35. Theory of Regulation. On November 21, 1986, The Wall Street Journal (p. 29) carried a short article titled
“It’ll Mean Another Two Semesters in the Red, But Who’s Counting?” This article described efforts by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) to require a fifth (graduate) year of study in
accounting for joining the institute. The following is an excerpt from that article:
“Technical demands have become so great on accountants that they can’t get five pounds of education in a four-pound bag.” explains
James MacNeil, director of the AICPA’s education division. He says the extra year “would help graduates understand such new
complexities as leveraged leases and buyouts and new types of securities being devised by Wall Street.” (Hawaii, Utah and Florida
already require five years of study before taking the CPA exam, and several other states are giving the matter independent
consideration.)
Such arguments, however, have failed to sway many educators. “Most of the deans of the nation’s 650 business schools oppose going to
five years from four,” says Charles Hickman, projects director for the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business, based in
St. Louis. “The big question raised by most deans is whether another roadblock should be raised to becoming a working accountant.”
Some opponents point out that because Florida imposed its five-year rule in 1983, the number of applicants for the CPA exam there has declined
sharply each year. The argue that the new education requirements reflect the regulators being “captured” by the CPA lobby.
Briefly explain:
The causes and consequences of regulation according to the “capture” theory of regulation.
How the preceding article supports this theory.
According to the capture theory of regulation, regulation is imposed by industry, or other politically effective groups, to further the
narrow self-interest of the regulated.
available to certify financial statements, CPA salaries can be expected to rise. Therefore, if a fifth year of accounting study is not
A.
According to The Wall Street Journal (5/12/91, p. B1):
Lewis Kaplow, an antitrust-law specialist and Harvard Law School professor, says such activity would be illegal if the parties involved
agreeing to exchange information to arrive at more informed independent judgments, the activity wouldn’t be illegal.
“If, in the end, [two schools] might have a different substantive view, that wouldn’t be a problem,” Mr. Kaplow says. “If, on the other
hand, they had some strong tendency to make the same offer, that would sound close to an agreement on price and be something that is
The schools say they are not fixing prices, but just giving one another the option to agree on a family-contribution number. “There’s no
collusion,” says Alfred Quirk, Dartmouth’s dean of admissions. Adds Harvard’s Mr. Miller: “The purpose of this is the exchange of