Table 12.16
(Table 12.16) In the table, the payoffs represent profits measured in thousands of
dollars. Suppose that Firm A and Firm B are playing an infinitely repeated game. In
period 6, Firm B decides to no longer cooperate with Firm A. If Firm A is using a grim
trigger strategy, Firm A will choose:
A) a low price in period 7 and all future periods.
B) a low price in period 7 and a high price in all future periods.
C) to set price below marginal cost and drive Firm B out of the market.
D) to maintain a high price in all future periods.
Two boxers, Brutus and Floyd, are training to fight each other. Each boxer is
considering whether to take steroids to improve his chance of winning the fight.
Assume that the boxing association does not have a policy against steroid use. If both
boxers take steroids, neither has an advantage and the payoffs (net of health costs) are
$3 million per boxer. If both boxers don’t take steroids, the payoffs are $4 million per
boxer. If one boxer takes steroids and the other doesn’t, the boxer taking the steroids
receives a payoff of $6 million (net of health costs) and the other boxer receives a
$1-million payoff.
a. Represent the preceding information in a normal form game.
b. What is the Nash equilibrium?
c. Would the boxers be better off if the boxing association banned steroids and tested
each boxer for steroids prior to a fight?