Chapter 15 – Auditing the Financing/Investing Process: Long-Term Liabilities, Stockholders’ Equity, and Income
Statement Accounts
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company’s Long-Term Incentive Plan (an employee benefit plan to reward company
performance), North American sales commission (commission to sales personnel),
and its team incentive accrual (incentive pay to service personnel). The effect of
reserve, without: any legitimate accounting analysis, to fill shortfalls in operating
results.” Throughout 2004, Diebold released parts of the reserve to meet “analyst
earnings consensus for the first two quarters and revised analyst earnings consensus
in the third quarter.”
Finally, in 2003 and in subsequent years, Diebold improperly capitalized certain
account was overstated.” CAP 250 was an installation accounting system, which
accrued for the cost of installation. Similar to Division 35, the account was
overstated and Diebold management failed to reconcile the known error. In addition
to this, Diebold improperly capitalized technology costs that should have been
expensed. According to the SEC Complaint, “In certain quarters when Diebold’s
earnings were short of forecast, Diebold management made top-level entries to
fraudulently capitalize additional expenses to the Oracle project. These improper
“additions,” which often were round numbers such as $1 million, had the effect of
materially reducing reported expenses, and thus increasing reported earnings.”
The SEC Complaint stated that, “Diebold’s improper, and in many instances
fraudulent, accounting practices misstated the company’s reported pre-tax earnings by
at least $127 million. To correct the recent misstatements, on
September 30, 2008, Diebold restated its financial statements for the years 2003
through 2006, and the first quarter of 2007, in its Form 10-K for 2007.”
b) To identify the misstatements in the earlier years of the fraud, the auditors should
have done a better job maintaining their professional skepticism and exercising good
judgment. Diebold was consistently reporting earnings that were right at analysts’
earnings expectations. Had the auditors exhibited more professional skepticism, they