larger and better known than Wachovia. Under the direction of now-retired CEO
Edward Crutchfield, First Union bought 90 banks. Mr. Crutchfield became known in
banking circles as “fast Eddie.” However, acquisitions of the Money Store and
CoreStates Financial Corporation hurt bank earnings in late 1990s, causing First
Union’s stock to fall from $60 to less than $30 in 1999. First Union had paid $19.8
billion for CoreStates Financial in 1998 and then had trouble integrating the acquisition.
Customers left in droves. Ill, Mr. Crutchfield resigned in 2000 and was replaced by G.
Kennedy Thompson. He immediately took action to close the Money Store operation
and exited the credit card business, resulting in a charge to earnings of $2.8 billion and
the layoff of 2300 in 2000.
In contrast, Wachovia assiduously avoided buying up its competitors and its top
executives frequently expressed shock at the premiums that were being paid for rival
banks. Wachovia had a reputation as a cautious lender.
Whereas big banks like First Union did stumble mightily from acquisitions, Wachovia
also suffered during the 1990s. Although Wachovia did acquire several small banks in
Virginia and Florida in the mid-1990s, it remained a mid-tier player at a time when the
size and scope of its bigger competitors put it at a sharp cost disadvantage. This was
especially true with respect to credit cards and mortgages, which require the economies
of scale associated with large operations. Moreover, Wachovia remained locked in the
Southeast. Consequently, it was unable to diversify its portfolio geographically to
minimize the effects of different regional growth rates across the United States.
In the past, big bank deals prompted a rash of buying of bank stocks, as investors bet on
the next takeover in the banking sector. Banks such as First Union, Bank of America
(formerly NationsBank), and Bank One acquired midsize regional banks at lofty
premiums, expanding their franchises. They rationalized these premiums by noting the
need for economies of scale and bigger branch networks. Many midsize banks that were
obvious targets refused to sell themselves without receiving premiums bigger than
previous transactions. However, things have changed.
Back in 1995 buyers of banks paid 1.94 times book value and 13.1 times after-tax
earnings. By 1997, these multiples rose to 3.4 times book value and 22.2 times after-tax
earnings. However, by 2000, buyers paid far less, averaging 2.3 times book value and
16.3 times earnings. First Union paid 2.47 times book value and 15.7 times after-tax
earnings. The declining bank premiums reflect the declining demand for banks. Most of
the big acquirers of the 1990s (e.g., Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Bank One) now
feel that they have reached an appropriate size.
Banking went through a wave of consolidation in the late 1990s, but many of the deals
did not turn out well for the acquirers’ shareholders. Consequently, most buyers were
unwilling to pay much of a premium for regional banks unless they had some unique
characteristics. The First UnionWachovia deal is remarkable in that it showed how
banks that were considered prized entities in the late 1990s could barely command any
premium at all by early 2001.
Discussion Questions:
1) In your judgment, was this merger a true merger of equals? Why might this
framework have been used in this instance? Do you think it was a fair deal for
Wachovia stockholders? Explain your answer.