defer the payment of taxes.
Potential Targets
Game and edutainment development divisions are often part of software conglomerates,
such as Cendant, Electronic Arts, and GT Interactive, which produce software for
diverse markets including games, systems platforms, business management, home
improvement, and pure educational applications. Other firms may be subsidiaries of
large book, CD-ROM, or game publishers. The parent firms showed little inclination to
sell these businesses at what Mattel believed were reasonable prices. Therefore, Mattel
focused on five publicly traded firms: Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., Activision, Inc.,
Interplay Entertainment Corp, The Learning Company, Inc. (TLC), and Take-Two
Interactive Software. Of these, only Acclaim, Activision, and The Learning Company
had their own established brands in the games and edutainment sectors and the size
sufficient to meet Mattel’s revenue criterion.
In 1999, TLC was the second largest consumer software company in the world, behind
Microsoft. TLC was the leader in educational software, with a 42% market share, and
in-home productivity software (i.e., home improvement software), with a 44% market
share. The company has been following an aggressive expansion strategy, having
completed 14 acquisitions since 1994. At 68%, TLC also had the highest gross profit
margin of the target companies reviewed. TLC owned the most recognized titles and
appeared to have the management and technical skills in place to handle the kind of
volume that Mattel desired. Their sales were almost $1 billion, which would enable
Mattel to achieve its objective in this “high-tech” market. Thus, TLC seemed the best
suited to satisfy Mattel’s acquisition objectives.
Completing the Acquisition
Despite disturbing discoveries during due diligence, Mattel acquired TLC in a
stock-for-stock transaction valued at $3.8 billion on May 13, 1999. Mattel had
determined that TLC’s receivables were overstated because product returns from
distributors were not deducted from receivables and its allowance for bad debt was
inadequate. A $50 billion licensing deal also had been prematurely put on the balance
sheet. Finally, TLC’s brands were becoming outdated. TLC had substantially
exaggerated the amount of money put into research and development for new software
products. Nevertheless, driven by the appeal of rapidly becoming a big player in the
children’s software market, Mattel closed on the transaction aware that TLC’s cash
flows were overstated.
Epilogue
For all of 1999, TLC represented a pretax loss of $206 million. After restructuring
charges, Mattel’s consolidated 1999 net loss was $82.4 million on sales of $5.5 billion.
TLC’s top executives left Mattel and sold their Mattel shares in August, just before the
third quarter’s financial performance was released. Mattel’s stock fell by more than 35%
during 1999 to end the year at about $14 per share. On February 3, 2000, Mattel
announced that its chief executive officer (CEO), Jill Barrad, was leaving the company.
On September 30, 2000, Mattel virtually gave away The Learning Company to rid itself
of what had become a seemingly intractable problem. This ended what had become a
disastrous foray into software publishing that had cost the firm literally hundreds of
millions of dollars. Mattel, which had paid $3.5 billion for the firm in 1999, sold the
unit to an affiliate of Gores Technology Group for rights to a share of future profits.