The following payoff matrix shows the outcomes for the US and the USSR from relying
on conventional weapons or atomic weapons. The percentages refer to the fraction of
the population that would die if a war occurred under the two weapons strategies.
Assume the payoff matrix is for 1945, shortly after the US had demonstrated the
effectiveness of the atomic bomb in World War II, i.e., the example begins in the upper
right cell where USA has atomic weapons and the USSR has only conventional
weapons.
Refer to the information given above. Suppose that a diplomat representing the USSR
made the following statement to a diplomat representing the United States: “We will
disarm all of our atomic weapons and not develop any new ones.” That statement is:
A. a credible promise because it would convince the United States to disarm as well.
B. a credible promise because it contains a commitment device.
C. a non-credible promise because mutual disarmament yields a worse outcome for
both countries.
D. a non-credible promise because of the commitment problem.
In surveying their alumni, State U’s economics department discovered that ramen
noodle consumption declined as soon as students graduated and found jobs. One
conclusion the survey team might draw from this result is that:
A. there is excess demand for ramen noodles.
B. the equilibrium price for ramen noodles is too high.
C. college graduates have a high reservation price for ramen noodles.
D. ramen noodles are an inferior good.