Figure 14-9
Uniguest, Inc. is a company that provides PCs with internet access and touch-sensitive
screens to hotels. Suppose the Hard Rock Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas informs
Uniguest that it is considering installing these systems in its hotel rooms. The Hard
Rock expects to be able to charge higher prices for these rooms if it installs Uniguest’s
systems in its rooms. The two companies begin bargaining over what price the Hard
Rock will pay Uniguest for its systems, and the decision tree shown above illustrates
this bargaining game. Note that the profit figures listed in the decision tree are
additional profits for the Hard Rock and total profits for Uniguest.
a. Suppose the Hard Rock offers Uniguest $1,200 per system. Will Uniguest accept or
reject this offer? Why?
b. Suppose the Hard Rock offers Uniguest $800 per system. Will Uniguest accept or
reject this offer? Why?
c. Suppose Uniguest attempts to obtain a favorable outcome from the bargaining by
telling the Hard Rock it will reject an $800-per-system offer. If the Hard Rock does not
believe the threat is credible, what will it do? Why? What will Uniguest do? Why?
d. Is there a sub-game perfect equilibrium in this situation? Explain.