Teaching Tip: For example, a U.S. firm might have a British subsidiary that is earning pounds.
Suppose the subsidiary is not well known and cannot procure pound financing at an acceptable
cost, so the parent arranges variable rate dollar loans. The U.S. parent is now at risk if the pound
declines because a depreciating pound will make repaying the dollar loans more expensive.
Moreover, the loans are variable rate and cannot be fully hedged with forward contracts because
of the changing outflow amounts. The parent may arrange a swap with a counterparty where the
British subsidiary agrees to pay a fixed rate of interest (and principal when due) in pound sterling
in exchange for receiving a dollar denominated variable rate of interest (and principal).
c. Credit Swaps
BIS data indicates that credit swaps grew rapidly before the financial crisis and in 2013 there was
an estimated $21 trillion in notional principal on credit default swaps or CDS for short. This
number has been declining from its peak at $62 trillion in 2007. Losses on mortgage related
CDS written by Lehman Brothers and AIG led to the insolvency of these firms. Central clearing
houses have now been created for both Europe and the U.S. The major problem with the CDS
market was the lack of collateral and capital to back the promise to pay in the event of a default.
Clearinghouses can reduce or eliminate counterparty risk by requiring margin sufficient to back
the net value of the contract. These contracts are also employing more standardized terms.
There are two types of CDS. In a Total Return CDS, one party pays either a fixed or a variable
rate of interest to the seller and the counterparty makes floating rate payments representing the
total return (interest and principal value changes) on an underlying credit instrument. Values of
the total return CDS respond to more than changes in underlying default risk. In a Pure CDS the
protection buyer will make a fixed periodic payment to the protection seller and the protection
seller will pay the protection buyer if a credit event occurs.1 If the CDS is cash settled the
protection seller will pay the buyer the drop in price of the reference entity credit. If the CDS is
physical settled the buyer delivers the underlying bond or loan, and the seller pays the par value
of the security. Since no economic tie is required between the protection buyer and the reference
entity credit the notional principal outstanding on CDS can be far larger than the underlying
credit. Protection sellers can generate premium income with only a minimal upfront capital
requirement if the seller has a strong credit rating. This leads to the possibility of the creation of
an excessive amount of CDS. The top sellers of CDS have been hedge funds seeking additional
income, although insurers have been net sellers as well. If either the protection seller’s credit
standing or the reference entity’s credit rating drops, the buyer may require more collateral which
can pressure sellers financially. In early 2008 during the financial crisis the costs of this type
insurance rose dramatically. For instance, the cost to insure against a Citigroup debt issue default
increased from $9,700 in June 07 to $72,000 in January 2008 to $190,000 in March 2008,
reflecting the greater probability of default (source follows).2
1 The ‘credit event’ is typically default. For more information see the CBOT website file titled
“CDR Liquid 50 TM NAIG Index Futures FAQs.”
2 For more information see, “Swap Skirmish: Risks Hidden, Says Hedge Fund Citigroup, Wachovia Face Lawsuits
Involving Credit Derivatives,” by Susan Pulliam, Serena Ng & Tom Mcginty, The Wall Street Journal Online,
March 4, 2008; Page C1 and “New Spasm Jolts Credit Markets: Bankers Rattled As Turmoil Returns To
Short-Term Loans,” by Liz Rappaport, Joellen Perry And Deborah Lynn Blumberg, The Wall Street Journal
Online, March 6, 2008; Page A1.