1) Table 17-27
Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading
status with Farland (a mythical nation). Historically, legislators have made threats of
not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal
of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The
payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which
Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not
renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow
benefits to the United States and Farland.
Refer to Table 17-27. When this game reaches a Nash equilibrium, the value of trade
flow benefits will be
a.United States $35 b and Farland $285 b.
b.United States $65 b and Farland $75 b.
c.United States $140 b and Farland $5 b.
d.United States $130 b and Farland $275 b.
2) Assume for Guatemala that the domestic price of coffee without international trade is
higher than the world price of coffee. This suggests that
a.Guatemala has a comparative advantage over other countries in the production of
coffee, and Guatemala will export coffee.
b.Guatemala has a comparative advantage over other countries in the production of
coffee, and Guatemala will import coffee.
c.other countries have a comparative advantage over Guatemala in the production of
coffee, and Guatemala will export coffee.
d.other countries have a comparative advantage over Guatemala in the production of
coffee, and Guatemala will import coffee.