Chapter 17 – Asymmetric Information, Voting, and Public Choice
39. Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A
proposed public good has a total cost of $1000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of
this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,
$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. Who are likely to vote in favor of this proposal?
40. Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A
proposed public good has a total cost of $1000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of
this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,
$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. In a majority vote, this proposal will most likely be:
41. Majority voting may produce economically inefficient outcomes because it: