Consider the following entry game: Here, firm B is an existing firm in the market, and
firm A is a potential entrant. Firm A must decide whether to enter the market (play
“enter”) or stay out of the market (play “not enter”). If firm A decides to enter the
market, firm B must decide whether to engage in a price war (play “hard”), or not (play
‘soft”). By playing “hard,” firm B ensures that firm A makes a loss of $2 million, but
firm B only makes $2 million in profits. On the other hand, if firm B plays ‘soft,” the
new entrant takes half of the market, and each firm earns profits of $4 million. If firm A
stays out, it earns zero while firm B earns $8 million. Which of the following are Nash
equilibrium strategies?
A. (enter, hard) and (not enter, hard)
B. (enter, soft) and (not enter, soft)
C. (not enter, hard) and (enter, soft)
D. (enter, hard) and (not enter, soft)
Consider a market characterized by the following inverse demand and supply functions:
PX = 10 – 2QX and PX = 2 + 2QX. Compute the number of units exchanged and the
price at which those units will be exchanged when there is an $8 per unit price floor.
A. 1 unit and $6 per unit.
B. 1 unit and $8 per unit.
C. 3 units and $6 per unit.
D. 3 units and $8 per unit.