1. The field of political economy
a.
casts aside most of the standard methods of economic analysis.
b.
is also referred to as the field of public choice.
c.
is also referred to as the field of macroeconomics.
d.
produces the conclusion that democratic principles rarely lead to desirable economic outcomes.
2. The field of political economy applies the methods of
a.
psychology to study how the economy works.
b.
political science to study how the economy works
c.
economics to study how government works.
d.
psychology to study how government works.
3. The field of political economy
a.
b.
c.
d.
4. Recent developments in political economy
a.
render much of the traditional field of political science obsolete.
b.
render much of the traditional field of economics obsolete.
c.
illustrate the resolute nature of democracy.
d.
point to the fact that government is a less-than-perfect institution.
5. Normally, we expect voters’ preferences to exhibit a property called
a.
transitivity.
b.
transversality.
c.
normality.
d.
universality.
6. If preferences exhibit the property of transitivity, then
a.
the preferences are irrational.
b.
individuals prefer more government involvement in private markets than do people whose preferences are not
transitive.
c.
preferences change over time more quickly than when preferences are not transitive.
d.
preferences satisfy one of the properties assumed to be desirable by Kenneth Arrow in Social Choice and
Individual Values.
7. Which of the following statements captures the meaning of transitivity of preferences?
a.
If A is preferred to B, then B is less preferred than A.
b.
If A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C.
c.
If A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then the preference for A over B is stronger than the preference
for B over C.
d.
If A is preferred to C, then there exists B such that A is preferred to B and C is preferred to A.
8. Which of the following sets of preferences satisfies the property of transitivity?
a.
Cookies are preferred to pie. Pie is preferred to brownies. Cookies are preferred to brownies.
b.
Cookies are preferred to pie. Brownies are preferred to pie. Pie is preferred to cookies.
c.
Cookies are preferred to ice cream. Ice cream is preferred to brownies. Brownies are preferred to cookies.
d.
Cookies are preferred to pie. Ice cream is preferred to cookies. Pie is preferred to ice cream.
9. Which of the following would violate transitivity?
a.
b.
c.
d.
10. Which of the following sets of preferences can not satisfy the property of transitivity?
a.
Plan A is preferred to plan D. Plan D is preferred to plan B. Plan C is preferred to plan B.
b.
Plan A is preferred to plan B. Plan B is preferred to plan C. Plan A is preferred to plan C.
c.
Plan C is preferred to plan A. Plan B is preferred to plan A. Plan C is preferred to plan B.
d.
Plan D is preferred to plan C. Plan C is preferred to plan B. Plan B is preferred to plan D.
11. The Condorcet paradox
a.
demonstrates that the order in which one votes on options may influence the outcome.
b.
demonstrates that majority voting by itself may not reveal the outcome that society wants.
c.
disproves Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
d.
Both a and b are correct.
12. The Condorcet voting paradox applies to situations in which voters
a.
decide between exactly two possible outcomes.
b.
decide among more than two possible outcomes.
c.
as a group have transitive preferences.
d.
choose the inferior candidate even though the majority preferred the better candidate.
13. The Condorcet paradox
a.
proved that the Arrow impossibility theorem is wrong.
b.
was proved wrong by the Arrow impossibility theorem.
c.
serves as an example of the Arrow impossibility theorem.
d.
pertains to voting systems, whereas Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem does not.
14. The Condorcet voting paradox demonstrates that democratic outcomes do not always obey the property of
a.
narrowness of preferences.
b.
concavity of preferences.
c.
asymmetry of preferences.
d.
transitivity of preferences.
15. The Condorcet paradox demonstrates that the result of a majority vote may be affected by
a.
moral hazard.
b.
adverse selection.
c.
the order of the votes.
d.
All of the above are correct.
16. Under majority rule, the order in which items are voted on is
a.
unimportant, and this is a lesson of the Condorcet paradox.
b.
unimportant, and this is a lesson of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
c.
important, and this is a lesson of the Condorcet paradox.
d.
important, and this is a lesson of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
17. The Condorcet paradox shows that
a.
allocations of resources based on majority rule are always inefficient.
b.
problems in counting votes can negate legitimate democratic outcomes.
c.
the order on which things are voted can affect the result.
d.
transitive preferences are inconsistent with rationality.
18. Which of the following is a lesson from the Condorcet paradox?
a.
If voters are choosing a point along a line, then majority rule will pick the most preferred point of the median
voter.
b.
Under certain conditions, there is no scheme for aggregating individual preferences.
c.
When there are more than two options, deciding the order in which to vote can have a powerful influence over
the outcome of an election.
d.
Majority voting always indicates what outcome a society really wants.
19. One implication of the Condorcet paradox is
a.
that the order in which things are voted on can affect the result.
b.
that the order in which things are voted on is irrelevant.
c.
that you do not want to be in charge of arranging which items are voted upon first.
d.
that when there are only two items being voted on the order matters.
20. Which of the following is not correct?
a.
Pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences.
b.
The order of pairwise voting can affect the result.
c.
Majority voting by itself does not tell us what outcome a society really wants.
d.
No voting system can satisfy all of the following properties: unanimity, transitivity, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and no dictators.
21. As an alternative to pairwise majority voting, each voter could be asked to rank the possible outcomes, giving 1 point
to her lowest choice, 2 points to her second-lowest choice, 3 points to her third-lowest choice, and so on. This voting
method is called a(n)
a.
median vote.
b.
pairwise minority vote.
c.
Borda count.
d.
Arrow count.
22. Suppose that residents of a town are asked to vote on the best day to improve the safety of an intersection. The three
choices are: a stoplight, a 4-way stop, and a 2-way stop. The mayor asks the residents to assign 3 points to their first
choice, 2 points to their second choice, and 1 point to their last choice. The intersection will be controlled by the method
that receives the most points. This voting scheme is called
a.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
b.
the Condorcet paradox.
c.
a Borda count.
d.
the median voter theorem.
23. Suppose that residents of a town are asked to vote on the best way to improve the safety of an intersection. The three
choices are: a stoplight, a 4-way stop, and a 2-way stop. When the mayor asks the residents to choose between a stoplight
and a 4-way stop, the residents choose a 4-way stop. Then, when the mayor asks them to choose between a 4-way stop
and a 2-way stop, they choose a 2-way stop. However, if the mayor firsts asks the residents to choose between a 4-way
stop and a 2-way stop, they choose a 2-way stop. Then, when the mayor asks the residents to choose between a 2-way stop
and a stoplight, they choose a stoplight. What does this example illustrate?
a.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
b.
the Condorcet paradox
c.
a Borda count
d.
the median voter theorem
Table 22-1
Three friends — Linda, Stephanie, and Jamie — are deciding where to go together for vacation. They all agree that they
should go to one of three places: France, Greece, or Italy. They also agree that they will have two pairwise votes to
determine where to go on vacation, with the majority determining the outcome on each vote. The first, second, and third
choices for each person are as indicated in the table below.
Linda
Stephanie
Jamie
First choice
France
Greece
Italy
Second choice
Greece
Italy
France
Third choice
Italy
France
Greece
24. Refer to Table 22–1. If the first vote pits France against Greece and the second vote pits Italy against the winner of
the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
France wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy.
b.
France wins the first vote and France wins the second vote, so they go to France.
c.
Greece wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece.
d.
Greece wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy.
25. Refer to Table 22–1. If the first vote pits France against Italy and the second vote pits Greece against the winner of
the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
France wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece.
b.
France wins the first vote and France wins the second vote, so they go to France.
c.
Italy wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy.
d.
Italy wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece.
26. Refer to Table 22–1. If the first vote pits Greece against Italy and the second vote pits France against the winner of
the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
Greece wins the first vote and France wins the second vote, so they go to France.
b.
Greece wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece.
c.
Italy wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy.
d.
Italy wins the first vote and France wins the second vote, so they go to France.
27. Refer to Table 22–1. Depending on the order of the pairwise voting,
a.
the friends could go to either France, Italy, or Greece.
b.
the friends could go to either France or Italy, but they will not go to Greece.
c.
the friends could go to either Italy or Greece, but they will not go to France.
d.
the friends could go to either France or Greece, but they will not go to Italy.
28. Refer to Table 22–1. If the friends change their minds and decide to choose a vacation destination using a Borda
count, then
a.
the friends will go to France.
b.
the friends will go to Greece.
c.
the friends will go to Italy.
d.
A Borda count will not result in a single winner in this case.
Table 22-2
Three longtime friends-Allen, Brian, and Cody-are deciding how they will spend their Sunday afternoon. They all agree
that they should do one of three things: go to a movie, play golf, or go to a baseball game. They also agree that they will
have two pairwise votes to determine how to spend their afternoon, with the majority determining the outcome on each
vote. The first, second, and third choices for each person are as indicated in the table below.
Allen
Brian
Cody
First choice
Baseball Game
Golf
Movie
Second choice
Golf
Movie
Baseball Game
Third choice
Movie
Baseball Game
Golf
29. Refer to Table 22-2. If (1) the first vote pits “baseball game” against “movie,” and (2) the second vote pits “golf”
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
“Baseball game” wins the first vote and “baseball game” wins the second vote, so they go to a baseball game.
b.
“Baseball game” wins the first vote and “golf” wins the second vote, so they go to the golf.
c.
“Movie” wins the first vote and “movie” wins the second vote, so they go to a movie.
d.
“Movie” wins the first vote and “golf” wins the second vote, so they play golf.
30. Refer to Table 22-2. If (1) the first vote pits “baseball game” against “golf,” and (2) the second vote pits “movie”
against the winner of the first vote, then
a.
“Baseball game” wins the first vote and “baseball game” wins the second vote, so they go to a baseball game.
b.
“Baseball game” wins the first vote and “movie” wins the second vote, so they go to a movie.
c.
“golf” wins the first vote and “golf” wins the second vote, so they play golf.
d.
“golf” wins the first vote and “movie” wins the second vote, so they go to a movie.
31. Refer to Table 22-2. Which of the following statements is correct?
a.
In a pairwise election, “movie” beats “golf.”
b.
In a pairwise election, “golf” beats “baseball game.”
c.
In a pairwise election, “baseball game” beats “movie.”
d.
None of the above is correct.
32. Refer to Table 22-2. Which of the following statements is correct?
a.
In a pairwise election, “golf” beats “movie.”
b.
In a pairwise election, “baseball game” beats “golf.”
c.
In a pairwise election, “movie” beats “baseball game.”
d.
All of the above are correct.
33. Refer to Table 22-2. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet paradox and the results of
pairwise voting by Allen, Brian, and Cody?
a.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the voting by Allen,
Brian, and Cody fails to produce transitive preferences.
b.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) produces transitive preferences, and the
voting by Allen, Brian, and Cody does produce transitive preferences.
c.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce transitive preferences,
and the voting by Allen, Brian, and Cody fails to produce transitive preferences.
d.
The paradox does not apply to the case at hand, because Brian’s preferences are not individually transitive.
34. Refer to Table 22-2. If Allen, Brian, and Cody use a Borda count, rather than pairwise majority voting, to decide how
to spend their afternoon, then they will
a.
watch a movie.
b.
play golf.
c.
watch a baseball game.
d.
None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance.
Table 22-3
Three family members — Seamus, Maeve, and Siobhan — are deciding what type of movie to attend. The three choices are
an action adventure, comedy, or horror. The first, second, and third choices for each person are as indicated in the table
below.
Seamus
Maeve
Siobhan
First Choice
Comedy
Action
Horror
Second Choice
Horror
Horror
Comedy
Third Choice
Action
Comedy
Action
35. Refer to Table 22–3. If the voting method is a Borda count, which alternative will be chosen?
a.
Comedy
b.
Action
c.
Horror
d.
None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance.
36. Refer to Table 22–3. Suppose the three decide to make the decision based on pairwise majority voting. If they first
choose between Action and Comedy and then choose between the winner of the first vote and Horror, which movie
alternative will win?
a.
Action
b.
Comedy
c.
Horror
d.
There is no clear winner – Comedy and Horror will tie.
37. Refer to Table 22–3. Suppose the three decide to make the decision based on pairwise majority voting. If they first
choose between Action and Horror and then choose between the winner of the first vote and Comedy, which movie
alternative will win?
a.
Action
b.
Comedy
c.
Horror
d.
There is no clear winner – Action and Horror will tie.
Table 22-4
The fortunate residents of Anytown have a budget surplus. The mayor decided that it is only fair to have the residents vote
on what to do with the surplus. The mayor has narrowed the options down to three possible projects: a playground, a
library, or a swimming pool. The voters fall into three categories and have preferences as illustrated in the table.
Voter Types
Residents with
Young Children
Residents with Older
Children
Residents with No Children
Percent of Electorate
45
35
20
First Choice
Playground
Swimming Pool
Library
Second Choice
Library
Playground
Swimming Pool
Third Choice
Swimming Pool
Library
Playground
38. Refer to Table 22–4. If the mayor asks the residents to choose between the playground and the library using pairwise
voting,
a.
the playground wins by 45%.
b.
the playground wins by 60%.
c.
the library wins by 20%.
d.
the library wins by 80%.
39. Refer to Table 22–4. If the mayor asks the residents to choose between the library and the swimming pool using
pairwise voting,
a.
the library wins by 30%.
b.
the library wins by 65%.
c.
the swimming pool wins by 10%.
d.
the swimming pool wins by 35%.
40. Refer to Table 22–4. If the mayor asks the residents to choose between the playground and the swimming pool using
pairwise voting,
a.
the playground wins by 10%.
b.
the playground wins by 45%.
c.
the swimming pool wins by 10%.
d.
the swimming pool wins by 55%.
41. Refer to Table 22–4. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the results of pairwise voting in
Anytown?
a.
The results of pairwise voting depend on the order of the pairs but satisfy the transitivity property.
b.
The results of pairwise voting do not depend on the order of the pairs and satisfy the transitivity property.
c.
The results of pairwise voting depend on the order of the pairs and do not satisfy the transitivity property.
d.
The results of pairwise voting do not depend on the order of the pairs and do not satisfy the transitivity
property.
42. Refer to Table 22–4. If the mayor decides to use a Borda count rather than pairwise voting,
a.
the swimming pool will win.
b.
the library will win.
c.
the playground will win.
d.
the results will be the same as with pairwise voting.
Table 22-5
The citizens of Anytown will decide whether to build a new library, a recreation center, or an arena. Exactly one of the
three choices will prevail, and the choice will be made by way of pairwise voting, with the majority determining the
outcome on each vote. The preferences of the voters are summarized in the table below.
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Percent of Electorate
40
35
25
First choice
Library
Recreation Center
Arena
Second choice
Recreation Center
Arena
Library
Third choice
Arena
Library
Recreation Center
43. Refer to Table 22-5. If (1) the first vote pits “library” against “recreation center,” and (2) the second vote pits “arena”
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
“Library” wins the first vote and “library” wins the second vote, so they build a library.
b.
“Library” wins the first vote and “arena” wins the second vote, so they build an arena.
c.
“recreation center” wins the first vote and “recreation center” wins the second vote, so they build a recreation
center.
d.
“recreation center” wins the first vote and “arena” wins the second vote, so they build an arena.
44. Refer to Table 22-5. If (1) the first vote pits “library” against “arena,” and (2) the second vote pits “recreation center”
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
“Library” wins the first vote and “library” wins the second vote, so they build a library.
b.
“Library” wins the first vote and “recreation center” wins the second vote, so they build a recreation center.
c.
“arena” wins the first vote and “arena” wins the second vote, so they build an arena.
d.
“arena” wins the first vote and “recreation center” wins the second vote, so they build a recreation center.
45. Refer to Table 22-5. Which of the following statements is correct?
a.
In a pairwise election, “library” beats “arena.”
b.
In a pairwise election, “arena” beats “recreation center.”
c.
In a pairwise election, “library” beats “recreation center.”
d.
All of the above are correct.
46. Refer to Table 22-5. Which of the following statements is correct?
a.
In a pairwise election, “arena” beats “library.”
b.
In a pairwise election, “library” beats “recreation center.”
c.
In a pairwise election, “recreation center” beats “arena.”
d.
All of the above are correct.
47. Refer to Table 22-5. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet paradox and the results of
pairwise voting in Anytown?
a.
The results of pairwise voting depend on the order of the pairs and preferences are transitive.
b.
The results of pairwise voting depend on the order of the pairs, but preferences are not transitive.
c.
The results of pairwise voting do not depend on the order of the pairs, but preferences are transitive.
d.
The results of pairwise voting do not depend on the order of the pairs and preferences are not transitive.
48. Refer to Table 22-5. If the citizens of Anytown use a Borda count, rather than pairwise majority voting, to decide
what to build, then they will build a new
a.
library.
b.
recreation center.
c.
arena.
d.
None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance.
Table 22-6
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
# Voters
40
15
45
First choice
C
B
A
Second choice
B
A
C
Third choice
A
C
B
49. Refer to Table 22–6. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes: A, B, and C. If a
Borda count election were held among these voters, giving three points to each voter’s first choice, two points to the
second choice, and one point to the last choice, which outcome would win the election?
a.
Outcome A
b.
Outcome B
c.
Outcome C
d.
Either outcome A or outcome C since these have the same total score.
50. Refer to Table 22–6. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes: A, B, and C. Which
of the following statements is true?
a.
In pairwise majority voting, B is preferred to A, A is preferred to C, and B is preferred to C.
b.
In pairwise majority voting, C is preferred to B, B is preferred to A, and C is preferred to A.
c.
In pairwise majority voting, B is preferred to A, A is preferred to C, and C is preferred to B.
d.
In pairwise majority voting, A is preferred to C, C is preferred to B, and A is preferred to B.
51. Refer to Table 22–6. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes: A, B, and C. In
pairwise majority voting in which voters choose first between A and B and then choose between the winner of the first
vote and C,
a.
outcome A will win the election.
b.
outcome B will win the election.
c.
outcome C will win the election.
d.
the outcome of the election cannot be determined with the given information.
Table 22-7
Suppose that residents of a town are asked to vote on the best way to improve the safety of an intersection. The three
choices are: a stoplight, a 4-way stop, and a 2-way stop. The voters are divided into three groups based on their
preferences.
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Percent of Electorate
40
40
20
1st Choice
4-way stop
stoplight
2-way stop
2nd Choice
2-way stop
4-way stop
4-way stop
3rd Choice
stoplight
2-way stop
stoplight
52. Refer to Table 22–7. If the first vote pits a stoplight against a 4-way stop and the second vote pits a 2-way stop
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
4-way stop wins the first vote and 4-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 4-way stop.
b.
4-way stop wins the first vote and 2-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 2-way stop.
c.
Stoplight wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a stoplight.
d.
Stoplight wins the first vote and 2–way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 2-way stop.
53. Refer to Table 22–7. If the first vote pits a 2–way stop against a 4-way stop and the second vote pits a stoplight
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
2-way stop wins the first vote and 2-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 2-way stop.
b.
2-way stop wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a stoplight.
c.
4-way stop wins the first vote and 4-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 4-way stop.
d.
4-way stop wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a stoplight.
54. Refer to Table 22–7. If the first vote pits a 2–way stop against a stoplight and the second vote pits a 4-way stop
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows:
a.
2-way stop wins the first vote and 2-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 2-way stop.
b.
2-way stop wins the first vote and 4-way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 4-way stop.
c.
Stoplight wins the first vote and stoplight wins the second vote, so the town installs a stoplight.
d.
Stoplight wins the first vote and 4–way stop wins the second vote, so the town installs a 4-way stop.
55. Refer to Table 22-7. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet paradox and the results of
pairwise voting on how to improve the safety of the intersection?
a.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the voting in the town
fails to produce transitive preferences.
b.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce transitive preferences,
but the voting in the town does produce transitive preferences.
c.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce transitive preferences,
and the voting in the town fails to produce transitive preferences.
d.
The paradox implies that pairwise voting always produces transitive preferences, and so the voting in the town
produces transitive preferences.
56. Refer to Table 22-7. If the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each person’s first choice
receives 3 points, second choice 2 points, and third choice 1 point, the result would be
a.
a 2-way stop.
b.
a 4-way stop.
c.
a stoplight
d.
a tie between a 2-way stop and a stoplight.
57. Refer to Table 22–7. Based on the information in the table, which of the following statements is true?
a.
In a vote between a 2-way stop and a stoplight, stoplight wins because 40% of voters have stoplight as their
1st choice.
b.
In a vote between a 2-way stop and a 4-way stop, the 4-way stop wins getting 80% of the total vote.
c.
In a vote between a 4-way stop and a stoplight, there is a tie because each gets 40% of the vote.
d.
None of the above are true.
Table 22-8
The citizens of Mayville are having a severe budget shortage and are faced with eliminating athletics from the town high
school. The town administrator has determined that the town can afford to maintain one sport. Exactly one of the three
choices will prevail, and the choice will be made by way of pairwise voting, with the majority determining the outcome
on each vote. The preferences of the voters are summarized in the table below.
Voter Type
Type A
Type B
Type C
Percent of Electorate
20
42
38
First choice
Hockey
Football
Basketball
Second choice
Football
Basketball
Hockey
Third choice
Basketball
Hockey
Football
58. Refer to Table 22–8. If the town administrator first asks the citizens to vote for hockey or basketball and then asks
them to choose between the winner of the first vote and football, what will be the outcome?
a.
Hockey will win the first vote and hockey will win the second vote.
b.
Hockey will win the first vote and football will win the second vote.
c.
Basketball will win the first vote and basketball will win the second vote.
d.
Basketball will win the first vote and football will win the second vote.
59. Refer to Table 22–8. The town administrator is a huge basketball fan. If he wants to ensure that basketball is the
winning sport, how should he set up the voting?
a.
First vote: hockey vs. basketball; Second vote: winner of first vote vs. football
b.
First vote: hockey vs. football; Second vote: winner of first vote vs. basketball
c.
First vote: basketball vs. football; Second vote: winner of first vote vs. hockey
d.
It is impossible for basketball to win according to Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
60. Refer to Table 22–8. If a Borda count is used, what will be the outcome of the voting?
a.
Basketball will win.
b.
Football will win.
c.
Hockey will win.
d.
Football and basketball will tie.
Table 22-9
Voter Type
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4