manage earnings. Assisted by defendants Beatty and Gollogly, Dunn manipulated the company’s
reserves to manage Nortel’s publicly reported earnings, create the false appearance that his leadership
and business acumen was responsible for Nortel’s profitability, and pay bonuses to these three
defendants and other Nortel executives.
4. Releasing reserves into income. From at least July 2002 through June 2003, Dunn, Beatty, and Gollogly
released excess reserves to meet Dunn’s unrealistic and overly aggressive earnings targets. When Nortel
internally (and unexpectedly) determined that it would return to profitability in the fourth quarter of
2002, the reserves were used to reduce earnings for the quarter, avoid reporting a profit earlier than
Dunn had publicly predicted, and create a stockpile of reserves that could be (and were) released in the
future as necessary to meet Dunn’s prediction of profitability by the second quarter of 2003. When 2003
turned out to be rockier than expected, Dunn, Beatty, and Gollogly orchestrated the release of excess
reserves to cause Nortel to report a profit in the first quarter of 2003, a quarter earlier than the public
expected, and to pay defendants and others substantial bonuses that were awarded for achieving
profitability on a pro forma basis. Because their actions drew the attention of Nortel’s outside auditors,
they made only a portion of the planned reserve releases. This allowed Nortel to report nearly break-
even results (though not actual profit) and to show internally that the company had again reached
profitability on a pro forma basis necessary to pay bonuses.
Role of Auditors and Audit Committee
In the second half of 2003, Nortel’s outside auditors raised concerns about Nortel’s handling of reserves
and, from that point forward, defendants’ scheme began to unravel. To appease the auditors, Nortel’s
management—led by Dunn and Beatty—conducted a purportedly comprehensive review of Nortel’s assets
and liabilities. This resulted in an announcement, on October 23, 2003, that Nortel would restate its
financials for FY 2000, FY 2001, and FY 2002.
Shortly after Nortel’s announced restatement, the audit committee commenced an independent
investigation and hired outside counsel to help it “gain a full understanding of the events that caused
significant excess liabilities to be maintained on the balance sheet that needed to be restated,” as well as to
recommend any necessary remedial measures. The investigation uncovered evidence that Dunn, Beatty, and
Gollogly and certain other financial managers were responsible for Nortel’s improper use of reserves in the
second half of 2002 and first half of 2003.
In March 2004, Nortel suspended Beatty and Gollogly and announced that it would “likely” need to
further revise and restate previously filed financial results. Dunn, Beatty, and Gollogly were terminated for
cause in April 2004.
On January 11, 2005, Nortel issued a second restatement that restated approximately $3.4 billion in
misstated revenues and at least another $746 million in liabilities. All of the financial statement effects of
defendants’ two accounting fraud schemes were corrected as of this date, albeit, there remained lingering
effects from defendants’ internal control and other nonfraud violations.
Nortel also disclosed the findings to date of the audit committee’s independent review, which concluded,
among other things, that Dunn, Beatty, and Gollogly were responsible for Nortel’s improper use of reserves
in the second half of 2002 and first half of 2003. The second restatement, however, did not reveal that
Nortel’s top executives had also engaged in revenue recognition fraud in 2000.
In May 2006, in its Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2005, Nortel admitted for the first
time that its restated revenues in part had resulted from management fraud, stating that “in an effort to meet
internal and external targets, the senior corporate finance management team . . . changed the accounting
policies of the company several times during 2000,” and that those changes were “driven by the need to
close revenue and earnings gaps.”
Throughout their scheme, defendants lied to Nortel’s independent auditor by making materially false and
misleading statements and omissions in connection with the quarterly reviews and annual audits of the