral to a predatory pricing scheme,

in which Brown & Williamson set below-cost prices to pressure Liggett to raise list prices on its

generics, thus restraining the economy segment’s growth and preserving Brown &

Williamson’s supra-competitive profits on name-brand cigarettes. After a jury returned a verdict

in favor of Liggett, the district court held that Brown & Williamson was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Among other things, it found a lack of injury to competition because there had

been no slowing of the generics’ growth rate and no tacit coordination of prices in the

economy segment by the various manufacturers. In affirming, the circuit court held that the

dynamic of conscious parallelism among oligopolists could not produce competitive injury in a

predatory pricing setting.

The Supreme Court held that Brown & Williamson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,

that the Robinson-Patman Act, by its terms, condemns price discrimination only to the extent

that it threatens to injure competition, and that the record in this case does not provide an

adequate basis for a finding of liability. While a reasonable jury could conclude that Brown &

Williamson envisioned or intended an anti-competitive course of events and that the price of

its generics was below its costs for 18 months, there is inadequate evidence to show that it

had a reasonable prospect of recovering its losses from below-cost pricing through slowing

the growth of generics.

IX. Texaco V. Ricky Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990) (See Discounts/Price

Discrimination, p.458)

Syllabus

Between 1972 and 1981, petitioner Texaco sold gasoline at its retail tank wagon prices to

respondent independent Texaco retailers but granted substantial discounts to distributors Gull

and Dompier. Gull resold the gas under its own name; the fact that it was being supplied by

Texaco was unknown to respondents. Dompier paid a higher price than Gull and supplied its

gas under the Texaco brand name to retail stations. With the encouragement of Texaco,

Dompier entered the retail market directly. Both distributors picked up gas at the Texaco plant

and delivered it directly to their retail outlets, and neither maintained any significant storage

facilities. Unlike Gull, Dompier received an additional discount from Texaco for the deliveries.

Texaco executives were well aware of Dompier’s dramatic growth and attributed it to the

magnitude of the discounts. During the relevant period, the stations supplied by the

distributors increased their sales volume dramatically, while respondents’ sales suffered a

corresponding decline. In 1976, respondents filed suit against Texaco under the

Robinson-Patman Amendments to the Clayton Act (Act), alleging that the distributor discounts

violated 2(a) of the Act, which, among other things, forbids any person to “discriminate in

price” between different purchasers of commodities, where the effect of such discrimination is

substantially to “injure … competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives

the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” The jury awarded

respondents actual damages. The district court denied Texaco’s motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict. Texaco had claimed that, as a matter of law, its “functional

discounts”–i.e., discounts that are given to a purchaser based on its role in the supplier’s

distributive system and reflect, at least in a generalized sense, the services performed by the

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

purchaser for the supplier–did not adversely affect competition within the meaning of the Act.

The district court rejected Texaco’s argument, reasoning that the “presumed legality of

functional discounts” had been rebutted by evidence that the amount of Gull’s and Dompier’s

discounts was not reasonably related to the cost of any function they performed. The Court of

Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court held that respondents had satisfied their burden of proving that Texaco

violated the Act.

1. Texaco’s argument that it did not “discriminate in price” within the meaning of 2(a) by

charging different prices is rejected in light of this Court’s holding in FTC v.

Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549, that “a price discrimination within the

meaning of [2(a)] is merely a price difference.” Texaco’s argument, which would create a

blanket exemption for all functional discounts, has some support in the legislative

history of the Act, but is foreclosed by the text of the Act itself, which plainly reveals a

concern with competitive consequences at different levels of distribution and carefully

defines two specific affirmative defenses that are unavailable.

2. Also rejected is Texaco’s argument that, at least to the extent that Gull and Dompier

acted as wholesalers, the price differentials did not “injure … competition” within the

meaning of the Act. It is true that a legitimate functional discount that constitutes a

reasonable reimbursement for the purchasers’ actual marketing functions does not

violate the Act. Thus, such a discount raises no inference of injury to competition under

FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47. However, the Act does not tolerate a

functional discount that is completely untethered either to the supplier’s savings or the

wholesaler’s costs. This conclusion is consistent with Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

practice, with Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642, and with the

analysis of antitrust commentators. The record here adequately supports the finding

that Texaco violated the Act. There was an extraordinary absence of evidence to

connect Gull’s and Dompier’s discounts to any savings enjoyed by Texaco. Both Gull

and Dompier received the full discount on all purchases even though most of their

volume was resold directly to consumers; and the extra margin on those sales obviously

enabled them to price aggressively in both their retail and wholesale marketing. The

Morton Salt presumption of adverse effect becomes all the more appropriate to the

extent they competed with respondents in the retail market. Furthermore, the evidence

indicates that Texaco was encouraging Dompier to integrate downward and was fully

informed about the dramatic impact of the Dompier discount on the retail market at the

same time that Texaco was inhibiting upward integration by respondents.

3. There is no merit to Texaco’s contention that the damage award must be judged

excessive as a matter of law. Texaco’s theory improperly blurs the distinction between

the liability and damages issues. There is no doubt that respondents’ proof of a

continuing violation as to the discounts to both distributors throughout the 9-year

damages period was sufficient. Proof of the specific amount of their damages

necessarily was less precise, but the expert testimony provided a sufficient basis for an

acceptable estimate of the amount of damages. Cf., e.g., J. Truett Payne Co. v.

Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-66.

Reprinted with permission from The United States Law Week, Vol. 58, pp. 4807-14, June 12,

1990.

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

Selected Bibliography

Ernest Beck, “Stores Told to Lift Prices in Germany,” The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2000, p.

A27.

Wesley A. Cann, Jr., “Vertical Restraints and the `Efficiency‘ Influence—Does Any Room Remain for

More Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative Antitrust Policies?,” American Business Law

Journal, 24, No. 4, Winter 1987, p. 483.

Edwin Chen, “Alleged Airline Price Fixing is Probed,” Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1990, p. D1.

Chicago Tribune, “U.S. Probing Airline Pricing Practices,” Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1990, section 3,

p.1.

Ernest Gellhorn and Kathryn M. Fenton, “Vertical Restraints during the Reagan Administration: A

Program in Search of a Policy,” The Antitrust Bulletin 33, No. 3, Fall 1988, p. 543.

Russell Gold and Ann Zimmerman, “Pumped Out: Wal-Mart’s Defeat in Low-Cost Gas Game,” The

Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2001, p. A14.

David Greenspan, “College Football’s Biggest Fumble,” The Antitrust Bulletin 33, No. 1, Spring 1988,

p. 1.

Kris Hundley, “Guilt and Greed,” St. Petersburg Times, November 19, 2000, p. 7D.

Los Angeles Times, “U.S. Recommends Ban on Air Fare Price Settings,” Waterloo Courier, August 8,

1990, p. B6

Robyn Meredith, “ADM: Too Much Like Japan, Inc.?,” USA Today, Aug. 17, 1995, p. 4B.

Susan Oberlander, “Big-Time Football Powers Seeking Antitrust Ruling on TV Contract,” The

Chronicle of Higher Education, February 1, 1989, p. A31.

Stanley I. Ornstein, “Exclusive Dealing and Antitrust,” The Antitrust Bulletin 34, No. 1, Spring 1989, p.

65.

“Panasonic Coughs Up Big Bucks in Price-Fixing Scheme,” The Wall Street Journal, January 19,

1989, p. B4

Andy Pasztor, “Price-Fix Case Naming Bottlers is Stepped Up,” The Wall Street Journal, October 15,

1987, p. 3.

Harry L. Shniderman, “The Robinson-Patman Act and the Supreme Court, 1978-85,” The Antitrust

Bulletin 31, No. 3, Fall 1986, p. 665.

John Urquhart, “Monsanto’s NutraSweet Ordered to Drop `Anti-Competitive’ Practices in Canada,”

The Wall

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Chapter 10 – Antitrust Law—Restraints of Trade

Street Journal, October 5, 1990, p. B6.

Stephen Wermiel, “High Court Rejects 17-Year Bid to Prove Japanese TV Pricing Conspiracy in U.S.,”

The Wall

Street Journal, April 28, 1987, p. 2.

Stephen Wermiel, “Supreme Court Hardens Stance on Pricing Suits,” The Wall Street Journal, May

15, 1990, p.

A3.

Anne Willette, “Archer Daniels Pleads Guilty,” USA Today, Oct. 16, 1996, p. 2B.

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