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November 10, 2022
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Subjective Short Answer
1.
Why are the actions
of
firms interdependent
in
an
oligopoly market
but
not
in
a monopolistically
competitive market?
2.
Why are the actions
of
the firms
in
an
ol
igopoly interdependent?
3.
Economists use game theory
to
analyze ____
______.
4.
Why
do
economists use game theory
to
study
the actions
of
firms
in
oligopoly markets
but
not
in
other markets?
5.
As
the number
of
firms
in
an
oligopoly in
dustry increases, the market moves closer
to
a __
________ market.
6.
Compare the equilibrium output
in
a duopoly
to
the monopoly output.
7.
Suppose the market for home-grown
peppers
in
the town
of
Smallville
is
comprised
of
two
farmers. Explain why they
might
try
to
collude.
8.
Suppose the market for home-grown
peppers
in
the town
of
Smallville
is
comprised
of
two
farmers. Suppose the two
farmers
try
to
collude. Explain why
their collusion might
not
be
successful.
price and reduce
each
farmer’s
indivi
dual profits.
Table
17
–
30
Imagine a small town
in
which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own
wells that produce safe drinking water. Each
week
Abby and Brad work
together
to
decide
how
many gallons
of
water
to
pump. They bring water
to
town and sell
it
at
whatever price the market will
bear.
To
keep things
si
mple, suppose
that Abby and Brad
can
pump
as
much water
as
they
want without cost
so
that the marginal
cost
is
zero. The weekly town demand
schedule and total revenue schedule
for
water
is
shown
in
the table below:
Quantity
(in
gallons)
Price
Total Revenue
(and Total Profit)
0
$12
$0
1
$11
$11
2
$10
$20
3
$9
$27
4
$8
$32
5
$7
$35
6
$6
$36
7
$5
$35
8
$4
$32
9
$3
$27
10
$2
$20
11
$1
$11
12
$0
$0
9.
Refer
to
Table
17
-30.
Discuss the difference bet
ween the monopoly outcome and th
e Nash equilibrium.
equilibrium. This problem illu
strates the tension between cooperation
and self-interest.
10.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
30.
Briefly explain why
each
duop
olist earns a lower profit
at
the
Nash
equ
ilibrium than
if
they
cooperated
to
produce
the monopoly output.
higher level
of
output
to
earn higher profits than half
of
the mon
opoly-output profits, total
quantity produced
in
the market in
creases, which lowers market price.
Table
17
–
31
Imagine a small town
in
a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Mig
uel, own dairies that produce milk that
is
safe
to
drink. Each
week
Maria and
Miguel work together
to
decide
how
many gallons
of
milk
to
produce. They bring
milk
to
town and sell
it
at
whatever pr
ice the market will bear.
To
keep
things simple, suppose that Maria and
Miguel
can
produce
as
much milk
as
th
ey want without cost
so
that the margin
al cost
is
zero. The weekly town
demand schedule and
total revenue schedule for milk
is
shown
in
the table below:
Quantity
(in
ga
llons)
Price
Total Revenue
(and Total Profit)
0
$24
$0
1
$22
$22
2
$20
$40
3
$18
$54
4
$16
$64
5
$14
$70
6
$12
$72
7
$10
$70
8
$8
$64
9
$6
$54
10
$4
$40
11
$2
$22
12
$0
$0
11.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
31.
Discuss the difference between the mono
poly outcome and the Nash equilib
rium.
12.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
31.
Briefly explain why
each
duop
olist earns a lower profit
at
the
Nash
equ
ilibrium than
if
they
cooperated
to
produce
the monopoly output.
13.
Define collusion.
14.
If
the members
of
an
oligopoly could agree
on
a total quantity
to
produce and a pr
ice
to
charge, what quantity and
price would they choose?
Will
this cho
ice represent a
Nash
equilibrium?
15.
When a group
of
firms acts
in
unison
to
maximize profits
as
if
they were a monopoly, they form a __________.
16.
Give
an
example
of
a famous cartel.
17.
OPEC (Organization
of
Petroleum Exporting
Countries)
is
an
example
of
a cartel
in
the outp
ut market for petroleum.
Major League Baseball could
be
considered a cartel
in
the __________ market for baseball
players.
18.
To
function
as
a monopoly, OPEC and other
cartels rely
on
__________ among members.
19.
Some people consider the
NCAA
(
National Collegiate Athletic Association
)
to
be
a __________
in
the market for
college athletics.
20.
If
the output effect
is
larger than the price effect,
an
individual
firm
will __________
production.
21.
How does free trade relate
to
the theory
of
oligopoly?
22.
Reaching and enforcing
an
agreement
between members
of
a cartel becomes more difficult
as
th
e size
of
the group
__________.
23.
As
the number
of
firms
in
an
oligopoly in
dustry decreases, the market moves closer
to
a __
________ market.
Table
17
–
32
Suppose that Angelina and
Brad own the only two professional photography
stores
in
town. Each must choose between a
low price and a high price fo
r senior photo packages. The annual econo
mic profit from
each
strategy
is
indicated
in
the
table below:
Angelina
Low price High price
Brad
Low price
Angelina’s
profit = $20,000
Brad’s
profit = $20,000
Angelina’s
profit = $4,000
Brad’s
profit = $23,000
High price
Angelina’s
profit = $25,000
Brad’s
profit = $5,000
Angelina’s
profit = $22,000
Brad’s
profit = $22,000
24.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
32.
Does Angelina have a dominant strategy?
If
so, describe
it.
strategy, $25,000 > $22,
000.
25.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
32.
Does Brad have a dominant strategy?
If
so, describe
it.
pricing strategy, $23,000
> $22,000.
26.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
32.
Is
there a Nash equilibrium?
If
so, descri
be
it.
the low pricing strategy.
Table
17
–
33
Suppose that Robert and
Howard own the only two movie studios
in
California. Each producer must
choose between a
low budget and a high budget
strategy for his next film. The economic prof
it from each strategy
is
indicated
in
the table
below:
Howard
Low budget High budg
et
Low budget
Howard’s
profit = $19,000
Howard’s
profit = $4,000
Robert
Robert’s
profit = $19,000
Robert’s
profit = $24,00
0
High budget
Howard’s
profit = $25,000
Robert’s
profit = $5,000
Howard’s
profit = $21,000
Robert’s
profit = $21,00
0
27.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
33.
Does Howard have a dominant strategy?
If
so, describe
it.
28.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
33.
Does Robert have a dominant strategy?
If
so,
describe
it.
29.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
33.
Is
there a Nash equilibrium?
If
so, descri
be
it.
Table
17
–
34
Suppose that two oil companies
–
BP
and
Exxon
–
own adjacent natural gas fields.
The profits that
each
firm earns
depends
on
both the number
of
wells
it
drills and th
e number
of
wells drilled
by
the other firm. The table belo
w lists
each
firm’s
individual profits:
Exxon
Drill
one
well Drill two wells
BP
Drill
one
well
Exxon’s
profit =
$10
million
BP’s
profit =
$10
million
Exxon’s
profit =
$12
million
BP’s
profit =
$6
million
Drill two wells
Exxon’s
profit =
$6
million
BP’s
profit =
$12
million
Exxon’s
profit =
$8
million
BP’s
profit =
$8
million
30.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
34.
Does Exxon have a dominant strategy?
If
so, describe
it.
31.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
34.
Does
BP
have a dominant strategy?
If
so,
describe
it.
32.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
34.
Is
there a Nash equilibrium?
If
so, descri
be
it.
drills two wells, Exxon cannot
do
any better than drilling two
wells. Thus, the
Nash
Table
17
–
35
Suppose that two coal mining
companies
–
Allied and Barclay
–
own adjacent land
suitable for excavating coal mines.
The profits that
each
firm
e
arns depends
on
both the number
of
mines
it
excavates and
the number
of
mines excavated
by
the other firm. The table belo
w lists
each
firm’s
individual profits:
Allied
Excavate
one
mine Excavate two mines
Barclay
Excavate
one
mine
Allied’s
profit =
$9
million
Barclay’s
profit =
$9
million
Allied’s
profit =
$11
million
Barclay’s
profit =
$6
million
Excavate two
mines
Allied’s
profit =
$6
million
Barclay’s
profit =
$11
million
Allied’s
profit =
$7
million
Barclay’s
profit =
$7
million
33.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
35.
Does Allied have a dominant strategy?
If
so,
describe
it.
34.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
35.
Does Barclay have a dominant strategy
?
If
so, describe
it.
35.
Refer
to
Table
17
–
35.
Is
there a Nash equilibrium?
If
so, descri
be
it.
36.
Cooperation
is
easier
to
achieve
in
________
__.
37.
Which strategy
was
the most success
ful
in
the
prisoners’
dilemma tournament?
38.
How does the
prisoners’
dilemma game apply
to
real-
life
situations?
39.
Antitrust laws tend
to
target restraint
of
trade
as
characterized
by
__________.
40.
Before the __________, agreements between ol
igopolists were unenforceable contracts;
afterwards, such agreements
were criminal conspiracies.
41.
How did the Clayton
Act
of
1914 differ from th
e Sherman Antitrust
Act
of
1890?
42.
The Clayton
Act
of
1914 allowed a person who
successfully sued a company for damages
caused
by
an
illegal
arrangement
to
restrain trade
to
recover __________
damages.
43.
What are the three examples
of
controversial business pr
actices that antitrust laws often prohib
it?
44.
Briefly describe the practice
of
resale price maintenance.
45.
Briefly describe the two arguments th
at economists make
to
defend the pr
actice
of
resale price maintenance.
46.
Which potentially anti-competitive bu
siness practice
is
often justified
on
the ground
s that
it
corrects for the free rider
problem?
47.
Briefly describe the business practice
of
tying.
Scenario
17
-6
Assume that a local telecommunications
company sells high speed internet
access and cable television. The
company’s
only two customers are Taylor
and Tim. Taylor
is
willing
to
pay
$50
per month for high speed internet
access and
$50
per
month for cable television.
Tim
is
willing
to
pay only $20 per month for high speed
internet access,
but
is
willing
to
pay
$70
per month for cable television.
Assume that the telecommunications
company
can
provide
each
of
these
products
at
zero marginal cost.
48.
Refer
to
Scenario
17
-6
.
If
the telecommunications company
is
unable
to
use tying, what
is
the profit
-maximizing
price
to
charge for high
speed internet access?
49.
Refer
to
Scenario
17
-6
.
If
the telecommunications company
is
unable
to
use tying, what
is
the profit
-maximizing
price
to
charge for cable televisio
n?
50.
Refer
to
Scenario
17
-6
.
If
the telecommunications provider
is
able
to
use tying
to
price high speed internet access an
d
cable television, what
is
the profit
-maximizing price
to
charge for the “tied”
good?
51.
Refer
to
Scenario
17
-6
. How much additional
profit
can
the telecommunications
company earn
by
switching
to
the
use
of
a tying strategy
to
price high
speed internet
access
and cable television
rather than pricing these goods separately?
52.
Briefly describe the practice
of
predatory pricing.
53.
Government regulators might suspect a
firm
of
engagin
g
in
predatory pricing
if
it
charges prices that seem
to
be
too
__________.
54.
Which
of
the controversial business practices, res
ale price maintenance, predatory
pricing,
or
tying,
was
a part
of
a
long-running antitrust lawsuit
against Microsoft and why?
55.
Even when allowed
to
collude, firms
in
an
oligopoly
may
choose
to
cheat
on
their agreeme
nts with the rest
of
the
cartel. Why?
56.
What effect does the number
of
firms
in
an
oligopoly have
on
the characteristics
of
the market?
price falls; the market begins
to
resemble a competitive one.
57.
Assume that demand for a product that
is
produced
at
zero marginal cost
is
reflected
in
the table below.
Quantity
Price
0
$36
200
$33
400
$30
600
$27
800
$24
1000
$21
1200
$18
1400
$15
1600
$12
1800
$ 9
2000
$ 6
2200
$ 3
2400
$ 0
a.
What
is
the profit-maximizing level
of
production for a group
of
oligopolistic firms that
operate
as
a cartel?
b.
Assume that this market
is
characterized
by
a duopoly
in
which collusive agreements are
illegal. What market price and
quantity will
be
associated with a Nash equilib
rium?
Q =
1200
b.
Q =
1600,
P =
12
58.
Describe the source
of
tension between cooperatio
n and self-interest
in
a market characterized
by
oligopoly.
Use
an
example
of
an
actual cartel arrangement
to
demonstrate
why this tension creates instability
in
cartels.
and price
of
crude oil.
59.
Describe the output and price effects that in
fluence the profit-maximizing decision
faced
by
a
firm
in
an
oligopoly
market. How does this differ from ou
tput and price effects
in
a monopoly
market?
by
competitors’ production decisions,
or
it
must assume competitors’ production will
not
change
in
response
to
its
own actions.
60.
Explain how the output effect and the pr
ice effect influence the production
decision
of
the individual oligopolist.
61.
Ford and General Motors are considerin
g expanding into the Vietnamese automobile
market. Devise a simple
prisoners’ dilemma game
to
demonstrate the strategic
considerations that are relevant
to
this decision.
(2,
2)
(4,
1)
(1,
4)
(3,
3)
62.
Nike and Reebok (athletic shoe companies) are
considering whether
to
adv
ertise during the Super Bowl. Devise a
simple prisoners’ dilemma game
to
demonstrate the strategic considerations th
at are relevant
to
this decision. Does the
repeated game scenario differ from a sin
gle period game?
Is
it
possible that a repeated game (withou
t collusive
agreements) could lead
to
an
ou
tcome that
is
better than a single-period game? Explain
the circumstances
in
which this
may
be
true.
63.
Outline the purpose
of
antitrust laws. What
do
they accomplish?
64.
Explain the practice
of
resale price maintenance and di
scuss why
it
is
controversial.
65.
Explain the practice
of
tying and discuss why
it
is
contro
versial.