terms, or assist in fighting off a hostile takeover.
U.S. and global M&A activity boomed in the late 1990s and through 2000 topping out at $1.83
trillion in 2000, but activity declined substantially after that. In 2001 U.S. M&A activity totaled
$819 billion, down 53% from the prior year, and declined again in 2002 to $458 billion. M&A
activity picked up slightly in 2003 to $465 billion, but grew rapidly again in 2004 when the total
value hit $748 billion, led by mergers of financial institutions. M&A activity in 2007 was $1.59
trillion. While M&A activity brings large fees to bankers, this type of business remains very
cyclical and it declined during the financial crisis, picking up in 2011. See below:
M&A activity by year
US Global
2008 $903 billion $2.90 trillion
2009 713 1.70
2010 687 1.80
2011 861 2.33
2012 882 2.04
2013* 594 1.45
* First nine months
Teaching Tip: According to a very interesting piece by Michael Jensen, “Agency Costs of
Overvalued Equity,” M. Jensen, Spring 2005, Financial Management, pp, 5-19, many if not most
of the large number of acquisitions in the late 1990s destroyed shareholder value. He argues that
overpriced equity led to too low cost of capital and encouraged managers to engage in poor
investments such as acquisitions in order to meet analysts’ earnings expectations. Given that a
high P/E ratio predicts rapid earnings growth and/or low risk, too high a stock price then predicts
an impossibly high growth rate (and/or an unrealistically low level of risk). The manager,
expected to hit ever growing earnings targets, faces an impossible task, because with overvalued
equity management cannot deliver the expected level of performance except by chance. Hence
firms look for ways to keep the fiction of improving performance alive, even resorting to illegal
accounting practices and poor acquisitions. This is a very interesting argument. It helps explain
why there were extreme pressures on managers to produce short term performance. It is not that
managers suddenly decided to ‘lie, cheat and steal.’ The pressure to perform has been very high,
and brought about in part by too close a tie between Wall Street analysts and corporate
executives, a conflict of interest. With overvalued equity, stock price signals are faulty and
cannot be relied upon as indicators of long term value of the firm. Trying to do so when those
signals are wrong must lead to suboptimal decisions for long term shareholder wealth. Several
firms enlisted their professional consultants in accounting and finance to help them find ways to
hit performance targets, which of course could not continue to occur without some form of
‘cheating’ such as accounting manipulations. This argument does not excuse managers. They
should have known better. We have seen a major breakdown of corporate governance at the
board level. Too many managers had ethical failures even though they were highly paid to act in
shareholders interests.
g. Other Service Functions
In addition to the above functions, investment bankers and securities firms also provide security