D) earn PG&E $6 per ton and save ConEd $4 per ton.
60. If it costs ConEd approximately $20 per additional ton of air pollution abated, but it costs
PG&E only $10 per additional ton of air pollution abated and a marketable pollution permit
trades for $14 per ton,
A) PG&E could gain by selling and ConEd could gain by buying.
B) PG&E could gain by buying and ConEd could gain by selling.
C) both PG&E and ConEd could gain by buying.
D) both PG&E and ConEd could gain by selling.
61. A system of tradable air pollution permits has the advantage of
A) reducing the total amount of air pollution.
B) eliminating all environmental liability for participating polluters.
C) rewarding efficient abatement effort at the expense of inefficient abatement efforts.
D) ensuring that the goal amount of abatement occurs at the lowest social cost.
62. If it costs ConEd approximately $26 per additional ton of air pollution abated, but it costs
PG&E only $18 per additional ton of air pollution abated, the two companies could both
benefit from trading a marketable pollution permit at any price between
A) $0 per ton and $18 per ton.
B) $0 per ton and $26 per ton.
C) $18 per ton and $26 per ton.
D) $26 per ton and $36 per ton.
63. If it costs ConEd approximately $20 per additional ton of air pollution abated, but it costs
PG&E only $10 per additional ton of air pollution abated and a marketable pollution permit
trades for $14 per ton,
A) PG&E could gain by buying and ConEd could gain by selling.
B) society would gain if PG&E would sell and ConEd would buy.
C) both PG&E and ConEd could gain by buying.
D) both PG&E and ConEd could gain by selling.
64. The Kyoto Protocols were initially
A) approved by the U.S. Senate and signed by President Clinton
B) approved by the U.S. Senate but never signed by President Clinton