Consider the following innovation game: Firm A must decide whether or not to
introduce a new product. Firm B must decide whether or not to clone firm As product.
If firm A introduces and B clones, then firm A earns $1 and B earns $10. If A introduces
and B does not clone, then A earns $10 and B earns $2. If firm A does not introduce,
both firms earn profits of 0. Which of the following is true?
A. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium profits are ($10, $2).
B. It is not in As interest to introduce.
C. Firm A does not care if B clones.
D. None of the answers is correct.
The change in net benefits that arises from a one-unit change in quantity is the:
A. marginal net benefits.
B. total net benefits.
C. variable benefits.
D. present value benefits.
The minimum legal price that can be charged in a market is:
A. a price floor.
B. a price ceiling.