113. Which voter is the voter whose views on a policy issue are in the middle of the spectrum, with half of the voters on
one side of this voter’s view and half on the other side.
a.
Average voter
b.
Mean voter
c.
Modal voter
d.
Median voter
114. The median voter’s preferred outcome is the same as the
a.
b.
c.
d.
115. If the median voter theorem holds,
a.
a Borda count will violate the principle of transitivity.
b.
the Condorcet paradox also holds.
c.
minority views will not receive much consideration.
d.
All of the above are correct.
116. The assertion that the median voter is “king” refers directly to the result established by the
a.
Arrow impossibility theorem.
b.
Condorcet paradox.
c.
median voter theorem.
d.
Borda mechanism.
117. The median voter
a.
is the voter exactly in the middle of the distribution.
b.
is the voter whose preferred outcome beats any other proposal in a two-way race.
c.
always has more than half the votes on his side in a two-way race.
d.
All of the above are correct.
118. According to the median voter theorem, majority rule will
a.
always produce an inconclusive outcome.
b.
produce the outcome least preferred by the median voter.
c.
produce the outcome most preferred by the median voter.
d.
produce an outcome that is inconsistent with transitive preferences.
119. The median-voter theorem explains why
a.
politicians take extreme stands on issues.
b.
voters are attracted to political outsiders.
c.
two opposing politicians tend to take opposite sides of each issues.
d.
politicians tend to take middle-of-the-road positions.
120. When Republicans and Democrats offer similar platforms in an election campaign, a likely explanation is the
a.
Arrow impossibility theorem.
b.
Condorcet paradox.
c.
median voter theorem.
d.
fact that politicians are more interested in the national interest than their own self-interest.
121. An implication of the median voter theorem is that, in a race between Republicans and Democrats,
a.
if Republicans want to win, they will take a “middle–of-the-road” stance on many issues.
b.
if Democrats want to win, they will take an extreme stance on many issues.
c.
Republicans and Democrats go to extremes to differentiate themselves from one another.
d.
Republicans and Democrats work hard to identify the fringe voters.
122. In American politics, we often observe that during a campaign, the Democratic and Republican positions on many
issues are similar, which illustrates
a.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
b.
the Condorcet paradox.
c.
a Borda count.
d.
the median voter theorem.
123. An implication of the median voter theorem is that
a.
minority views and majority views are given equal weight.
b.
platforms of the major political parties will not differ greatly.
c.
the logic of democracy is fundamentally flawed.
d.
behavioral economics plays a significant role in voting outcomes.
124. Assume there are nine voters in a certain small town and let x = the preferred number of dollars spent per person per
month on garbage collection. For Voters 1, 2 3, and 4, x = $10; for Voter 5, x = $15; for Voter , x = $18; and for Voters 6,
7, 8 and 9, x = $20. The median voter is
a.
Voter 3.
b.
Voter 4.
c.
Voter 5.
d.
Voter 6.
125. Assume there are nine voters in a certain small town and let x = the preferred number of dollars spent per person per
month on garbage collection. For Voters 1, 2, and 3, x = $10; for Voter 4, x = $15; for Voter 5, x = $18; and for Voters 6,
7, 8 and 9, x = $20. Based on these preferences, which of these dollar amounts will win over any one of the others?
a.
$10.
b.
$15.
c.
$18
d.
$20.
126. Assume there are 4065 voters in a certain small town and let x = the preferred number of dollars charged monthly to
support local parks. For Voters 1-1050, x = $10; for voters 1051-2121, x= $20, for voters 2122-3334, x = $30; for voters
3335-3998, x = $40; and for 3999-4065, x = $50. Based on these preferences, which of the dollar amounts will win over
any of the others?
a.
$20.
b.
$30.
c.
$50
d.
None of the above are correct.
127. A community has five voters who are interested in only one issue: the government’s spending on local parks. If
Andre would like the government to spend $12,000 on parks, Brandon prefers $7,000, Charlene prefers $4,000, Dennis
prefers $2,000, and Ernie prefers $0, how much spending would a politician seeking to win the election select when
running against one opponent?
a.
$2,000
b.
$4,000
c.
$7,000
d.
$12,000
128. Suppose that there are 175 voters in an election and that 80 of them prefer a $100 budget while the remainder prefer
a $150 budget. Which of the following statements is true?
a.
The Condorcet Paradox predicts that the $100 budget will win even though fewer people prefer that budget.
b.
The median voter theorem predicts that the winning budget will be $125, the median of the preferences of the
two types of voters.
c.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem says that the winning budget cannot be determined in this election since there is
no unanimity.
d.
None of the above.
Scenario 22-3
At issue in a particular city vote is how much to spend, per person, on road repair next year. Among the 10,000 voters,
2,900 prefer to spend $500 per person, but no more; 2,200 prefer to spend $600 per person, but no more; 1,900 prefer to
spend $800 per person, but no more; 1,600 prefer to spend $1,200 but no more, and 1,400 prefer to spend $1,400 per
person, but no more.
129. Refer to Scenario 22-3. The median voter is one who prefers to spend
a.
$500.
b.
$600.
c.
$800.
d.
None of the above are correct.
130. Refer to Scenario 22-3. If there is a vote on whether to spend $600 per person or $800 per person, the median voter
will vote to spend
a.
$800 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person.
b.
$800 per person and the voting outcome will be $600 per person.
c.
$600 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person.
d.
$600 per person and the voting outcome will be $600 per person.
131. Refer to Scenario 22-3. If there is a vote on whether to spend $800 per person or $1,200 per person, the median
voter will vote to spend
a.
$800 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person.
b.
$800 per person and the voting outcome will be $1200 per person.
c.
$1200 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person.
d.
$1200 per person and the voting outcome will be $1200 per person.
Table 22–17
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Percent of electorate
55
30
15
First choice
C
B
A
Second choice
B
A
B
Third choice
A
C
C
132. Refer to Table 22-17. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible outcomes: A, B,
and C. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which of the
following statements is true?
a.
As the Condorcet Paradox predicts, majority rule fails to produce transitive preferences for society.
b.
As Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem demonstrates, it is impossible from this information to determine which
outcome the voters prefer.
c.
The median voter theorem allows us to conclude that in a vote between B and C, B will win since the Type 2
voter is the median voter.
d.
While the Condorcet Paradox predicts that majority rule may not produce transitive preferences for society as
a whole, society‘s preferences in this case are transitive.
133. Refer to Table 22-17. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible outcomes: A, B,
and C. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which voter type is the
median voter?
a.
Type 1
b.
Type 2
c.
Type 3
d.
The median voter cannot be determined without knowing the pair of outcomes from which the voters will be
choosing.
134. Refer to Table 22-17. The table shows the preferences for three types of voters over three possible outcomes: A, B,
and C. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which of the following
statements is true?
a.
In a vote between B and C, C loses since only the Type 1 voters prefer C to B.
b.
In a vote between A and B, B wins getting 85% of the total vote.
c.
In a vote between A and C, C loses getting only 45% of the total vote.
d.
Both a and b.
Table 22–18
The following table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible alternatives as well as the percentage
of the electorate with the given preferences.
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Percent of voters
25
30
40
5
First choice
W
X
Y
Z
Second choice
X
Z
W
Y
Third choice
Y
W
Z
X
Fourth choice
Z
Y
X
W
135. Refer to Table 22-18. In a majority vote between alternatives W and X, what percentage of the votes would W
receive?
a.
35%
b.
45%
c.
55%
d.
65%
136. Refer to Table 22-18. In a majority vote between alternatives X and Y, what percentage of the votes would X
receive?
a.
35%
b.
45%
c.
55%
d.
65%
137. Refer to Table 22-18. Suppose voters first choose in a majority vote between W and X. Second, voters choose in a
majority vote between the winner of the first vote and Y. Third, voters choose in a majority vote between the winner of
the second vote and Z. Which alternative will win?
a.
W
b.
X
c.
Y
d.
Z
138. Refer to Table 22-18. Suppose before any voting takes place that alternative W is eliminated as an option. If the
voters first choose between alternatives X and Y in a majority vote, with the winner of that vote going against option Z in
a majority vote, which alternative would win?
a.
X
b.
Y
c.
Z
d.
There would be no clear winner – alternatives X and Y would tie.
139. Refer to Table 22-18. Suppose before any voting takes place that alternative W is eliminated as an option. Based on
this information, the median voter’s first choice is
a.
X
b.
Y
c.
Z
d.
The median voter’s first choice cannot be determined from the information given.
140. Refer to Table 22-18. If the vote is conducted using a Borda count where each person’s first choice receives 4
points, each person’s second choice 3 points, each person’s third choice 2 points, and each person’s fourth choice 1 point,
which alternative would win?
a.
W
b.
X
c.
Y
d.
Z
Table 22–19
The 600 voters of Appleton are deciding by majority rule how much to spend on a new library.
Number of voters who most prefer this amount of spending
$0
50
$2 million
100
$3 million
125
$4 million
150
$5 million
175
141. Refer to Table 22-19. The median voter prefers to spend
a.
$2 million.
b.
$3 million.
c.
$3.5 million.
d.
$4 million.
142. Refer to Table 22-19. If an election were held between spending $2 million and $3 million, the median voter would
vote for
a.
$3 million and $3 million would win.
b.
$3 million and $2 million would win.
c.
$2 million and $3 million would win.
d.
$2 million and $2 million would win.
143. Refer to Table 22-19. If an election were held between spending $2 million and $4 million, the median voter would
vote for
a.
$2 million and $2 million would win.
b.
$2 million and $2 million would win.
c.
$4 million and $2 million would win.
d.
$4 million and $4 million would win.
Table 22–20
The table below shows the preferred city budget (in millions) for
in the city of Springfield.
Percent of Voters
Preferred Budget
4%
$60
6%
$50
14%
$0
16%
$40
18%
$20
20%
$30
22%
$10
144. Refer to Table 22-20. In an election, each voter will select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget.
Using this information, what is the most preferred budget of the median voter?
a.
$10
b.
$20
c.
$30
d.
$40
145. Refer to Table 22-20. In an election, each voter will select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. In
which of the following cases does a budget of $32 win?
a.
$32 versus $10, and $32 versus $40
b.
$32 versus $10, but not $32 versus $40
c.
$32 versus $40, but not $32 versus $10
d.
Neither $32 versus $10 nor $32 versus $40
146. Refer to Table 22-20. In an election, each voter will select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. In
which of the following cases does a budget of $22 win?
a.
$22 versus $10, and $22 versus $40
b.
$22 versus $10, but not $22 versus $40
c.
$22 versus $40, but not $22 versus $10
d.
Neither $22 versus $10 nor $22 versus $40
Scenario 22-4
Three members of the DiCarlo family, Vinny, Maria, and Franki, are choosing the entree for a large family reunion. Their
options are: spaghetti, ravioli, lasagne, and pizza. Vinny prefers spaghetti over lasagne, lasagne over ravioli, and ravioli
over pizza. Maria prefers ravioli over spaghetti, spaghetti over pizza, and pizza over lasagne. Frankie prefers pizza over
ravioli, ravioli over lasagne, and lasagne over spaghetti.
147. Refer to Scenario 22–4. Maria recommends using a vote by majority rule and proposes first choosing between
spaghetti and lasagne, then choosing between the winner of the first vote and ravioli, and finally choosing between the
winner of the second vote and pizza. If everyone votes according to his or her preferences,
a.
the winner of the first vote will be spaghetti, the winner of the second vote will be ravioli, and the winner of
the final vote will be ravioli.
b.
the winner of the first vote will be spaghetti, the winner of the second vote will be spaghetti, and the winner of
the final vote will be spaghetti.
c.
the winner of the first vote will be lasagne, the winner of the second vote will be ravioli, and the winner of the
final vote will be ravioli.
d.
the winner of the first vote will be lasagne, the winner of the second vote will be lasagne, and the winner of the
final vote will be ravioli.
148. Refer to Scenario 22–4. Vinny recommends using a vote by majority rule and wants to be sure that his first choice
becomes the winner. Which order should he should propose to use for pairwise voting to ensure his desired outcome?
a.
first choosing between ravioli and spaghetti, then choosing between the winner of the first vote and pizza, and
finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and lasagne
b.
first choosing between pizza and spaghetti, then choosing between the winner of the first vote and lasagne, and
finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and ravioli
c.
first choosing between lasagne and pizza, then choosing between the winner of the first vote and ravioli, and
finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and spaghetti
d.
None of the proposed voting orders will result in Vinny’s first choice winning the vote.
149. Refer to Scenario 22-4. If the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each person’s first
choice receives 4 points, second choice 3 points, third choice 2 points, and fourth choice 1 point, the election winner
would be
a.
pizza.
b.
ravioli.
c.
lasagne.
d.
spaghetti.
150. Refer to Scenario 22-4. If, before any votes were cast, ravioli was eliminated from the choices and the vote were
conducted according to a Borda count system where each person’s first choice receives 3 points, second choice 2 points,
and third choice 1 point, the election winner would be
a.
pizza.
b.
spaghetti
c.
lasagne.
d.
The result would be a three-way tie between pizza, spaghetti and lasagne.
151. Refer to Scenario 22-4. If, before any votes were cast, ravioli was eliminated from the choices, the median voter’s
first choice would be
a.
pizza.
b.
spaghetti
c.
lasagne.
d.
There is not enough information to answer this question.
Table 22–21
The following table shows the number of voters preferring various amounts of spending to develop a river to make it more
attractive for canoeing and kayaking.
Number of Voters
Preferred Spending (millions)
1
$0.0
4
$0.5
20
$1.0
22
$1.5
25
$2.0
35
$2.5
15
$3.0
152. Refer to Table 22-21. What is the preferred spending amount of the median voter?
a.
$1.0
b.
$1.5
c.
$2.0
d.
None of the above are correct.
153. Refer to Table 22-21. Suppose the voters are asked to choose between $1 million and $2.5 million. If all voters cast
a vote for the spending amount closest to their own preference, how many votes will the $1 million spending amount
receive?
a.
25
b.
47
c.
72
d.
102
154. Refer to Table 22-21. The city council is considering two alternative ballots. The first would allow voters to choose
between $1.5 million and $2 million. The second would allow voters to select between $2 million and $2.5 million. If the
first ballot is used,
a.
voters will select $1.5 million. If the second ballot is used voters will select $2 million.
b.
voters will select $1.5 million. If the second ballot is used voters will select $2.5 million.
c.
voters will select $2 million. If the second ballot is used voters will select $2 million.
d.
voters will select $2 million. If the second ballot is used voters will select $2.5 million
155. Refer to Table 22-21. Suppose on election day that the voters with a preference for less than $1.5 million do not
show up to vote on a choice to spend either $2 million or $2.5 million. In this case, what is the preferred spending amount
of the median voter (among those who actually cast a vote)?
a.
$2 million and $2 million wins.
b.
$2 million, but $2.5 million wins.
c.
$2.5 million, and $2.5 million wins.
d.
$2.5 million, but $2 million wins.
Table 22–22
The town of Fairview is considering a renovation to the high school. The voters in Fairview have different preferences on
the budget for the renovation as displayed below.
Preferred Budget
Number of Voters
$0 million
12,000
$4 million
18,000
$8 million
6,000
$12 million
8,000
$16 million
19,000
$20 million
20,000
$24 million
10,000
156. Refer to Table 22-22. The median voter is one who prefers to spend
a.
$12 million.
b.
$16 million
c.
$20 million.
d.
None of the above are correct.
157. Refer to Table 22-22. If there is a vote between a budget of $16 million and $20 million and voter vote for the
budget nearest their preferred budget, then the median voter will vote to spend
a.
$16 million and the voting outcome will be $16 million.
b.
$16 million and the voting outcome will be $20 million.
c.
$20 million and the voting outcome will be $20million.
d.
$20 million and the voting outcome will be $20 million.
158. Refer to Table 22-22. If there is a vote between a budget of $12 million and $16 million, the median voter will vote
to spend
a.
$12 million and the voting outcome will be $12 million.
b.
$12 million and the voting outcome will be $16 million.
c.
$16 million and the voting outcome will be $12 million.
d.
$16 million and the voting outcome will be $16 million.
159. Economic policy that appears to be ideal in an economics textbook may not be the final policy that is approved by
elected politicians because
a.
sometimes a politician’s self interest may conflict with the national interest.
b.
economics professors have a notoriously low voting rate.
c.
only policies advocated by the President’s Council of Economic Advisors receive enough national attention to
interest politicians.
d.
Economists cannot explain why politicians do not implement the ideas from their textbooks.
160. Economic theory assumes that voters, politicians, and other political participants are largely motivated by
a.
personal self-interest.
b.
altruism.
c.
a desire to promote the general welfare.
d.
a desire to promote allocative economic efficiency.
161. Suppose there are 3 possible outcomes to a vote: A, B, and C. If voters prefer A to B, C to B, and A to C, which of
the following concepts are violated?
a.
Transitivity
b.
Median Voter Theorem
c.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
d.
None of the above concepts are violated
162. Suppose there are 3 possible outcomes to a vote: A, B, and C. If voters prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A, which of
the following concepts are violated?
a.
Transitivity
b.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
c.
Median voter theorem
d.
None of the above concepts are violated.
163. Arrow’s impossibility theorem proves that
a.
no voting system can satisfy several preferable properties at the same time.
b.
politicians will never be able to satisfy the median voter.
c.
politicians will never be able to act fully in the best interests of the public good.
d.
no voting system will ever depend on the median voter.
164. The median voter theorem states that
a.
the median voter will never hold the decisive vote in an election.
b.
policies that are enacted will be least preferable to the median voter.
c.
the median voter will hold the decisive vote in an election.
d.
policies that are enacted will be most preferred by the median voter.