Figure 14-2
The
government of a developing country plans to award two firms, Gigacom and
Xenophone, the exclusive rights to share the market for high speed Internet service.
Gigacom and Xenophone can both provide the service either via television cable lines
or via direct subscriber line (dbl). Suppose the government is considering a proposal to
delay one firm’s entry into the market on the grounds that it wants to prevent “harmful”
competition. Figure 14-2 shows the decision tree for this game.
If the government delays Gigacom’s entry and Xenophone moves first, what is the
likely outcome in the market?
A) Both offer Internet service via cable line; Xenophone earns a profit of $6 million,
and Gigacom earns a profit of $9 million.
B) Both offer DSL Internet service; Xenophone earns a profit of $8 million, and
Gigacom earns a profit of $7 million.
C) Xenophone offers DSL Internet service and earns a profit of $5 million, while
Gigacom offer Internet service via cable line and earns a profit of $6.5 million.
D) Xenophone offers Internet service via cable line and earns a profit of $4 million,
while Gigacom offers DSL Internet service and earns a profit of $4.5 million.
Consumers are willing to purchase a product up to the point where