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Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 41
Table 22-6
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Percent of electorate
55
30
15
First choice
C
B
A
Second choice
B
A
B
Third choice
A
C
C
73. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible
outcomes: A, B, and C. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on
this information, which of the following statements is true?
a.
As the Condorcet Paradox predicts, majority rule fails to produce transitive preferences for
society.
b.
As Arrow's Impossibility Theorem demonstrates, it is impossible from this information to
determine which outcome the voters prefer.
c.
The median voter theorem allows us to conclude that in a vote between B and C, B will
win since the Type 2 voter is the median voter.
d.
While the Condorcet Paradox predicts that majority rule may not produce transitive
preferences for society as a whole, society's preferences in this case are transitive.
74. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible
outcomes: A, B, and C. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this
information, which voter type is the median voter?
a.
Type 1
b.
Type 2
c.
Type 3
d.
The median voter cannot be determined without knowing the pair of outcomes from which
the voters will be choosing.
75. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences for three types of voters over three possible
outcomes: A, B, and C. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this
information, which of the following statements is true?
a.
In a vote between B and C, C loses since only the Type 1 voters prefer C to B.
b.
In a vote between A and B, B wins getting 85% of the total vote.
c.
In a vote between A and C, C loses getting only 45% of the total vote.
d.
Both a and b.
42 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
Table 22-7
Number of People
Preferred Budget
4
$20
7
$30
10
$ 0
13
$40
15
$10
26
$50
76. Refer to Table 22-7. The table shows the most preferred budget of 75 voters. In an election, each
voter will select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. Using this information, what
is the most preferred budget of the median voter?
a.
$10
b.
$20
c.
$30
d.
$40
77. Refer to Table 22-7. The table shows the most preferred budget of 75 voters. In an election, each
voter will select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. Which of the following state-
ments regarding this information is true?
a.
In an election between a $33 budget and a $37 budget, the $33 budget will win.
b.
Since the median voter theorem implies that the budget of the median voter will win the
election, we would expect the overall best budget to be $25, the median of the available
budgets.
c.
In an election between a $10 budget and a $40 budget, the $40 budget will win.
d.
Both b and c.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 43
Table 22-8
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Percent of electorate
32
20
15
33
First choice
D
C
A
B
Second choice
C
A
D
D
Third choice
B
D
B
A
Fourth choice
A
B
C
C
78. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible out-
comes: A, B, C, D. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this
information, which of the following statements is false?
a.
Outcome D is preferred to outcome C overall.
b.
Outcome C is preferred to outcome B overall.
c.
Outcome B is preferred to outcome D overall.
d.
Outcome D is preferred to outcome A overall.
79. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible out-
comes: A, B, C, D. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Given pair-
wise voting in which voters choose first between A and B, then between the winner of the first vote
and C, and finally between the winner of the second vote and D, which outcome would win?
a.
A
b.
B
c.
C
d.
D
80. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible out-
comes: A, B, C, and D. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Suppose a
Borda count election is held in which each voter ranks the four outcomes, giving 1 point to last
place, 2 points to second to last, 3 points to the second best, and 4 points to the best. In this case,
which outcome would win?
a.
A
b.
B
c.
C
d.
D
81. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible out-
comes: A, B, C, and D. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Suppose
that, for some reason, D is eliminated as a possible option. Using a Borda count election, with 3
44 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
points for the best choice, 2 points for the second best choice, and 1 point for the last choice, which
outcome would win this election?
a.
A
b.
B
c.
C
d.
There would be a three-way tie.
82. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible out-
comes: A, B, C, and D. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. If the elec-
tion is an instant runoff, the winner will be
a.
A.
b.
B.
c.
C.
d.
D.
Table 22-9
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
# Voters
40
15
45
First choice
C
B
A
Second choice
B
A
C
Third choice
A
C
B
83. Refer to Table 22-9. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes:
A, B, and C. If a Borda count election were held among these voters, giving three points to each vot-
er's first choice, two points to the second choice, and one point to the last choice, which outcome
would win the election?
a.
Outcome A
b.
Outcome B
c.
Outcome C
d.
Either outcome A or outcome C since these have the same total score.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 45
84. Refer to Table 22-9. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes:
A, B, and C. Which of the following statements is true?
a.
In pairwise majority voting, B is preferred to A, A is preferred to C, and B is preferred to
C.
b.
In pairwise majority voting, C is preferred to B, B is preferred to A, and C is preferred to
A.
c.
In pairwise majority voting, B is preferred to A, A is preferred to C, and C is preferred to
B.
d.
In pairwise majority voting, A is preferred to C, C is preferred to B, and A is preferred to
B.
85. Refer to Table 22-9. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes:
A, B, and C. In pairwise majority voting in which voters choose first between A and B and then
choose between the winner of the first vote and C,
a.
outcome A will win the election.
b.
outcome B will win the election.
c.
outcome C will win the election.
d.
the outcome of the election cannot be determined with the given information.
86. Suppose that in a Borda count election, outcome X is preferred to outcome Y, and outcome Y is pre-
ferred to outcome Z, when outcomes X, Y, and Z are all available options. When Y is removed as an
option, however, outcome Z is preferred to outcome X. This would violate Arrow's assumption that
voting systems should satisfy
a.
unanimity.
b.
transitivity.
c.
the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
d.
no dictators.
87. Which of the following would violate transitivity?
a.
Vanessa likes A more than B, C more than B, and C more than A.
b.
Jay likes C more than B, A more than B, B more than D, and C more than D.
c.
Maddy likes C more than A, B more than D, A more than B, and D more than C.
d.
Victoria likes C more than B, C more than D, and B more than D.
46 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
88. Suppose that there are 175 voters in an election and that 80 of them prefer a $100 budget while the
remainder prefer a $150 budget. Which of the following statements is true?
a.
The Condorcet Paradox predicts that the $100 budget will win even though fewer people
prefer that budget.
b.
The median voter theorem predicts that the winning budget will be $125, the median of
the preferences of the two types of voters.
c.
Arrow's impossibility theorem says that the winning budget cannot be determined in this
election since there is no unanimity.
d.
None of the above.
Scenario 22-2
The following table shows the preferences for the five voters in a city regarding how to deal with the
city’s diseased trees.
Voter #
1
2
3
4
5
1st choice
B
B
C
D
A
2nd choice
C
C
D
C
C
3rd choice
D
A
A
A
D
4th choice
A
D
B
B
B
A = do nothing
B = follow the expert's advice to remove every tree
C = remove every 4th tree now and perhaps more later
D = use an untested spraying alternative
89. Refer to Scenario 22-2. Consider the public policy for dealing with the diseased trees. Using pair-
wise majority voting with A versus B, then the winner of that vote versus C, then the winner of that
vote versus D, which policy wins?
a.
A
b.
B
c.
C
d.
D
90. Refer to Scenario 22-2. Consider the public policy for dealing with the diseased trees. Using a
Borda count with 4 points assigned to the first choice, 3 points assigned to the second choice, 2
points assigned to the third choice, and 1 point assigned to the fourth choice, which policy wins?
a.
A
b.
B
c.
C
d.
D
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 47
91. Refer to Scenario 22-2. Consider the public policy for dealing with diseased trees. Based on the
preferences in the table, which of the following statements is correct?
a.
Outcome D is preferred to outcome C overall.
b.
Outcome B is preferred to outcome C overall.
c.
Outcome D is preferred to outcome B overall.
d.
Outcome A is preferred to outcome D overall.
92. What is the name of the mathematical result showing that no voting system can simultaneously sat-
isfy the properties of unanimity, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and no dicta-
tors?
a.
The fundamental theorem of behavioral economics
b.
Arrow's impossibility theorem
c.
The fundamental theorem of voting
d.
The median voter theorem
93. One implication of the Condorcet paradox is
a.
that the order in which things are voted on can affect the result.
b.
that the order in which things are voted on is irrelevant.
c.
that you do not want to be in charge of arranging which items are voted upon first.
d.
that when there are only two items being voted on the order matters.
94. Which voter is the voter whose views on a policy issue are in the middle of the spectrum, with half
of the voters on one side of this voter's view and half on the other side.
a.
Average voter
b.
Mean voter
c.
Modal voter
d.
Median voter
95. A community has five voters who are interested in only one issue: the government’s spending on
local parks. If Andre would like the government to spend $12,000 on parks, Brandon prefers
$7,000, Charlene prefers $4,000, Dennis prefers $2,000, and Ernie prefers $0, how much spending
would a politician seeking to win the election select when running against one opponent?
a.
$2,000
b.
$4,000
c.
$7,000
d.
$12,000
48 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
96. The median-voter theorem explains why
a.
politicians take extreme stands on issues.
b.
voters are attracted to political outsiders.
c.
two opposing politicians tend to take opposite sides of each issues.
d.
politicians tend to take middle-of-the-road positions.
Scenario 22-3
Three candidates, Frank, Brian, and Wanda, are running for office. There are three voters in the
upcoming election: Henry, Diane, and Linda. Henry prefers Brian over Frank and Frank over
Wanda. Diane prefers Wanda over Brian and Brian over Frank. Linda prefers Frank over Brian and
Brian over Wanda.
97. Refer to Scenario 22-3. If the voters were given a choice of Frank versus Brian first, then the win-
ner was in a second election versus Wanda, who would win?
a.
Frank
b.
Brian
c.
Wanda
d.
There is not enough information to answer this question.
98. Refer to Scenario 22-3. If the voters were given a choice of Frank versus Wanda first, then the win-
ner was in a second election versus Brian, who would win?
a.
Frank
b.
Brian
c.
Wanda
d.
There is not enough information to answer this question.
99. Refer to Scenario 22-3. If the voters were given a choice of Brian versus Wanda first, then the win-
ner was in a second election versus Frank, who would win?
a.
Frank
b.
Brian
c.
Wanda
d.
There is not enough information to answer this question.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 49
100. Refer to Scenario 22-3. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet para-
dox and the results of pairwise voting by Henry, Diane, and Linda?
a.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the
voting by Henry, Diane, and Linda fails to produce transitive preferences.
b.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) produces transitive
preferences, and the voting by Henry, Diane, and Linda does produce transitive
preferences.
c.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce
transitive preferences, and the voting by Henry, Diane, and Linda fails to produce
transitive preferences.
d.
The paradox does not apply to the case at hand, because Henry's preferences are not
individually transitive.
101. Refer to Scenario 22-3. If the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each
person's first choice receives 3 points, second choice 2 points, and third choice 1 point, the election
winner would be
a.
Frank.
b.
Brian.
c.
Wanda.
d.
a tie between Frank and Wanda.
102. Refer to Scenario 22-4. If the first vote pits a stoplight against a 4-way stop and the second vote
pits a 2-way stop against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
4-way stop wins the first vote and 4-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a
4-way stop.
b.
4-way stop wins the first vote and 2-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a
2-way stop.
c.
Stoplight wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a
stoplight.
d.
Stoplight wins the first vote and 2-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 2-
way stop.
50 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
103. Refer to Scenario 22-4. If the first vote pits a 2-way stop against a 4-way stop and the second vote
pits a stoplight against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
2-way stop wins the first vote and 2-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a
2-way stop.
b.
2-way stop wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a
stoplight.
c.
4-way stop wins the first vote and 4-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a
4-way stop.
d.
4-way stop wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a
stoplight.
104. Refer to Scenario 22-4. If the first vote pits a 2-way stop against a stoplight and the second vote
pits a 4-way stop against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
2-way stop wins the first vote and 2-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a
2-way stop.
b.
2-way stop wins the first vote and 4-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a
4-way stop.
c.
Stoplight wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a
stoplight.
d.
Stoplight wins the first vote and 4-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 4-
way stop.
105. Refer to Scenario 22-4. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet para-
dox and the results of pairwise voting on how to improve the safety of the intersection?
a.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the
voting in the town fails to produce transitive preferences.
b.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce
transitive preferences, but the voting in the town does produce transitive preferences.
c.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce
transitive preferences, and the voting in the town fails to produce transitive preferences.
d.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting always produces transitive preferences, and so
the voting in the town produces transitive preferences.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 51
106. Refer to Scenario 22-4. If the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each
person's first choice receives 3 points, second choice 2 points, and third choice 1 point, the result
would be
a.
a 2-way stop.
b.
a 4-way stop.
c.
a stoplight
d.
a tie between a 2-way stop and a stoplight.
107. Refer to Scenario 22-4. Based on the information in the table, which of the following statements is
true?
a.
In a vote between a 2-way stop and a stoplight, stoplight wins because 40% of voters have
stoplight as their 1st choice.
b.
In a vote between a 2-way stop and a 4-way stop, the 4-way stop wins getting 80% of the
total vote.
c.
In a vote between a 4-way stop and a stoplight, there is a tie because each gets 40% of the
vote.
d.
None of the above are true.
108. The Condorcet paradox demonstrates that the result of a majority vote may be affected by
a.
moral hazard.
b.
adverse selection.
c.
the order of the votes.
d.
All of the above are correct.
Scenario 22-5
Three members of the DiCarlo family, Vinny, Maria, and Franki, are choosing the entree for a large
family reunion. Their options are: spaghetti, ravioli, lasagne, and pizza. Vinny prefers spaghetti
over lasagne, lasagne over ravioli, and ravioli over pizza. Maria prefers ravioli over spaghetti,
spaghetti over pizza, and pizza over lasagne. Frankie prefers pizza over ravioli, ravioli over lasagne,
and lasagne over spaghetti.
109. Refer to Scenario 22-5. Maria recommends using a vote by majority rule and proposes first choos-
ing between spaghetti and lasagne, then choosing between the winner of the first vote and ravioli,
52 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
and finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and pizza. If everyone votes according
to his or her preferences,
a.
the winner of the first vote will be spaghetti, the winner of the second vote will be ravioli,
and the winner of the final vote will be ravioli.
b.
the winner of the first vote will be spaghetti, the winner of the second vote will be
spaghetti, and the winner of the final vote will be spaghetti.
c.
the winner of the first vote will be lasagne, the winner of the second vote will be ravioli,
and the winner of the final vote will be ravioli.
d.
the winner of the first vote will be lasagne, the winner of the second vote will be lasagne,
and the winner of the final vote will be ravioli.
110. Refer to Scenario 22-5. Vinny recommends using a vote by majority rule and wants to be sure that
his first choice becomes the winner. Which order should he should propose to use for pairwise vot-
ing to ensure his desired outcome?
a.
first choosing between ravioli and spaghetti, then choosing between the winner of the first
vote and pizza, and finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and lasagne
b.
first choosing between pizza and spaghetti, then choosing between the winner of the first
vote and lasagne, and finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and ravioli
c.
first choosing between lasagne and pizza, then choosing between the winner of the first
vote and ravioli, and finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and spaghetti
d.
None of the proposed voting orders will result in Vinny’s first choice winning the vote.
111. Refer to Scenario 22-5. If the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each
person's first choice receives 4 points, second choice 3 points, third choice 2 points, and fourth
choice 1 point, the election winner would be
a.
pizza.
b.
ravioli.
c.
lasagne.
d.
spaghetti.
112. Refer to Scenario 22-5. If, before any votes were cast, ravioli was eliminated from the choices and
the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each person's first choice receives
3 points, second choice 2 points, and third choice 1 point, the election winner would be
a.
pizza.
b.
spaghetti
c.
lasagne.
d.
The result would be a three-way tie between pizza, spaghetti and lasagne.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 53
113. Refer to Scenario 22-5. If, before any votes were cast, ravioli was eliminated from the choices, the
median voter’s first choice would be
a.
pizza.
b.
spaghetti
c.
lasagne.
d.
There is not enough information to answer this question.
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative
Table 22-10
Three family members -- Seamus, Maeve, and Siobhan -- are deciding what type of movie to attend.
The three choices are an action adventure, comedy, or horror. The first, second, and third choices
for each person are as indicated in the table below.
Seamus
Maeve
Siobhan
First Choice
Comedy
Action
Horror
Second Choice
Horror
Horror
Comedy
Third Choice
Action
Comedy
Action
114. Refer to Table 22-10. If the voting method is a Borda count, which alternative will be chosen?
a.
Comedy
b.
Action
c.
Horror
d.
None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance.
115. Refer to Table 22-10. Suppose the three decide to make the decision based on pairwise majority
voting. If they first choose between Action and Comedy and then choose between the winner of the
first vote and Horror, which movie alternative will win?
a.
Action
b.
Comedy
c.
Horror
d.
There is no clear winner - Comedy and Horror will tie.
116. Refer to Table 22-10. Suppose the three decide to make the decision based on pairwise majority
voting. If they first choose between Action and Horror and then choose between the winner of the
first vote and Comedy, which movie alternative will win?
a.
Action
b.
Comedy
c.
Horror
d.
There is no clear winner - Action and Horror will tie.
54 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
Table 22-11
The following table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible alternatives as
well as the percentage of the electorate with the given preferences.
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Percent of voters
25
30
40
5
First choice
W
X
Y
Z
Second choice
X
Z
W
Y
Third choice
Y
W
Z
X
Fourth choice
Z
Y
X
W
117. Refer to Table 22-11. In a majority vote between alternatives W and X, what percentage of the
votes would W receive?
a.
35%
b.
45%
c.
55%
d.
65%
118. Refer to Table 22-11. In a majority vote between alternatives X and Y, what percentage of the
votes would X receive?
a.
35%
b.
45%
c.
55%
d.
65%
119. Refer to Table 22-11. Suppose voters first choose in a majority vote between W and X. Second,
voters choose in a majority vote between the winner of the first vote and Y. Third, voters choose in
a majority vote between the winner of the second vote and Z. Which alternative will win?
a.
W
b.
X
c.
Y
d.
Z
120. Refer to Table 22-11. Suppose before any voting takes place that alternative W is eliminated as an
option. If the voters first choose between alternatives X and Y in a majority vote, with the winner of
that vote going against option Z in a majority vote, which alternative would win?
a.
X
b.
Y
c.
Z
d.
There would be no clear winner - alternatives X and Y would tie.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 55
121. Refer to Table 22-11. Suppose before any voting takes place that alternative W is eliminated as an
option. Based on this information, the median voter’s first choice is
a.
X
b.
Y
c.
Z
d.
The median voter’s first choice cannot be determined from the information given.
122. Refer to Table 22-11. If the vote is conducted using a Borda count where each person’s first choice
receives 4 points, each person’s second choice 3 points, each person’s third choice 2 points, and
each person’s fourth choice 1 point, which alternative would win?
a.
W
b.
X
c.
Y
d.
Z
Table 22-12
The following table shows the number of voters preferring various amounts of spending on a new
school.
Number of Voters
Preferred Spending (millions)
12
$0.0
33
$0.5
47
$1.0
22
$1.5
6
$2.0
4
$2.5
1
$3.0
123. Refer to Table 22-12. What is the preferred spending amount of the median voter?
a.
$0.5
b.
$1.0
c.
$1.5
d.
$2.0
124. Refer to Table 22-12. Suppose the voters are asked to choose between $0.5 and $2.0. If all voters
cast a vote for the spending amount closest to their own preference, which spending amount will win
a majority of the votes?
a.
$0.5
b.
$2.0
c.
Neither. The vote will be a tie.
d.
Neither, since the median spending amount, $1.5, will always win in a vote.
56 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
125. Refer to Table 22-12. Suppose the voters are asked to choose between $0.5 and $2.0. If all voters
cast a vote for the spending amount closest to their own preference, how many votes will the $0.5
spending amount receive?
a.
33
b.
45
c.
92
d.
114
126. Refer to Table 22-12. Suppose on election day that the voters with a preference for $0.0, $2.0,
$2.5, and $3.0 do not show up to vote. In this case, what is the preferred spending amount of the
median voter (among those who actually cast a vote)?
a.
$0.50
b.
$0.75
c.
$1.00
d.
$1.50
Table 22-13
The fortunate residents of Anytown have a budget surplus. The mayor decided that it is only fair to
have the residents vote on what to do with the surplus. The mayor has narrowed the options down to
three possible projects: a playground, a library, or a swimming pool. The voters fall into three
categories and have preferences as illustrated in the table.
Voter Types
Residents with
Young Children
Residents with
Older Children
Residents with No
Children
Percent of Electorate
45
35
20
First Choice
Playground
Swimming Pool
Library
Second Choice
Library
Playground
Swimming Pool
Third Choice
Swimming Pool
Library
Playground
127. Refer to Table 22-13. If the mayor asks the residents to choose between the playground and the
library using pairwise voting,
a.
the playground wins by 45%.
b.
the playground wins by 60%.
c.
the library wins by 20%.
d.
the library wins by 80%.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 57
128. Refer to Table 22-13. If the mayor asks the residents to choose between the library and the swim-
ming pool using pairwise voting,
a.
the library wins by 30%.
b.
the library wins by 65%.
c.
the swimming pool wins by 10%.
d.
the swimming pool wins by 35%.
129. Refer to Table 22-13. If the mayor asks the residents to choose between the playground and the
swimming pool using pairwise voting,
a.
the playground wins by 10%.
b.
the playground wins by 45%.
c.
the swimming pool wins by 10%.
d.
the swimming pool wins by 55%.
130. Refer to Table 22-13. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the results of pair-
wise voting in Anytown?
a.
The results of pairwise voting depend on the order of the pairs but satisfy the transitivity
property.
b.
The results of pairwise voting do not depend on the order of the pairs and satisfy the
transitivity property.
c.
The results of pairwise voting depend on the order of the pairs and do not satisfy the
transitivity property.
d.
The results of pairwise voting do not depend on the order of the pairs and do not satisfy
the transitivity property.
131. Refer to Table 22-13. If the mayor decides to use a Borda count rather than pairwise voting,
a.
the swimming pool will win.
b.
the library will win.
c.
the playground will win.
d.
the results will be the same as with pairwise voting.
58 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
Table 22-14
The Johnson family is planning a vacation and, though Mr. and Mrs. Johnson will be paying for the
trip, they have decided to use a democratic voting process to choose their destination. The family
members’ preferences are reflected in the table below.
Mr. Jack
Johnson
Mrs. Jill
Johnson
Janie
Julie
Justin
1st choice
Grand Canyon
Opryland
Opryland
Disneyland
Sea World
2nd choice
Sea World
Grand Canyon
Disneyland
Grand Canyon
Disneyland
3rd choice
Opryland
Disneyland
Grand Canyon
Sea World
Grand Canyon
4th choice
Disneyland
Sea World
Sea World
Opryland
Opryland
132. Refer to Table 22-14. Mr. Johnson recommends using a vote by majority rule and proposes first
choosing between Opryland and the Grand Canyon, then choosing between the winner of the first
vote and Sea World, and finally choosing between the winner of the second vote and Disneyland. If
everyone votes according to their preferences,
a.
the winner of the first vote will be Opryland, the winner of the second vote will be Sea
World, and the winner of the final vote will be Disneyland.
b.
the winner of the first vote will be Grand Canyon, the winner of the second vote will be
Grand Canyon, and the winner of the final vote will be Disneyland.
c.
the winner of the first vote will be Grand Canyon, the winner of the second vote will be
Sea World, and the winner of the final vote will be Disneyland.
d.
the winner of the first vote will be Grand Canyon, the winner of the second vote will be
Grand Canyon, and the winner of the final vote will be Grand Canyon.
133. Refer to Table 22-14. Suppose that before the family can arrive at their decision, Opryland an-
nounced that it will be closed for the season due to flooding. Mr. Johnson recommends using a vote
by majority rule and proposes first choosing between the Grand Canyon and Sea World, and then
choosing between the winner of the first vote and Disneyland. If everyone votes according to their
preferences,
a.
the winner of the first vote will be Sea World, the winner of the second vote will be
Disneyland.
b.
the winner of the first vote will be Sea World, the winner of the second vote will be Grand
Canyon.
c.
the winner of the first vote will be Grand Canyon, the winner of the second vote will be
Disneyland.
d.
the winner of the first vote will be Grand Canyon, the winner of the second vote will be
Grand Canyon.
Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics ❖ 59
134. Refer to Table 22-14. Mr. Johnson recommends using a vote by majority rule. If he wants to en-
sure that his 1st choice becomes the family’s winning destination, he should propose
a.
first choosing between Opryland and the Grand Canyon, then choosing between the
winner of the first vote and Sea World, and finally choosing between the winner of the
second vote and Disneyland.
b.
first choosing between Disneyland and Sea World, then choosing between the winner of
the first vote and the Grand Canyon and finally choosing between the winner of the second
vote and the Opryland.
c.
first choosing between Sea World and the Grand Canyon, then choosing between the
winner of the first vote and Disneyland, and finally choosing between the winner of the
second vote and Opryland.
d.
first choosing between Opryland and Disneyland, then choosing between the winner of the
first vote and the Grand Canyon, and finally choosing between the winner of the second
vote and Sea World.
135. Refer to Table 22-14. If Mr. Johnson wants to ensure that his 1st choice becomes the family’s win-
ning destination, he should propose
a.
using a vote by majority rule and first choosing between Opryland and the Grand Canyon,
then choosing between the winner of the first vote and Sea World, and finally choosing
between the winner of the second vote and Disneyland.
b.
using a vote by majority rule and first choosing between Disneyland and Sea World, then
choosing between the winner of the first vote and the Grand Canyon and finally choosing
between the winner of the second vote and the Opryland.
c.
using a vote by majority rule and first choosing between Sea World and the Grand
Canyon, then choosing between the winner of the first vote and Disneyland, and finally
choosing between the winner of the second vote and Opryland.
d.
using a Borda count.
136. Refer to Table 22-14. If the family uses a Borda count to make their decision, what is their vacation
destination?
a.
Grand Canyon
b.
Sea World
c.
Opryland
d.
Disneyland
60 ❖ Chapter 22/Frontiers in Microeconomics
137. Refer to Table 22-14. Suppose that before the family can arrive at their decision, Opryland an-
nounced that it will be closed for the season due to flooding. If the family uses a Borda count, their
vacation destination will be
a.
Grand Canyon
b.
Sea World
c.
Disneyland
d.
There is a tie between the Grand Canyon and Disneyland.
Table 22-15
The town of Portsmouth is considering a renovation to the high school. The voters in Portsmouth
have different preferences on the budget for the renovation as displayed below.
Preferred Budget
Number of Voters
$0 million
12,000
$4 million
20,000
$8 million
6,000
$12 million
8,000
$16 million
30,000
$20 million
4,000
138. Refer to Table 22-15. The median voter is one who prefers to spend
a.
$4 million.
b.
$8 million
c.
$12 million.
d.
$16 million.
139. Refer to Table 22-15. If there is a vote between a budget of $8 million and $12 million, the median
voter will vote to spend
a.
$8 million and the voting outcome will be $8 million.
b.
$8 million and the voting outcome will be $12 million.
c.
$12 million and the voting outcome will be $8 million..
d.
$12 million and the voting outcome will be $12 million.
140. Refer to Table 22-15. If there is a vote between a budget of $12 million and $16 million, the me-
dian voter will vote to spend
a.
$12 million and the voting outcome will be $12 million.
b.
$12 million and the voting outcome will be $16 million.
c.
$16 million and the voting outcome will be $12 million..
d.
$16 million and the voting outcome will be $16 million.
